Summary
noting that a stipulation of probable cause ordinarily requires the court to grant judgment on the pleadings on a § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim
Summary of this case from Jenkins v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov'tOpinion
05 Civ. 9343 (LBS).
July 10, 2006
Memorandum and Order
Plaintiff Carlos Canario brings suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and Detective Giselle Moyano (collectively "Defendants"), claiming false arrest and malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff also brings a cause of action for negligence under New York state law. Defendants here bring a motion for judgment on the pleadings, per Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff also brings a motion to amend the Complaint to add a new negligence claim.
I. Background
On January 24, 2005, Maggie Runyan, the Principal of the school Canario's son attends, telephoned the police to report that both she and the child's mother, Wendy Minaya, saw Canario approach his son in violation of an Order of Protection. (Answer Ex. C.) On February 13, 2005, Detective Moyano spoke with Minaya. Minaya both confirmed that she had seen Canario at her son's school and stated that an Order of Protection restricting such visits had been on file at the school since September. (Answer Ex. I.) On February 17, 2005, Detective Moyano checked the New York City Police Department database (known as "FINEST Message") to verify that there was an active Order of Protection limiting Canario's access to his son. (Answer Ex. E.) The FINEST Message revealed that such an Order, requiring Canario to "stay away" from his son's person, home, school, and place of employment, had been served on January 4, 2005, and would not expire until January 4, 2010. (Id.) On February 18, 2005, Detective Moyano conducted a telephone interview of Runyan and confirmed that Runyan had seen Canario approach his son at the school in January and that Runyan called the police because she understood such contact to be in violation of an Order of Protection. (Answer Ex. K.)
On March 2, 2005, Detective Moyano arrested Canario for Criminal Contempt in the Second Degree: Failure to Obey a Court Order. (Compl. ¶ 10; Answer Ex. B.) According to the Complaint, Canario told Detective Moyano at the time of his arrest that he had not been served with the Order of Protection before his visit to the school and that he had been unaware of the Order at that time. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Indeed, in his Complaint, Canario alleges that he was not served with the Order until January 25, 2005, a day after the school visit, and in his signed statement made upon arrest, Canario stated: "When I went to see my son Rasheed Canario I was not aware the Court Order was in affect [sic]. . . . I received the Court Order in January, not sure of date." (Answer Exs. F, L.) Canario was released on March 7, 2005. On March 30, 2005, all criminal charges against Canario were dismissed on motion of the District Attorney. (Compl. ¶ 14.)
The Complaint alleges that Canario was continuously incarcerated from March 2, 2005 until March 30, 2005. In both Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and at oral argument on this motion, however, Canario clarified that he was actually incarcerated only through March 7, 2005.
II. Legal Standard
The Court evaluates a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) under the same standard it applies to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Bishop v. Toys "R" Us-NY LLC, 414 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Taking all well-pleaded facts in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, the Court can dismiss the Complaint only when "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle him to relief." Staron v. McDonald's Corp., 51 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
In addition, as in the case of a 12(b)(6) motion, if the Court considers matters outside the pleadings, the Court can convert the motion to one for summary judgment, but must give all parties "reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). However, materials attached to the Complaint or Answer are part of the pleadings and may be considered by the Court without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.").
III. Discussion
A. Municipal Liability of the City of New York
The motion for judgment on the pleadings regarding Canario's § 1983-based claims against the City of New York is granted. A party attempting to hold a municipality liable as a person under § 1983 must first plead "the existence of a municipal policy or custom in order to show that the municipality took some action that caused his injuries." Vippolis v. Vill. of Haverstraw, 768 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1985). Such a policy or custom may be (i) the municipality's official policy, see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); (ii) a decision or action taken by an official or officials responsible for establishing policy with respect to the subject matter in question, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986) (plurality opinion); (iii) an uncodified practice "so permanent and well settled" as to imply the constructive acquiescence of policymaking officials, Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970); or (iv) in certain circumstances, a policy of inadequate training or supervision, see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386-88 (1989).
Canario has not identified any municipal policy or custom as being involved in the events here at issue. The motion for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983-based claims against the City of New York is thus granted.
