We are cognizant that our courts have liberally construed the right of indigent parties to litigate their rights in court without providing security for costs. Campbell v. Lee, 12 Tenn. App. 293, 296-97 (1930). Still, possessory bonds serve a separate purpose from cost bonds, and our courts have never excused an indigent litigant from providing security for a possessory bond.

The fact that Ms. Pelt is indigent does not change our analysis. We are cognizant that our courts have liberally construed the right of indigent parties to litigate their rights in court without providing security for costs. Campbell v. Lee, 12 Tenn. App. 293, 296–97 (1930). Still, possessory bonds serve a separate purpose from cost bonds, and our courts have never excused an indigent litigant from providing security for a possessory bond. SeeScott v. Brandon, 125 Tenn. 314, 143 S.W. 601, 602 (1911) (distinguishing between the use of a pauper's oath for a cost bond and a possessory bond in a replevin action); Crye–Leike Prop. Mgmt. v. Dalton, No. W2015-02437-COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4771769, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2016) (holding that indigent tenant had met the requirement to provide security for costs with pauper's oath but affirming dismissal of appeal when tenant retained possession without posting a possesory bond).

" To the same effect, see Campbell v. Lee, 12 Tenn. App. 293, 296, 297. In the present case it appears without dispute that petitioner A.D. Hewell was unable to get any solvent person to sign the bond required of him.

The power to inquire into the truthfulness of the pauper's oath unquestionably belongs to the trial court and it must be invoked therein or the appeal will be treated as having been regularly taken. Tennessee Procedure by Higgins Crownover, sec. 1837; Campbell v. Lee, 12 Tenn. App. 293; State, to Use of Fletcher, v. Gannaway, 84 Tenn. 124, 16 Lea, 124. 2.