Opinion
Case No. 2:03-CV-225 PGC
May 8, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff, Dee Campanella aka David McCrary, has filed with the Court a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2002). In an order dated March 11, 2003, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. That order required Plaintiff to within thirty days pay an initial partial filing fee of $11.96 and to complete and submit to the Court a certification form showing that he has exhausted his claim in the prison grievance process. To date, Plaintiff has not complied.
Although Plaintiff Campanella lists some other plaintiffs in the caption of his complaint, he does not mention them again in the body of his complaint. And, all pleadings submitted thus far in this case are signed only by Plaintiff. Plaintiff is reminded that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, "Every pleading, written motion, and other paper . . ., if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party." If Plaintiff is to join with other plaintiffs in bringing a single lawsuit, he must ensure that each other plaintiff signs each pleading, motion, or document to which that plaintiff is a party. Further, as a pro se plaintiff, Plaintiff may not represent a corporate plaintiff. Harrison v. Wahatoyas, LLC, 253 F.3d 552, 556-57 (10th Cir. 2001). In this particular case, because the other possible plaintiffs are not mentioned in the complaint's body or other pleadings and none of them signed any of the pleadings, the Court construes this complaint as brought solely by Plaintiff Campanella aka McCrary.
However, Plaintiff has just filed a letter with the Court requesting information on wiring money to the Court for fees. Even if Plaintiff were to eventually pay his initial partial filing fee, though, he has neither shown that he has exhausted his claim against certain defendants in the prison grievance system, see id. § 1997e(a), nor has he stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 id. § 1915A.
Out of a confusing and rambling complaint, the Court has extracted but a single claim: that prison personnel have delayed Plaintiff's access to his mail and opened legal mail not addressed to them. Because Plaintiff has not exhausted that claim in the prison grievance system, the Court dismisses all defendants affiliated with the State of Utah.
Still, two defendants remain that do not require exhaustion: the United States of America and the United States postal inspector. Plaintiffs claim against these defendants tails for two reasons: First, a § 1983 claim is not an appropriate vehicle for bringing suit against federal government defendants. See 42 id. § 1983 ("Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of anyState or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .") (emphasis added). Second, Plaintiff has not connected the federal defendants to his claim in any way. There must be some "`affirmative link'" shown between the alleged harm suffered by Plaintiff and the defendant's actions. See Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys. Inc., 973 F. Supp. 1228, 1248 (D.Colo. 1997) (citation omitted), rev'd on other grounds, 195 F.3d 584 (10th Cir. 1999).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed because he failed to pay his initial partial filing fee as required by this Court's earlier order. Alternatively, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed (1) as to the defendants affiliated with the State of Utah because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim in the prison grievance system and (2) as to the federal defendants because Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2002).