Opinion
F075518
03-18-2020
CAMP DAVID RESORTS, LLC, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant, v. ROSAMOND COMMUNITY SERVICES DISTRICT, Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
Kassouni Law and Timothy V. Kassouni for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant. Burke, Williams & Sorensen and Martin Kosla for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. S1500CV283329)
OPINION
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Lampe, Judge. Kassouni Law and Timothy V. Kassouni for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Appellant. Burke, Williams & Sorensen and Martin Kosla for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Respondent.
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Rosamond Community Services District (District) brought a judicial foreclosure action against Camp David Resorts, LLC (Camp David) after Camp David failed to pay special assessments for the construction of water and sewer improvements levied against its real property. Following a bench trial, the trial court rejected Camp David's challenge to the validity of the special assessments and entered a judgment in judicial foreclosure, which ordered the sale of the property.
On appeal, Camp David contends the trial court erred when it found its challenge to the validity of the assessments was barred by the 30-day limitations period of Streets and Highway Code section 10400 and the doctrine of res judicata. Camp David also contends the assessments are invalid, as the District failed to meet its burden of proving they complied with the requirements of Proposition 218. We conclude Camp David's defense is barred by the statute of limitations, and therefore affirm the judgment.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Streets and Highways Code.
Article XIII D of the California Constitution (article XIII D).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Assessment District 1990-2
The District is a community services district created to provide public improvements in the Kern County community of Rosamond. To provide a source of water service and sewer collection for District lands incapable of being served by the present facilities, the District formed assessment district 1990-2 (AD 1990-2) pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Improvement Act of 1913 (§ 10000 et seq.) (the 1913 Act), and authorized the sale of limited obligation bonds under the Improvement Bond Act of 1915 (§ 8500 et seq.) (the 1915 Act).
To establish the assessment district, the District first adopted a resolution in June 1990 declaring its intent to form AD 1990-2, issued bonds pursuant to the 1915 Act, and levied special assessments for the proposed improvements. Next, an engineer's report (AD 1990-2 report) was prepared which described: (1) the plans and specifications for the water improvements (water pipelines and a pump station) and sewer improvements (sewer pipelines and manholes); (2) the total cost of the improvements; (3) the method the engineer used to determine the amount each parcel was to be assessed; and (4) an assessment roll showing the property owners' names and addresses, and the amount to be assessed against each parcel. A diagram was included which showed all of the parcels within AD 1990-2.
On December 12, 1990, following a hearing on the AD 1990-2 report, the District adopted a resolution confirming the assessments and ordering the proposed work to be performed. A week later, the District recorded a notice of assessment, with a list of property owners and the amounts assessed on each lot. After adopting a resolution authorizing the issuance of limited obligation improvement bonds for AD 1990-2, the District issued bonds totaling $11,331,000 as of March 1, 1991.
Some of assessments within AD 1990-2 were later amended, and the amended assessments and list of affected property owners recorded. In a February 1991 resolution, the District amended a prior resolution, which directed the secretary/treasurer to file a copy of a list of unpaid assessments with the Kern County tax collector/treasurer, to the extent the unpaid assessments differed from the amended assessments, and directed the district engineer to file a list of unpaid assessments in the aggregate principal amount of $11,331,000 in the secretary/treasurer's office.
The property at issue here, assessor's parcel number (APN) 471-022-02-00-0 (formerly APN 249-032-02) (the Property) is a 320-acre parcel that was included in AD 1990-2 and identified as parcel 103. The Property comprises the eastern half of section 7, while the adjacent parcel to the west, labeled parcel 102 in the AD 1990-2 report, comprises the western half of section 7. When AD 1990-2 was created, the same entity, Sand Cattle Creek Company, owned parcels 102 and 103.
The Property originally was assessed $750,599.81 in AD 1990-2. The assessment was comprised of (1) costs related to sewer improvements, (2) earthquake insurance, and sheeting and shoring costs, which were divided on a per acre basis between the parcels participating in the construction of the sewer and water system improvements; (3) incidental and bond costs, which were divided between the parcels based on their percentage of total assessment; and (4) acreage fees, which were included at the landowner's request.
With respect to the sewer improvements, the AD 1990-2 report explained that parcels 102 through 110 would benefit from a sewer trunk line in the District's west half. Accordingly, those nine parcels would pay for the (1) construction of the trunk line along Felsite Avenue and 30th Street West, (2) future sewer improvements, and (3) a portion of the construction of a 21-inch sewer in 30th Street West. In addition, parcels 102, 103, and 104 would be assessed for the construction of a trunk line along 40th Street West, as they would benefit from it. Based on these differing benefits, parcels 105 through 110 were assessed at $944.47 per acre, parcel 104 at $1,023.22 per acre, and parcels 102 and 103 at $1,104.38 per acre. Parcels 102 and 103 were not assessed for water improvements, as they were not among the parcels that would benefit from them.
