Opinion
09-cr-119 (ARR) 18-cv-5824 (ARR)
03-23-2020
DESMOND CAMPBELL, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
Not for print or electronic publication
Opinion & Order
ROSS, United States District Judge:
On January 29, 2019, I entered an order denying Desmond Campbell's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Op. & Order, Jan. 29, 2019, ECF No. 620. Almost one year later, Campbell filed a pro se motion for relief from that order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See Mot. to Vacate J., ECF No. 623. On January 29, 2020, I denied Campbell's Rule 60(b) motion. See Op. & Order, Jan. 29, 2020, ECF No. 624 ("Jan. 2020 O&O"). Campbell, again proceeding pro se, now moves for reconsideration of my denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. See Mot. for Recons., ECF No. 625.
Campbell does not specify under which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure he brings the instant motion. Because he filed the instant motion more than twenty-eight days after my denial of his Rule 60(b) motion, I cannot consider the instant motion under Rule 59(e). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Mot. for Recons. 4 (dating instant motion as signed, and likely mailed, on March 10, 2020). Thus, I consider it under Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
Rule 60(b) sets forth grounds for "reliev[ing] a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). I should grant such relief "only in extraordinary circumstances." Aczel v. Labonia, 584 F.3d 52, 61 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988)). Campbell asks that I relieve him from my order denying his Rule 60(b) motion, citing as grounds for relief that I "misconstrued a critical aspect of law" and that I am "in a position to prevent a manifest injustice[.]" Mot. for Recons. 1-2. Campbell then revisits the same arguments that he raised in his Rule 60(b) motion—namely, that (1) he was not competent to plead guilty or undergo criminal prosecution; (2) his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately address his lack of competence; and (3) he received deficient assistance from a "jailhouse lawyer." See Jan. 2020 O&O at 4-6; Mot. for Recons. 2-3. Campbell has presented no compelling reason for me to grant him relief from my decision on his Rule 60(b) motion.
Thus, the instant motion is denied. I reiterate that because of the statutory restrictions on second or successive § 2255 petitions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), I cannot provide Campbell with any further consideration of his claims. For such further consideration, Campbell must make an application to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED. Dated: March 23, 2020
Brooklyn, NY
/s/_________
Allyne R. Ross
United States District Judge