Child support is always modifiable upon proper showing of a change in either the child's needs or the supporting parents financial ability. Cason v. Cason, 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673 (1978); Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977). The amount awarded is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 264 S.C. 624, 216 S.E.2d 541 (1975).
A decree of support may be increased, decreased or terminated due to a change in circumstances pursuant to § 20-3-160, Code of Laws of S.C. (1976). Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977). We conclude there is ample authority for the proposition that the family court has subject matter jurisdiction under URESA to increase the amount of support granted in an out-of-state decree.
Given the limited record before us, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in increasing the award to $700 monthly. See also Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977) (where a child gets older and becomes a teenager, the child has additional needs). We further note there is no competent evidence of the amount of support indicated by the guidelines.
Mrs. Nicholson testified to an increase in expenses for Charles' food, clothes, school and social activities. See Campbell v.McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977) and Fender v. Fender, 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971). Further, § 20-7-40 of the South Carolina Code of Laws (1981) provides as follows:
The trial court has authority to increase, decrease or terminate, upon a proper showing of a change of conditions, the support payments provided for in a judgment of divorce. Cason v. Cason, 271 S.C. 393, 247 S.E.2d 673 (1978); Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977); Smith v. Smith, 262 S.C. 291, 204 S.E.2d 53 (1974). By providing for an automatic increase in child support, the lower court has arbitrarily increased the amount of support without a showing of a change of conditions.
The fact of inflation can scarcely be used, then, as a justification for reducing child support obligations particularly when, as here, the parent's income has increased more than nominally since the last child support order. SeeSpires v. Higgins, 271 S.C. 530, 248 S.E.2d 488 (1978); cf.Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 279 S.E.2d 616 (1981); Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977); Fender v. Fender, 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971). The trial judge found that Nelson's remarriage and move to Richmond constituted a changed adverse circumstance for Merritt because the move, necessitated by her remarriage, resulted in increased visitation costs and higher private school tuitions.
The fact of inflation can scarcely be used, then, as a justification for reducing child support obligations particularly when, as here, the parent's income has increased more than nominally since the last child support order. SeeSpires v. Higgins, 271 S.C. 530, 248 S.E.2d 488 (1978); cf.Stevenson v. Stevenson, 276 S.C. 475, 279 S.E.2d 616 (1981); Campbell v. McPherson, 268 S.C. 444, 234 S.E.2d 774 (1977); Fender v. Fender, 256 S.C. 399, 182 S.E.2d 755 (1971). The trial judge found that Nelson's remarriage and move to Richmond constituted a changed adverse circumstance for Merritt because the move, necessitated by her remarriage, resulted in increased visitation costs and higher private school tuitions.