That means that district courts must press difficult, hesitant, or ambivalent defendants to answer yes or no whether they wish to waive the right to counsel. See United States v. Campbell , 659 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing importance of unequivocal demand and rationale for requirement), vacated on other grounds, 568 U.S. 802, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012). Turning to the facts here, seven days after the mistrial was declared in the Indianapolis trial, Grundy moved to represent himself.
See also United States v. Campbell , 659 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, sub. nom. Campbell v. United States , 568 U.S. 802, ––– S.Ct. ––––, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012) (describing the rationales for requiring that the demand to proceed pro se be unequivocal). Cross's purported request to proceed pro se does not meet this standard.
See Faretta , 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Courts have required an unequivocal assertion of the right to self-representation in order to prevent a defendant from using an ambiguous waiver of the right to counsel as a tool to overturn his or her conviction. See United States v. Campbell , 659 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, sub. nom. Campbell v. United States, 568 U.S. 802, ––– S.Ct. ––––, 184 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012). Moreover, a request to proceed pro se must be made in a timely fashion.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court granted Campbell's petition for a writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to this court for reconsideration in light of its decision in Dorsey. Campbell v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 190 (2012). Campbell on remand now argues that we should reconsider our decision as to his conviction as well as his sentence, because the certiorari petition challenged both and was granted, thus remanding the case in its entirety.
“Courts have required an unequivocal assertion of the right to self- representation in order to prevent a defendant from using an ambiguous waiver of the right to counsel as a tool to overturn his or her conviction.” Id. (citing United States v. Campbell, 659 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, sub nom., Campbell v. United States, 568 U.S. 802 (2012)). Second, a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel must do so in a timely fashion.