"In the absence of an express statute, a demand of a defendant, whether pleaded by way of set-off, counterclaim, or cross bill, is regarded as an affirmative action, and therefore, unlike a matter of pure defense, is subject to the operation of the statute of limitations, and is unavailable if barred." The cases of Rubin v. Lucerne Aurelia Crown R. Co., 87 Wn. 198, 151 P. 500, and Canadian Bank of Commerce v. Sampson, 145 Wn. 245, 259 P. 710, are to the same effect. The cases of State ex rel. American Freehold-Land Mtg. Co. v. Tanner, 45 Wn. 348, 88 P. 321, and Buck v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 96 Wn. 683, 165 P. 878, are different, in that in each of these cases the matter pleaded was strictly in defense and not by way of counterclaim or set-off, and arose out of the transaction upon which the action was based.

A written statement may be libelous although it does not contain an imputation of an offense that may be punishable as a crime. 33 Am.Jur., Libel and Slander, Sec. 45, p. 65; Hetherington v. Sterry, 28 Kan. 426, 42 Am.Rep. 169; Knapp v. Green, 123 Kan. 550, 124 Kan. 266, 256 P. 153, 259 P. 710., 55 A.L.R. 850. It is apposite to note that a statement may be actionable as libelous when written or printed and yet not be so taken when spoken.