Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States

6 Citing cases

  1. Baggett Transp. Co. v. U.S.

    969 F.2d 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992)   Cited 13 times

    SHIPPER SEAL(S) APPLIED. CARRIER MAY REMOVE SEAL(S) AND REPLACE WITH EQUIVALENT SEAL(S) ON PRIOR CONSENT OF CONSIGNOR. IF SEALS ARE BROKEN IN EMERGENCIES, NOTIFY CONSIGNOR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. CARRIER MUST ANNOTATE SEAL CHANGES ON [BILL OF LADING]. APPLICATION OF SHIPPER SEALS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A REQUEST FOR EXCLUSIVE USE OF VEHICLE/CONTAINER. The carriers rely on a decision of our predecessor court, Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States, 302 F.2d 270, 157 Ct.Cl. 365 (1962), and a decision of the Comptroller General, American Farm Lines, Inc., Nos. B-203805, B-204113 (Comptroller General, December 24, 1981), to support their contention that the prior consent statement was a request for exclusive use. In Campbell, the government bill of lading contained the following language:

  2. Flying Tiger Line v. Pinto Trucking Service

    517 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1981)   Cited 13 times
    In Flying Tiger Line v Pinto Trucking Serv. (517 F. Supp. 1108 [ED Pa 1981]) the court said at page 1112: "Because the public policy as contained in the Carmack Amendment is to hold carriers * * * liable for the actual injury to goods shipped, arrangements attempting to limit liability will be strictly construed against the carrier."

    The fact that Pinto charged more for the exclusive use of its vehicles does not change the fact that the rate charged was for the shipment of "freight, all kinds." The premium charged was for the additional service rendered by Pinto in not mixing the goods FTL shipped with goods shipped by other companies. See, e.g., Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States, 302 F.2d 270, 271, 157 Ct.Cl. 365 (1962); Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 236 F. Supp. 594 (D.Idaho 1964). The separate listing of exclusive use of vehicle rates simply reflects the basic commodity rate that a shipper would have to pay for that service.

  3. Emery Air Freight Corporation v. U.S.

    499 F.2d 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1974)   Cited 14 times

    Moreover, we do not have the authority to refer the issue of the reasonableness of plaintiff's past charges to the Board. Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States, 302 F.2d 270, 271, 157 Ct.Cl. 365, 369 (1962). It is quite clear from the Board's orders (referred to above), and the Initial Decision that both the Board and the administrative law judge construed plaintiff's Tariff Rule 65 as authorizing it to substitute service when, in the judgment of the carrier, this was necessary to expedite the shipment.

  4. Strickland Transportation Co. v. United States

    334 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1964)   Cited 19 times

    But here there is no uncertainty. The Government, in the absence of affirmative declaration to the contrary, intends thereby to ship at the lowest possible rate, and if that can only be accomplished by a limitation in value (release shipment), it is the purpose of the Government to declare that value. If not a literal, it was nonetheless, a substantial compliance. Glickfeld v. Howard Van Lines, 9 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 723; Campbell "66" Express Co., Inc. v. United States, Ct.Cl., 1962, 302 F.2d 270. Next, but no more substantial, is T.I.M.E.'s contention that the "limitation of action" of § 204a of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 304a, precludes the United States from deducting or offsetting transportation overcharges more than two years after payment of the charges.

  5. Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Airlines

    275 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)   Cited 28 times
    In Tishman, the plaintiff sought to avoid the defendant carrier's terms of limitation of liability in its contract by alleging that employees of the defendant carrier stole plaintiff's jewelry.

    In Montana-Dakota it was held that such a provision does not create a basis for the recovery in court of unreasonable past rates. Citing T.I.M.E., the Court of Claims in Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States, 302 F.2d 270, 271, 157 Ct.Cl. 365 (1962) held that "This court neither has the authority to determine the reasonableness of a motor carrier's past charges when the shipper challenges them as being unreasonable, nor the authority to refer the issue of reasonableness of such charges to the Commission." The language of section 216(b) of the Motor Carrier Act was identical in every important respect with the language of section 1375(a) of the Federal Aviation Act.

  6. Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. United States

    236 F. Supp. 594 (D. Idaho 1964)   Cited 6 times

    Both parties in this action have cited numerous authorities in an attempt to shed some light on this question. The question seems to have been decided in the case of Campbell "66" Express, Inc. v. United States, 302 F.2d 270, 271, 157 Ct.Cl. 365 (1962). In this case, the Court of Claims stated: