Opinion
Cause No. IP 00-1443-C-B/S.
November 7, 2001
ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Shawn Campbell alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution through the use of excessive force following an arrest. Defendants have moved for summary judgment, arguing that Campbell cannot maintain federal claims against the City of Elwood, and that Brizendine acted under qualified immunity in using force against Campbell. For the reasons set forth below, we GRANT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Factual Background
The facts relevant to this case are largely undisputed. On or about May 15, 1999, Shawn Campbell, a resident of Madison County, Indiana, was stopped on suspicion of driving while intoxicated by Elwood police officers, including Jason Brizendine, a full-time police officer with the Elwood City Police Department. (Campbell depo. at 152.) During the traffic stop, Campbell told the officers that he had scoliosis and that being handcuffed behind his back was painful. (Id.) The officers cuffed Campbell's hands in front of him. (Pl's Statement of Addt'l Material Facts ¶ 67.)
Then, on or about May 29, 1999, Campbell returned home from a local bar and discovered noise in an upstairs apartment in his building at 2008 South A. St., Elwood, Indiana. (Pl's Resp. to D's Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2.) Campbell went to the apartment where he found some friends and decided to join them. (Id.) The occupants had been drinking and (apparently) smoking marijuana in the apartment. (Id.) Prior to entering the apartment, Campbell himself had consumed beer and smoked marijuana, and when he arrived he was "somewhat high." (Id.)
Roughly two hours after Campbell joined the group in the upstairs apartment, Brizendine arrived at Campbell's apartment to discuss an unrelated matter. (Id.) Campbell's brother answered the door and informed Brizendine that Campbell was not at home. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Brizendine heard a bottle break outside and saw several people, many of whom he recognized as being underage, peek out an upstairs window. (Id. at 3.) Brizendine went to the upstairs apartment, entered a partially open door, and saw beer bottles throughout the premises. (Id.) At the time, he was the only officer on the scene in the presence of at least 10 civilians. (Id.) Officer Brodie Brown arrived shortly thereafter. (Id.)
Brizendine and Campbell met just inside the front door to the apartment. (Id.) At the time of this encounter, Campbell weighed approximately 120 pounds, and Brizendine weighed approximately 300 pounds. (Campbell depo. at 163; Compl. ¶ 28.) The two exchanged comments about the necessity of a search warrant to enter the premises. (Pl's Resp. to D's Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) Brizendine asked Campbell to consent to a pat-down search, and Campbell agreed. (Id. at 4.) In the course of the search, Brizendine found a pipe with marijuana residue in Campbell's pocket. (Id.) Brizendine arrested Campbell for possession of marijuana and reckless possession of paraphernalia. (Id.) Brizendine cuffed Campbell's hands behind his back, turned him around and positioned him with his back to the wall. (Id.) While being handcuffed, Campbell continued to argue with Cory Troutman, another occupant of the apartment, because "Troutman accused Campbell of getting everyone in the apartment in trouble." (Id.) Approximately five members of the group were arrested, and then the officers ran out of handcuffs. (Id. at 3.)
Brizendine instructed everyone in the group to sit down. (Id.) As Campbell, the only subject still standing, looked for a place to sit down, Brizendine attempted to sweep his feet from beneath him. (Id.) Campbell hopped several times, resisting Brizeindine's attempts to get him to the ground. (Id.) In response, Brizendine pushed Campbell to the ground by applying his hands to Campbell's forehead and shoulder and his foot to Campbell's right thigh. (Id.) Campbell hit the wall and fell to the ground, splitting the wall paneling and injuring himself. (Id.)
Officers who later arrived on the scene found a "bag containing a green plant-like substance, a blue pipe, and three Soma pills" in the apartment. (Id. at 3.) Campbell pled guilty to possession of marijuana and was sentenced on that charge to 180 days suspended, 180 days home detention, and one year of probation. (Id. at 4.)
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party on the particular issue. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmovant must establish more than mere doubt as to the material facts, but must "adduce evidence `set[ting] forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Packman v. Chicago Tribune Co., 2001 WL 1158990, at *4 (7th Cir. 2001). The mere existence of a factual dispute will not bar summary judgment; the facts in dispute must be outcome-determinative. Id. In considering a motion for summary judgment, a court must review the record and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 255; Del Raso v. U.S., 244 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2001). While the justification for a Fourth Amendment seizure is typically a factual question, summary judgment may be appropriate where the facts underlying the seizure are not in dispute. Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 433 (7th Cir. 1993); Pliska v. City of Stevens Point, Wis., 823 F.2d 1168, 1177 (7th Cir. 1987).
Analysis
In the Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff concedes that the City of Elwood is entitled to summary judgment on the constitutional claims because the alleged injuries were not caused by an individual with final policymaking authority and because no evidence exists of the city's custom, practice, or deliberate indifference with regard to such violations. As no dispute exists on these points, summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to federal claims against the City of Elwood. We therefore turn to Campbell's claim against Brizendine as an individual.
