Defendant next argues that the verdict of the jury was excessive and was based on passion and prejudice. In support of such argument, defendant cites Parnham v. Carl W. Linder Co., 36 Ill. App.2d 224, 183 N.E.2d 744, and Campbell v. Chesapeake Ohio R. Co., 36 Ill. App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736, in which verdicts of $60,000 were approved where the plaintiff lost the sight of one eye. It should be observed that in Campbell v. Chesapeake Ohio R. Co., supra, no claim was made that the amount of the verdict was excessive. Plaintiff was forty-two years of age at the time of the incident, had a life expectancy of 31.6 years.
• 7 Plaintiffs claim that the defendant has waived any claim that the jury instructions with regard to damages were erroneous because he does not argue on appeal that the verdict is excessive. (See Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Roach (1899), 180 Ill. 174, 54 N.E. 212; Campbell v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry. Co. (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736.) Campbell and Roach do indicate that errors in damages instructions will not be considered on appeal where there is no claim that the damages are excessive, but defendant here does suggest that the damages are excessive and we think that the prejudice to the defendant in including the above elements of damage as a measure of restitution is obvious. • 8 We do agree with plaintiffs that the defendant has waived the argument that the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of rescission. Plaintiffs' instruction on this issue told the jury that they could grant rescission if they found: (1) plaintiff had a right to expect to receive that for which they bargained; and (2) plaintiffs had bargained for a house reasonably fit for its intended use, not a house with defects plus damages.
In support of this theory, the railroad refers us to authorities in which such evidence was introduced against the defendant railroad. Crabtree v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 35, 411 N.E.2d 19; Campbell v. Chesapeake Ohio Ry. Co. (1962), 36 Ill. App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736; Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 618 (1955). The rationale for admitting the customs and rules of other railroads against a defendant railroad is, however, entirely absent when that evidence is sought to be introduced against a plaintiff employee.
The duty to provide a reasonably safe place to work includes more than physical terrain free from defects. It also includes the conditions of work and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. Campbell v. Chesapeake O. Ry. Co., 36 Ill. App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736 and Goodwin v. Wabash R. Co., 33 Ill. App.2d 349, 179 N.E.2d 430. [3] The evidence regarding the employer's negligence is not only substantial but is also substantially undisputed.
' See also Dennis v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 375 U.S. 208, 84 S.Ct. 291, 11 L.Ed.2d 256; Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208; Page v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 5 Cir., 312 F.2d 84; and Campbell v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 36 Ill.App.2d 276, 183 N.E.2d 736. There are also numerous opinions, some of them by Texas courts, in which it is held that the Federal Statute is controlling over the common-law or statute of a state.