Opinion
Civil No. 01-1542 (JAG/GAG).
October 28, 2005
ORDER
Before the Court is plaintiff Reyes Cañada's Motion for Reconsideration of Order (Docket No. 742), wherein he asks the Court to vacate the sanction of dismissal entered against him. He has also filed a Supplemental Motion thereto (Docket No. 746). The defendants have duly opposed said motions (see Docket Nos. 747, 749 and 751).
Plaintiff argues that, because the Court has now determined that his violation of the order prohibiting mention of the Pillich-Rey complaint is not grounds for a mistrial, his dismissal should be vacated, and a lesser sanction imposed upon him. This way, he argues, he will have his day in Court after nearly five years of waiting for the same.
Although the Court agrees that the sanction of dismissal against plaintiff is indeed harsh, it nonetheless finds itself compelled to uphold the same. In doing so, the Court reincorporates its findings and conclusions contained in its October 18, 2005 order sanctioning plaintiff (Docket No. 696), 2005 WL 2660393 (D.P.R.).
From the Court's perspective, the issue is not whether plaintiff's statement before the jury affected the ultimate outcome of the trial. The Court understands it did not, as explained in a separate order (Docket No. 754). The issue is whether the Court can condone an extremely flagrant violation of various orders specifically precluding all parties from mentioning a given matter before the jury. More so, the parties had been forewarned that the Court would respond to any violation of said orders in a most severe manner. This is a matter wholly independent of that of the mistrial. Even if, upon due consideration, the Court at a later stage of trial admits evidence of the Pillich-Rey lawsuit, plaintiff's violation of an express order would still lie.
The Court further disagrees with plaintiff's characterization that he has not had his day in Court. He in fact had it twice, first at the original trial, and second, when he was called to testify in this retrial. Because of plaintiff's violation of the Court's order, the trial was disrupted. The Court, in turn, recessed for the day in which plaintiff would have continued to testify, in order to determine the course of action it would take on the matter. To now allow plaintiff to continue his case would amount to giving him a free extra day in court, something not given to other litigants. Cf. Reyes Cañada v. Rey Hernández, 326 F. Supp. 2d 255, 256 (D.P.R. 2004) (holding that defendants in this case were not entitled to reopen six hour long evidentiary hearing for submission of additional evidence, after court had already issued an adverse ruling).
The Court cannot, at this time, consider imposing upon plaintiff a lesser sanction in lieu of dismissal. Even if in fact plaintiff himself ignored the Court's orders, this constitutes no excuse for his violation thereof. A fine, as plaintiff suggests, would only constitute a mere slap on the wrist.
Accordingly, the Court reaffirms its ruling ordering the dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The dismissal of both his federal and state law claims shall be without prejudice.See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Nonetheless, as a sanction, plaintiff may not refile his claims in federal court, as he already had his day in this forum.
Had instead any of the defendants violated the preclusive order at issue, or any other similar order precluding the mentioning of evidence to the jury (i.e., the DE-16 order), the Court, as a sanction of equal magnitude, would have stricken his/her allegations and entered default.
The Court will in due course, instruct the jury on this matter. Neither the parties nor counsel shall make any mention whatsoever of plaintiff's dismissal to the jury. Failure to comply with this order will result in severe sanctions.
SO ORDERED.