On appeal, defendant now argues that even if, as we have held here, the 1993 offer barred his claim for adverse possession between 1986 and 1996, it does not preclude him from demonstrating adverse possession for the 10-year period following 1993. Although, as noted above, it is settled law that a possessor's offer to purchase property will defeat his or her assertion of title by adverse possession where the offer is tendered "during the statutory period" ( Walling v Przybylo, 24 AD3d at 7; see Garrett v Holcomb, 215 AD2d at 885), an offer that comes after the statutory period — i.e., after title is obtained — may be irrelevant ( see Guariglia v Blima Homes, 89 NY2d 851, 853-854; Albright v Beesimer, 288 AD2d at 579; Campano v Scherer, 49 AD2d 642, 643; cf. Gonthier v Home, 576 A2d 745, 748 [Me 1990] [offer after the statutory period "could be considered indicative of the nature of (the) holding during the (statutory) period"]). Where, however, the offer to purchase or other overt acknowledgment of title in another is made prior to the commencement of the claimed statutory period, it necessarily impacts the element of hostility ( see Gonthier v Home, 576 A2d at 748).

Under RPAPL 522, a party seeking to obtain title by adverse possession on a claim not based upon a written instrument must show that the parcel was either "usually cultivated or improved" (RPAPL 522) or "protected by a substantial enclosure" (RPAPL 522; see, City of Tonawanda v Ellicott Cr. Homeowners Assn., 86 A.D.2d 118; see also, Birnbaum v Brody, 156 A.D.2d 408). In addition, a party must satisfy the common-law requirement of demonstrating that the possession of the parcel was hostile, under claim of right, open and notorious, exclusive, and continuous for a period of 10 years or more (see, City of Tonawanda v Ellicott Cr. Homeowners Assn., supra; Franzen v Cassarino, 159 A.D.2d 950; Woodrow v Sisson, 154 A.D.2d 829; Campano v Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642). By letter dated April 13, 1981, the appellant wrote the Manhattan School of Music offering to purchase the property in dispute.

Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, defendants are not required to establish that plaintiffs affirmatively requested permission to use the disputed property in order to establish that their use was permissive. The presumption of hostility is rebutted when a possessor asks a landowner for permission to use property (see e.g. Estate of Becker v. Murtagh, 19 N.Y.3d at 82, 945 N.Y.S.2d 196, 968 N.E.2d 433 ; Campano v. Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, 643, 370 N.Y.S.2d 237 [1975] ), but evidence of such a request is not required in every case. On the contrary, a permissive use may arise directly from the owner's grant of permission (see e.g. Longshore v. Hoel Pond Landing, 284 A.D.2d 815, 816, 727 N.Y.S.2d 518 [2001], lv. denied 97 N.Y.2d 603, 735 N.Y.S.2d 492, 760 N.E.2d 1288 [2001] ), or may be implied in the absence of express permission by the parties' actions or, as previously noted, from the cordial nature of their relationship (see e.g. Chaner v. Calarco, 77 A.D.3d at 1218, 910 N.Y.S.2d 227 ; Koudellou v. Sakalis, 29 A.D.3d 640, 641–642, 814 N.Y.S.2d 730 [2006] ).

Moreover, other than repairing or replacing pavement that apparently was already present in some form when they acquired the parcel, they do not claim that they made any changes in the parcel that would have signaled continuous occupation beyond the summer season, such as landscaping it or constructing permanent seating, decks, or storage structures ( compare Gorman v. Hess, 301 A.D.2d at 684, 754 N.Y.S.2d 393). Plaintiffs' temporary placement during the summer season of portable items such as lawn furniture is insufficient, without more, to constitute the requisite improvement ( see Campano v. Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, 643, 370 N.Y.S.2d 237 [1975]; compare Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N.Y. 95, 99, 106 N.E.2d 28 [1952]; Silipigno v. F.R. Smith & Sons, Inc., 71 A.D.3d 1255, 1257, 896 N.Y.S.2d 261 [2010] ).

First, the fence separating the disputed parcel from the remainder of the property cannot satisfy the enclosure requirement because, as defendant concedes, it was not erected by defendant, but by plaintiff's predecessors in title; further, although defendant claims that another fence previously existed in the same location, there is no evidence that defendant constructed it ( see Gallas v Duchesne, 268 AD2d at 729-730; Yamin v Daly, 205 AD2d 870, 872). Second, as to defendant's alleged use of the disputed parcel for storage, even if the presence of engine parts, lumber, and other "relatively insubstantial" materials ( Campano v Scherer, 49 AD2d 642, 643) were found sufficient to support an adverse possession claim, there is no evidence of the exact locations where these items were stored or that they were stored in the pad area ( see id.). Finally, defendant contends that there are material issues of fact as to whether one of the buried fuel tanks extended, in whole or in part, into the pad area.

Hence, plaintiff could not now tack the alleged adverse use onto his claim of adverse possession (see, Rose Val. Joint Venture v Apollo Plaza Assocs., supra, at 697; Pegalis v Anderson, supra, at 797). We further find that plaintiff failed to establish that his possession between 1966 and 1979 was hostile and under a "claim of right" since he conceded that title remained with a record owner prior to the running of the 10-year statutory period when he made two offers to purchase said property from the record owner during the relevant period (see, Manhattan School of Music v Solow, 175 A.D.2d 106, 107, lv dismissed 79 N.Y.2d 820; Campano v Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, 643). Moreover, the record reveals that in 1969 plaintiff tore down the old garage, which infringed on the disputed parcel, and two years later built a new garage solely within his property line.

Plaintiffs proved their actual entry on and possession of the disputed parcel. They constantly maintained the lot by mowing it and removed trees, establishing its usual cultivation as required by RPAPL 522 (1) (see, Campano v Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, 643; see also, Mastin v Village of Lima, 86 A.D.2d 777). No credible evidence was presented that there was any interruption in plaintiffs' possession and use of the property from August 1969 through the date in 1985 when they received defendants' letter advising them that defendants had acquired a deed to the Schoolhouse Lot. Thus, title to the disputed parcel was shown to have vested in plaintiffs in 1979 after 10 years of possession (see, CPLR 212 [a]).

Nevertheless, the record does not establish a permissive user. Seeking permission for use from the record owner negates hostility ( Campano v. Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642; Smith v. Folmsbee, 31 A.D.2d 584) and absent a clear, unequivocal, open repudiation of permission the user is not transformed into a hostile one ( Hinkley v. State of New York, 234 N.Y. 309; Moore v. Day, 199 App. Div. 76, affd 235 N.Y. 554; Durand v. Leigh, 15 A.D.2d 629). Here, however, defendant's affidavit shows that what the City claims to have been a request for permission was, in fact, only an inquiry as to whether a building permit was necessary for the construction of a retaining wall.

June 8, 1978 Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered March 8, 1977 in Washington County, which modified an earlier judgment of the same court, entered September 27, 1974 (see Campano v Scherer, 49 A.D.2d 642, mod 51 A.D.2d 821). Order affirmed, with costs. No opinion. Sweeney, J.P., Kane, Staley, Jr., Larkin and Herlihy, JJ., concur.

February 5, 1976 Motion and cross motion for amendment of decision and order granted, without costs, to the extent that the decretal paragraph of the decision dated July 2, 1975 ( 49 A.D.2d 642) and the order entered thereon on July 11, 1975 are hereby amended to read as follows: "Judgment modified, on the law and the facts, to the extent that plaintiffs are adjudged to be the sole owners in fee simple absolute of all the premises described in their deed, excepting the portion thereof which is actually encroached upon by defendants' dwelling and to the extent that defendants are adjudged to be the sole owners in fee of that portion of plaintiffs' property which is actually encroached upon by defendants' dwelling, and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs." Any motions for clarification of the judgment below with respect to access to defendants' dwelling should be directed to the Trial Term Justice. Greenblott, J.P., Sweeney, Kane, Larkin and Reynolds, JJ., concur.