Defendant contends that he acted under qualified immunity in using force to restrain and immobilize Campbell. Qualified immunity is available only to officials with discretionary or policymaking authority, including police officers, when sued in their individual capacities under § 1983. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 166 (1993); Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 766 (7th Cir. 2000). Essentially, this defense is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Officials acting under qualified immunity are not subjected to suit "unless their actions violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights then known to a reasonable officer." Ulichny v. Merton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 249 F.3d 686, 706 (7th Cir. 2001).
The analysis of a qualified immunity defense requires an ordered, two-step inquiry. First, the Court must determine "whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged." Saucier v. Katz, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155 (2001). For this purpose, we examine the facts in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant used excessive force in handcuffing him and forcing him to the floor. Defendant responds that any force used in the encounter with Campbell was reasonable. Allegations of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment are evaluated under an "objective reasonableness" standard, "in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001). This fact-specific analysis requires consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident. Estate of Phillips v. City of Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1997). Relevant considerations include "the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. See also Timas v. Klaser, 2000 WL 684185, at *7 (S.D.Ind. Mar. 20, 2000); Mason v. Hamilton County, 13 F. Supp.2d 829 (S.D.Ind. 1998). We must examine the reasonableness of the actions "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, quoted in Porter v. City of Muncie, 1999 WL 33117261, at *2 (S.D.Ind. 1999).
First, Campbell challenges Brizendine's handcuffing him behind the back, because Campbell had allegedly informed officers on a prior occasion that the position caused him pain by aggravating his scoliosis. This argument is ultimately unpersuasive. In McNulty v. Village of Deerfield, 1998 WL 30676 (N.D. Ill Jan. 23, 1998), a diabetic man brought an excessive force claim against police officers who refused to loosen or adjust his handcuffs, even after he complained of the resulting pain for nearly 30 minutes. In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the court held that the use of handcuffs was reasonable, even where a subject made officers aware of pain due to a medical condition. Id. at *3. The court noted, "Officers would face serious threat to their safety and would threaten the safety of others if they loosened or removed an arrestee's handcuffs upon a complaint of pain or discomfort." Id.
Campbell's complaint as to the handcuffing procedure closely resembles that of McNulty. Campbell has not alleged any form of abuse connected with the handcuffing, other than that Brizendine knew it would cause Campbell pain and it did. As the McNulty court determined, such a minor application of force does not rise to the level of excessive force, regardless of the temporary pain or discomfort experienced by the subject. To hold that discomfort or pain associated with handcuffing constitutes excessive force "would open the floodgates of litigation to any individual who was ever arrested and handcuffed." Id. Such a holding would also shrink the boundaries of "reasonableness" in an unreasonable fashion. Therefore, we find that, even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Campbell, Brizendine's use of handcuffs in this instance did not amount to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Campbell also contends that Brizendine used excessive force in forcing him to the floor, causing injury to Campbell upon impact. The undisputed facts reveal that Brizendine was one of only two officers supervising 10 subjects, many of whom were presumably under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The risks posed by such a group are not easily ascertainable. Brizendine attempted to maintain order by directing everyone in the group to sit on the floor. Campbell concedes that he remained standing when all others in the group had been seated. Brizendine first attempted a less intrusive method of obtaining Campbell's compliance, namely the foot-sweep. Campbell resisted these measures, repeatedly hopping over Brizendine's feet and remaining upright. This active resistance to a direct instruction justified some minimal application of force. Brizendine applied force only until Campbell rested on the floor; no further force was applied. Given the totality of the circumstances, including the number of presumably intoxicated suspects on the premises and Campbell's active resistance to a direct instruction, Brizendine's use of force was reasonable.
Although Plaintiff claims that he "was not resisting arrest in any way, or trying to escape," (Pl's Resp. to D's Mot. for Summ. J. at 8) his actions following the handcuffing illustrate genuine resistance to the officers' instructions.
Plaintiff also argues that Brizendine's "personal animosity" toward Campbell stemming from an earlier interaction somehow proves that Brizendine used excessive force on the occasion in question. However, as Seventh Circuit precedent makes clear, the excessive force analysis turns on the reasonableness of the officer's response to facts and circumstances apparent at the moment of the incident, not the officer's underlying intent or motivation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2001).
However, Campbell's ability to state a constitutional violation is not dispositive of our qualified immunity inquiry. Even assuming that a constitutional claim could be made out on a favorable view of the facts, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. This determination must be made in light of the context surrounding the alleged violation. Id. A right may be clearly established "if it is so obvious that a reasonable state actor would know that what they were doing violated the Constitution or if a closely analogous case establishes that the conduct is unconstitutional." Willits v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2001 WL 1028482 (S.D.Ind. Aug. 14, 2001), citing Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2001). "The `very action in question' need not have previously been held unlawful, but, in the light of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the action must be apparent." Sivard v. Pulaski County, 17 F.3d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). If reasonable officials could disagree on the issue, a right is not clearly established. Ulichny, 249 F.3d at 706; Hinnen v. Kelly, 992 F.2d 140, 142-43 (7th Cir. 1993).
