State ex rel. Standard Oil Company v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1951), 230 Ind. 1, 101 N.E.2d 60; Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace (1939), 216 Ind. 114, 23 N.E.2d 472. In other words, `a legislative body may enact a law, the operation of which depends upon the existence of a stipulated condition, and . . . it may delegate to a ministerial agency power to determine whether the condition exists.' Campbell v. Heiss (1944), 222 Ind. 297, 302, 53 N.E.2d 634, 636. A planning commission's review of a subdivision plan to determine if the plan is in compliance with the applicable statutes and ordinances is a form of exercising delegated authority to make factual determinations within the guidelines established by a legislative body. "We reiterate that the Ordinance involved here does not give the [Plan] Commission unguided discretion to determine what conditions are adverse to the health, safety, and general welfare of the community.
Appellant has cited no authorities for his position which is without merit. As stated in Campbell v. Heiss (1944), 222 Ind. 297, 302, 53 N.E.2d 634, 636: ". . . It is well settled that a legislative body may enact a law, the operation of which depends upon the existence of a stipulated condition, and that it may delegate to a ministerial agency power to determine whether the condition exists."
Due process of law does not require a hearing prior to the taking effect of rates filed under the provisions of said § 47-1227, Burns' 1940 Replacement where no objection has 7. been filed and no action has been taken thereon by the Public Service Commission, within the ten day period as prescribed in paragraph (c) of said section. Campbell v. Heiss (1944), 222 Ind. 297, 301, 53 N.E.2d 634; Clift v. Southern R. Co. (1919), 188 Ind. 472, 124 N.E. 457; Crane v. Hahlo (1922), 258 U.S. 142, 147, 42 S.Ct. 214, 66 L.Ed. 514, 517; Home Teleph. Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles (1908), 211 U.S. 265, 29 S.Ct. 50, 53 L.Ed. 176; Phillips v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1931), 283 U.S. 589, 51 S. Ct. 608, 75 L.Ed. 1289; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin (1932), 287 U.S. 156, 53 S.Ct. 98, 77 L.Ed. 231.
Schaffer v. Leimberg, supra. See also Brown v. DeConcini, 60 Ariz. 476, 140 P.2d 224; Miller v. Municipal Court of City of Los Angeles, supra; Lapinski v. Copacino, supra; Regan v. Kroger Grocery Baking Co., supra; Campbell v. Heiss, 222 Ind. 297, 53 N.E.2d 634; Desper v. Warner Holding Co., supra; Carmelly v. Hanson, 133 N.J.L. 180, 43 A.2d 685; Wutkowski v. Palutes, 131 N.J.L. 441, 37 A.2d 29; Beasley v. Gottlieb, 131 N.J.L. 117, 35 A.2d 49; Egling v. Lombardo, supra. Contra, Robinson v. Norato, R.I., 43 A.2d 467.
In other words, "a legislative body may enact a law, the operation of which depends upon the exercise of a stipulated condition, and . . . it may delegate to a ministerial agency the power to determine whether the condition exists." Id. (quoting Campbell v. Heiss, 222 Ind. 297, 53 N.E.2d 634, 636 (1944)). The Area Plan Commission's review of the development requirements in the Ordinance, Ch. 52.04(A)(3) is not a mere ministerial act, but rather is vested with the discretionary power typically reserved to the County Commissioners by the legislature.
In other words, "a legislative body may enact a law, the operation of which depends upon the existence of a stipulated condition, and . . . it may delegate to a ministerial agency power to determine whether the condition exists." Campbell v. Heiss (1944), 222 Ind. 297, 302, 53 N.E.2d 634, 636. A planning commission's review of a subdivision plan to determine if the plan is in compliance with the applicable statutes and ordinances is a form of exercising delegated authority to make factual determinations within the guidelines established by a legislative body. We reiterate that the Ordinance involved here does not give the Commission unguided discretion to determine what conditions are adverse to the health, safety, and general welfare of the community.
Such ministerial functions can be delegated. Campbell v. Heiss (1944), 222 Ind. 297, 53 N.E.2d 634. The review board does not have the discretion to decide who is to be promoted.