The report explains that future improvement costs were included to cover improvements that would benefit parcels in AD 1990-2, but would be constructed as part of a future assessment district. Future improvements included a portion of the 30th Street West sewer line in the District's west half. The schedule of work items for the future sewer improvements estimated the bid price for the work to be $89,600.
Parcel 104 was located to the southwest of parcel 102, while parcels 105 through 110 were located immediately south of parcels 102 and 103.
The District constructed the sewer lines in accordance with the AD 1990-2 report, with the sewer line running along 40th Street West and ending at the bottom left corner of parcel 102. The nearest sewer lines to the Property are about a half-mile away—one is on 40th Street West and the other at Felsite Avenue and 30th Street West. At the time of trial, the Property did not receive sewer service.
Assessment District 1991-3
Pursuant to the request of certain District property owners to form an assessment district to construct public improvements for their benefit, the District adopted a resolution in August 1991 to establish AD 1991-3. The resolution directed the District engineer to prepare plans and specifications, detailed cost estimates, and a preliminary assessment diagram and assessment roll to meet the 1913 Act's requirements.
An engineer's report for AD 1991-3 was completed in October 1992 (the AD 1991-3 report). The AD 1991-3 report described: (1) the plans and specifications for water improvements (construction of a reservoir site, a hydropneumatics system, a booster pump station, and installation of underground water pipelines), sewer improvements (upgrades to existing wastewater treatment plant, construction of a new lift station and underground sanitary sewer pipelines), and reclaimed water system improvements; (2) the total cost of the improvements; (3) the engineer's method of determining the amount to be assessed against each parcel; and (4) an assessment roll showing the names and addresses of the property owners in the assessment district, and the amount to be assessed against each parcel. A diagram of the parcels within the assessment district was included.
On October 14, 1992, following a hearing on the AD 1991-3 report, the District adopted a resolution confirming the assessments and ordering the proposed improvement work to be performed. Five days later, the District recorded a notice of assessment, with a list of property owners and the amounts assessed on each lot. After adopting a resolution authorizing the issuance of limited obligation improvement bonds for AD 1991-3 under the 1915 Act, the District issued the bonds totaling $29,655,000 as of December 2, 1992.
The Property, labeled parcel 235 in the AD 1991-3 report, originally was assessed $2,266,814.24. The assessment was comprised of: (1) costs related to water, sewer, and reclaimed water improvements, (2) incidental costs, which were divided on a per acre basis between the participating properties; and (3) bond costs, which were divided between the parcels based on their percentage of the total assessment.
The AD 1991-3 report explained the cost of constructing the facilities would be assessed to all parcels on a percentage of area benefitted basis. With respect to the water improvements, it was determined that four pressure zones, labeled Zones A through D, would service AD 1991-3. The assessments were distributed to each parcel by determining the facility and pipeline costs associated with each parcel's pressure zone, with all parcels being assessed their share of a reservoir and "an increase in AVEK turnout capacity." Water pipeline assessments were determined by the parcel's benefit from the local piping network, as well as the transmission lines. The Property fell within Zone C, which would be gravity fed from the reservoir located north of Dawn Road. The report explained that all parcels within the zone would benefit from, and be assessed for, water transmission lines that would carry water from the 30th Street West reservoir to the Dawn Road reservoir.
With respect to the sewer improvements, the AD 1991-3 report stated all parcels would participate in the costs associated with improvements to increase efficiency and capacity at the wastewater treatment plant, which included the construction of a lift/grinder station, along with controls and telemetry necessary to automate the system. Finally, it was determined all parcels within Sections 5 and 7, which included the Property, would benefit from, and be assessed for, the construction of a reclaimed water distribution pipeline to Dawn Road.
After formation of AD 1991-3, the District constructed the water transmission line and the Dawn Road reservoir in accordance with the AD 1991-3 report. As such, an operational water transmission line runs from the 30th Street West reservoir to the Dawn Road reservoir. About one-half mile of the transmission line traverses the northern part of the Property in a southwest direction, which could be used to provide water service to the Property upon payment of connection fees and installation of service lines at the property owner's expense. According to the District's assistant general manager, John Houghton, the Dawn Road reservoir and transmission line is capable of providing water to the Property. However, only part of the reclaimed water line was built and lines were not built to Dawn Road.
Houghton explained reclaimed water is recycled, nonpotable water that comes from the wastewater treatment plant.