Although the Seventh Circuit has noted that the Fourth Amendment protection against excessive force has long been clearly established, Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 146 (7th Cir. 1990), Plaintiff has not offered evidence that Defendant should have been on notice that his conduct constituted excessive force, either by virtue of a closely analogous case or by the egregious nature of his actions. Plaintiff attempts to construct an analogy relating this case to Lanigan v. Village of East Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467 (7th Cir. 1997). There, an unarmed motorist was subjected to "one violent push and poke" by an officer during a traffic stop. Id. at 475. Prior to discovery, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that the three named officials were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 470. The court of appeals did not expressly rule on whether the defendants were shielded by qualified immunity, but reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider the allegations with the benefit of a more fully developed factual record. Id. at 477.
Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the court in Lanigan "denied qualified immunity to an officer who administered `one violent push and poke' to a citizen detained on a traffic stop, who was not handcuffed, which resulted in no injury." (Pl's resp. to D's Mot. for Summ. J. at 8.) Plaintiff apparently relies on this case to argue that, if officers can be denied qualified immunity for a relatively innocuous, non-injurious use of force, then Brizendine must necessarily be denied qualified immunity in the present case. This reasoning does not hold up, however. The court in Lanigan did not deny qualified immunity to any officer. The court simply acknowledged that dismissal was entered prematurely, before the district court could properly ascertain whether the plaintiff failed to state a claim on any set of facts. As we consider the present matter on summary judgment, with a full complement of largely undisputed facts, the Lanigan holding adds nothing to our analysis of Brizendine's qualified immunity defense. Plaintiff has not pointed to any closely analogous case that should have alerted Brizendine to a potential Fourth Amendment violation.
The closest case the Court has identified, DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger, 969 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D.Ill. 1997), dealt with some significantly different circumstances than the present case. There, police officers attempted to execute a misdemeanor arrest warrant on DuFour-Dowell at her residence. Id. at 1116. DuFour-Dowell answered the door wearing a summer-weight nightgown, said she would be "happy" to accompany the officers, and requested to change clothes. Id. At some point, one of the officers told the suspect it would be fine for her to change clothes, so long as one of the officers accompanied her. Id. DuFour-Dowell said she would accompany the officers after alerting her family and changing clothes. Id. She then went back into her house and allowed the storm door to close behind her. Id. The officers grabbed DuFour-Dowell by the arm, threw her to the floor and applied substantial, injurious pressure to her back for several minutes. Id. The court found that the officers' use of force was unnecessary, because they could have stopped DuFour-Dowell from retreating into the house merely by grabbing her arm. Id. at 1120. The subsequent measures were unnecessary to achieve compliance with their instruction. Id.
Here, apartment occupants outnumbered officers, 10 to 2. Many of these occupants were reasonably presumed to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Campbell had resisted a direct instruction to be seated, first merely by delay and later by actively avoiding Brizendine's attempts to put him on the ground. He had also continued to argue with another partygoer, even as Brizendine handcuffed him. Brizendine's use of force came in direct response to Campbell's avoidance tactics and did not continue past the point of compliance with the original instruction. By Campbell's own account, the force applied lasted only moments, not several minutes as in the DuFour-Dowell case. Therefore, based on these significant distinctions, the holding in DuFour-Dowell did not necessarily place Brizendine on notice of possible Fourth Amendment violations.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not offered evidence other than conclusory statements that Brizendine's use of force was plainly excessive. Brizendine's actions in this encounter do not rise to the level of egregiousness that amount to an obvious violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., McDonald by McDonald v. Haskins, 966 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding a gun to the head of an unarmed 9-year-old and threatening to pull the trigger should have been obviously unreasonable to officer where child was not a suspect, did not attempt to evade police, and posed no danger to officers or others); Estate of Bryant by Bryant v. Buchanan, 883 F. Supp. 1222, 1227 (S.D.Ind. 1995) (shackling suspect's legs, spraying CS gas into his face until he became unconscious, and applying sufficient force to result in death was plainly excessive given lack of danger posed by suspect).
Even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts suggest no genuine dispute that should preclude the grant of summary judgment on this issue. Therefore, because we find that Officer Brizendine acted under qualified immunity, we GRANT Defendant's Motion for summary Judgment.
Given the disposition of this Motion and the absence of any special circumstances, we adhere to the general rule that federal courts should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction over state-law claims where federal claims have been dismissed before trial. City of Chicago v. Int'l College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997); Buethe v. Britt Airlines, Inc., 749 F.2d 1235, 1239 (7th Cir. 1984).