Opinion
2003-00778.
Decided January 20, 2004.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendants Huntington Coach Corporation and Claude DeFay appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Jones, J.), entered January 9, 2003, as denied their motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, and the defendant Finley Middle School, Huntington Union Free School District No. 3, cross-appeals from so much of the same order as denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it.
Curtis, Vasile, Devine McElhenny, Merrick, N.Y. (Brian W. McElhenny and Michael J. Dorry of counsel), for defendants-appellants-respondents.
Donohue, McGahan Catalano, Jericho, N.Y. (Jonathan Rexford Ames of counsel), for defendant-respondent-appellant.
Sanders, Sanders, Block Woycik, P.C., Mineola, N.Y. (Melissa Ingrassia, Mark R. Bernstein, and Martin Block of counsel), for respondents.
Before: DANIEL F. LUCIANO and REINALDO E. RIVERA, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed and cross-appealed from, on the law, the motion of the defendants Huntington Coach Corporation and Claude DeFay, and the motion of the defendant Finley Middle School, Huntington Union Free School District No. 3, are granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellants-respondents and the respondent-appellant, all cross claims insofar as asserted against the respondent-appellant are dismissed, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the appellants-respondents and the respondent-appellant.
Finley Middle School, Huntington Union Free School District No. 3 (hereinafter the school district), established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that the sudden and unforeseen act which caused the infant plaintiff's injuries could not have been prevented by any reasonable degree of supervision. In response, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Velez v. Freeport Union Free School Dist., 292 A.D.2d 595; Nossoughi v. Ramapo Cent. School Dist., 287 A.D.2d 444; Janukajtis v. Fallon, 284 A.D.2d 428, 430; Convey v. City of Rye School Dist., 271 A.D.2d 154, 160). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the school district's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims insofar as asserted against it ( see Francisquini v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 305 A.D.2d 455; Morman v. Ossining Union Free School Dist., 297 A.D.2d 788).
Moreover, the Supreme Court should have granted the motion of the bus company, the defendant Huntington Coach Corporation, and the bus driver, the defendant Claude DeFay, since in response to their demonstration of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the plaintiffs failed to submit sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether their alleged negligence was a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff's injuries ( see Derdiarian v. Felix Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 308; Nocilla v. Middle Country Cent. School Dist., 302 A.D.2d 573; Thomas v. United States Soccer Fedn., 236 A.D.2d 600).
FLORIO, J.P., SMITH, LUCIANO and RIVERA, JJ., concur.