Arriving at this conclusion, we need not consider the question of waiver of the claim of fraud and duress based upon voluntary payments on the contract sought to be canceled. See Williams v. Rentz Bkg. Co., 114 Ga. App. 778 ( 152 S.E.2d 825) (1966); Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422) (1969). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

215 Ga. 319, 321(2) ( 110 S.E.2d 341) (1959), citing Tuttle v. Stovall, 134 Ga. 325 ( 67 SE 806) (1910). Accord, Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422) (1969). See Toole v. Brownlow Sons Co., 151 Ga. App. 292, 294(1) ( 259 S.E.2d 691) (1979); OCGA § 13-7-2.

In Lynch Enterprise Fin. Corp. v. Realty Constr. Co., 176 Ga. 700 (3) ( 168 S.E. 782), it was held: "There is no fraud if the other party knows that the representation is false. [Cit.]" See also Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63, 69 ( 166 S.E.2d 422); Hart v. Trust Co. of Columbus, 154 Ga. App. 329 ( 268 S.E.2d 384). As to the allegation that Thayer also defrauded her by representing that credit life insurance was required to give the loan, the evidence shows the loan documents clearly and prominently stated credit life insurance was not a prerequisite to obtaining the loan; and appellant signed it and testified the documents were explained to her and she understood them. She is deemed to have read this statement and understood it ( Hart, p. 330).

Held: Notwithstanding the authorities cited by appellants to show that economic pressure can constitute duress and that this duress was continuous and not waived by appellants (Code Ann. § 20-503; Tidwell v. Critz, 248 Ga. 201 ( 282 S.E.2d 104); Whitt v. Blount, 124 Ga. 671 ( 53 S.E. 205); Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422); Williams v. Rentz Banking Co., 112 Ga. App. 384 ( 145 S.E.2d 256)), one inescapable conclusion emerges. The actions of the seller Wright might have constituted a breach of the sales contract, and the appellants might indeed have expended substantial sums and incurred the risk of further loss in reliance on the original contract of sale and its terms; it might be true that when the plaintiff laid down new terms the appellants could not or had no time to protest without incurring greater risk, and losing the entire development project.

Under such circumstances, Ware Manor waived any possible duress defense to the note upon which this action is based. Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422) (1969). 4. Charter establishes a prima facie case that it was entitled to judgment on the note and that it had complied with the requirements of Code Ann. § 20-506 relative to the enforcement of the attorneys fees provision as set forth in said note. None of the evidence adduced at trial raised an issue of failure of consideration, misrepresentation, or duress in the execution of the note.

Pulliam v. Merchants c. Bank, 33 Ga. App. 68 ( 125 S.E. 509). Nor may allegations of fraud be of assistance to Hammond where he was aware of the nature of the fraudulent scheme from the beginning ( Woodall v. Beauchamp, 142 Ga. App. 543 ( 236 S.E.2d 529)), a premise previously established by the Supreme Court in this litigation. Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63, 69 ( 166 S.E.2d 422). We conclude therefore, that it was not error for the trial court to grant summary judgment to the bank as against Boling, Wallace and Hammond for the existing deficiency for if the underlying indebtedness was valid, so must the deficiency arising from that indebtedness.

The note itself shows that there is no limitation as to Hart's liability, and no fraud which would relieve him from liability was timely alleged or established. "Where a debtor voluntarily pays a part of an amount claimed to be due by his creditor on a contract which the debtor seeks to attack on the ground of duress and fraud in an action against him by the creditor for an overdue instalment thereunder he is conclusively deemed to have waived the duress and fraud if at the time of the partial payment he has knowledge of all the facts upon which he now bases his claim of fraud and duress as a ground for avoiding the validity and enforcement of the contract and at a time when the alleged duress was at an end. Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422) (1969). See also, Widincamp v. Patterson, 33 Ga. App. 483, 484 (3) ( 127 S.E. 158) (1924).

See State Hwy. Dept. v. Hewitt Contracting Co., 221 Ga. 621, 624 ( 146 S.E.2d 632) (1966); Tuttle v. Stovall, 134 Ga. 325 ( 67 S.E. 806) (1910). See also Webb v. City of Atlanta, 188 Ga. 485 ( 4 S.E.2d 154) (1939) and Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63, 69 ( 166 S.E.2d 422) (1969). In the face of Woodall's year-long silence following full knowledge of the alleged fraudulent representations, the law presumes that he treated the property as his own, thus ratifying the agreement and purchase.

Even assuming that the original alimony agreement is invalid for any of the reasons asserted by the defendant's answer, the undisputed facts show a ratification of the agreement by the defendant, while represented by counsel, by his subsequent payments thereunder and his incorporation of the agreement in a Mexican divorce decree which he obtained. Brooks v. Hooks, 221 Ga. 229, 235 ( 144 S.E.2d 96); Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63 ( 166 S.E.2d 422). The balance of payments due is shown by the evidence; the defendant's remedy for reducing the amount of his obligation is the revision of the alimony judgment pursuant to Code Ann. § 30-220 (Ga. L. 1955, pp. 630, 631; Ga. L. 1964, pp. 713, 714). Therefore, the grant of summary judgment for the wife was not error.

The state's general law of duress is codified at Ga. Code Ann. § 20-503 (1977).E. g., Causey v. Matson, 215 Ga. 306, 110 S.E.2d 356 (1959) (lease of service station); Love v. State, 78 Ga. 66, 3 S.E. 893 (1887) (sale of a mule); Camp v. Hatcher, 119 Ga. App. 63, 166 S.E.2d 422 (1969) (dispute over attorneys' fees); Dean v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 710, 112 S.E.2d 315 (peanut farming); Atlanta Life Ins. Co. v. Mason, 89 Ga. App. 319, 79 S.E.2d 352 (1953) (threatened discharge from employment); and Farrar Lumber Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 48 Ga. App. 319, 172 S.E. 724 (1934) (threatened foreclosure).See Ga. Code Ann. § 20-503 (1977); Yearwood v. National Bank of Athens, 222 Ga. 709, 152 S.E.2d 360 (1966).