B. Liability of Detective Moyano
Having granted Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983-based claims against the City of New York, the Court now turns to the claims asserted against Detective Moyano. The Court notes that at the June 1, 2006 oral argument on this motion, the parties stipulated that Detective Moyano had probable cause to arrest Canario. Because under New York law neither false arrest nor malicious prosecution claims can succeed where there has been a finding of probable cause, ordinarily this stipulation would require the Court to grant Detective Moyano's motion for judgment on the pleadings on the § 1983-based claims. Here, however, Canario contends that Detective Moyano fabricated a confession and distributed it to the prosecutor. It is well-settled in this Circuit that if a law enforcement officer fabricates "information likely to influence a jury's decision and forwards that information to prosecutors, he violates the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial, and the harm occasioned by such an unconscionable action is redressable in an action for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 1997). In this way, if Canario has alleged facts to support the fabrication claim, the Court is required to deny Detective Moyano's request for qualified immunity and allow the claim to proceed. See id. (holding that where a law enforcement officer fabricates material evidence, "[q]ualified immunity is unavailable . . . [because] the action violates an accused's clearly established constitutional rights, and no reasonably competent police officer could believe otherwise") (citation omitted). Here, however, accepting all of Canario's factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, there is no evidence that Detective Moyano fabricated evidence.
Detective Moyano arrested Canario pursuant to a statute requiring "[ i] ntentional disobedience or resistance to the lawful process or other mandate of a court." N.Y. Penal Law § 215.50(3) (McKinney 2006) (emphasis added). Canario maintains that Detective Moyano fabricated evidence of intent in two instances. The first is a sworn statement Detective Moyano made in the Criminal Court Complaint, dated March 2, 2005:
that defendant is aware of the order of protection in that defendant stated in substance in deponent's presence, THE ORDER OF PROTECTION WAS SERVED ON ME IN MY APARTMENT BY OFFICERS FROM THE 34TH PRECINCT SOMETIME IN JANUARY.
(Zucker Decl. Ex. D.) There is nothing false about this statement. The alleged violation of the Order of Protection occurred on January 24. According to the Complaint, Canario was not served with the Order of Protection until January 25 and was arrested on March 2. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12.) Thus, when the cited statement was taken on March 2, Canario was aware of the Order of Protection; the statement is in present tense, conveying that at the time of the March 2 arrest and interview — not at the time of the violation — Canario was aware of the Order. Furthermore, consistent with the Complaint, the cited statement indicates that Canario was served "sometime in January." This statement never says that Canario had been aware of the Order of Protection at the time of the alleged violation. Thus, accepting Canario's version of the events as true, this statement cannot support a charge of fabricating a confession because it contains nothing false or misleading.
Indeed, the typed statement Detective Moyano signed and submitted on March 2 makes clear that Canario stated he was not aware of any Order of Protection when he visited his son at school in January. See Answer Ex. L.
The second statement Canario cites as evidence that Detective Moyano fabricated a confession was a statement read into the record by the District Attorney at Canario's arraignment:
Ms. Troy: In addition I have statement notice. On March 2, 2005 at approximately 840 hours inside 556 East 108th Street to Detective Wayano (ph) the defendant said in substance, the Order of Protection was served on me in the apartment.
And then at 1200 hours at the 26th Precinct also to Detective Wayano (ph) the defendant said, I went to see my son. I was aware the Court Order was in effect. We did approach. I wanted to see my son. I hadn't seen my son since August. I didn't mean any harm. I received the Court Order in January. I'm not sure of the date.
(Zucker Decl. Ex. F.) The District Attorney stated that she was using the hearing as an opportunity to "fil[e] with the Court a family registry form and filing and serving the defendant's written statement as well as the Miranda waiver card and a copy of the underlying Order of Protection." (Id.) It is thus clear that the D.A. was reading from Canario's handwritten statement and was giving Canario's counsel notice of the existence of the statement and its contents. Canario's handwritten statement in fact says:
When I went to see my son my Rasheed Canario I was not aware the Court Order was in affect [sic]. I saw Wendy Minaya from a distance but did not approach. I just wanted to see my son. I hadn't seen my son since August. I didn't mean any harm. I received the Court Order in January, not sure of date.
(Answer Ex. F.)
The only reasonable inference from the absence of the word "not" in the transcript of the arraignment is that either the District Attorney misread Canario's handwritten statement, or the Court Reporter misheard her or mistakenly omitted the word. There is absolutely no evidence that Detective Moyano gave the District Attorney a version of the confession which said that Canario had been aware of the Order of Protection when he went to the school. In fact, Detective Moyano submitted another report on March 2 which accurately transcribed the handwritten statement, specifically stating that Canario claimed he had not been aware the Order of Protection was in effect at the time of the school visit. See Answer Ex. L. This accurate statement was the basis for Canario's release. See Answer Ex. G. Because there is no evidence Detective Moyano ever created or transferred to the District Attorney any fabricated confession, the motion for judgment on the pleadings on all § 1983-based claims against Detective Moyano is granted.
IV. Conclusion
Having resolved all the federal claims in Defendants' favor, this Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Canario's cause of action for negligence. In addition, because Canario's motion to amend the Complaint involves a state law claim as well, the Court finds that motion properly left for the state court. In sum, the motion for judgment on the pleadings on all federal claims is granted, and the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over all remaining claims and motions.
SO ORDERED.