The Prior Foreclosure Action and Assessment Credits
By the time AD 1991-3 was formed, Desert Highlands Associates (Desert Highlands) owned the Property and its adjoining parcel (parcel 234 in the AD 1991-3 report). Rosamond Pacific Land Company (RPLC) subsequently obtained title to parcel 234. While Desert Highlands and RPLC were obligated to pay annual principal and interest installments on the AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3 assessments, neither property owner paid the required installments for tax years 1994/95 and 1995/96. Consequently, the District filed actions against the two property owners for judicial foreclosure of the assessment liens on these two parcels, which were later consolidated for trial.
Meanwhile, due to the elimination of certain improvements, the District passed resolutions in 1996 creating bond tender programs for AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3, which enabled the District to purchase bonds from bondholders at a discount, thereby reducing the bonded indebtedness of the assessment districts. As a result, affected properties in both assessment districts which were to benefit from the eliminated improvements received credits against outstanding assessments. With respect to the Property, the District applied the AD 1990-2 credit of $8,052.29 first to the late penalty for tax year 1995/96, reducing it to zero, and the remaining credit to the base delinquency for that year. The District applied the AD 1991-3 credit of $298,795.60 first to the unpaid late penalty and base delinquency for tax year 1996/97, reducing both to zero, and the remaining credit to the interest penalty for tax year 1995/96.
In the foreclosure actions, the parties stipulated to the validity of the assessments on the affected parcels and the fact the assessments for tax years 1994/95 and 1995/96, and the first installment for tax year 1996/97, remained unpaid. Desert Highlands and RPLC did not contest the amount of the delinquencies or the District's entitlement to a foreclosure judgment; instead, the only litigated issue was the correct method of applying the bond tender credits. The trial court determined the District's methodology was correct and entered an appropriate judgment. Desert Highlands and RPLC appealed; this court affirmed the trial court's judgment. (Rosamond Community Services District v. Desert Highlands Associates (Aug. 28, 1998, F029329) [nonpub. opn.].)
This Lawsuit
The Property was sold at a tax sale in 2006; thereafter, ownership of the Property changed multiple times. Subsequent annual assessments levied against the Property were not paid and ultimately were removed from the Kern County tax roll. The assessments at issue in this case were levied in AD 1990-2 for tax years 1996/97 (second installment) to 2004/05 and 2007/08 to 2014/15, and in AD 1991-3 for tax years 1997/98 to 2004/05, and 2007/08 to 2011/12. The total amount of delinquent assessments (exclusive of penalties, statutory interest, administrative costs, and legal fees and costs) for AD 1990-2 was $1,198,943.67 and for AD 1991-3 was $3,259,946.68, for a total delinquency of $4,458,890.35.
Camp David became the owner of the Property via a grant deed recorded on October 14, 2014. Two weeks later, Camp David filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the District. In December 2014, the District filed a cross-complaint against Camp David for judicial foreclosure of the delinquent assessment liens on AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3. The District's cross-complaint became the operative pleading in the case after Camp David's complaint was disposed of by demurrer.
Rollington Ferguson also was named as a cross-defendant. The District subsequently dismissed him from the action.
The Court Trial on the Cross-Complaint
A court trial on the cross-complaint was held on October 3 and 4, 2016. Current or former District employees Ronald Smith, John Houghton and Steve Perez testified, as did a civil engineer involved in preparing the engineering reports for AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3. Christopher Vidal, a former District employee, testified about an email he sent to Camp David's attorney in August 2013 in response to the attorney's inquiry about the Property. In the email, Vidal stated he reviewed "the documents" (which Vidal testified included the construction plans and engineer's reports for the assessment districts), and a July 2011 letter from District employee, Nathaniel Rippee, and determined there was no infrastructure to serve the Property. Vidal further stated the developer would bear all costs associated with the required improvements, including the costs and procurement of all rights of way or easements.
Vidal, who had an associate's degree in engineering, was employed by the District for eight months in 2010. He provided "plan check" and technical engineering support for the District. When he wrote the email, he was working for the District as a consultant.
In Rippee's letter, which he sent to Alex Wilson of Mohave Power Company, Inc., in response to an inquiry by Wilson, Rippee stated there was "not adequate infrastructure (existing water and existing sewer lines) within your immediate area to provide you with water or sewer services." Rippee explained that while an existing water line traversed the northern portion of the Property, it was only a transmission main, which fed an existing water storage tank located north of the Property, and the nearest sewer main was located about one mile east. While the necessary improvements to provide water and sewer services to the Property could be constructed, the property owner would have to bear all the costs associated with the design and construction.
At the time, Mohave Power Company was the owner of the Property.
In 2015, the Kern County Assessor-Recorder's office reviewed the assessed value of the Property for the 2014/15 tax year "under the Proposition 8 'Decline In Value' program." Val Encomio, an appraiser in the assessor's office, prepared a notice of changed valuation of the Property, which stated the current assessed value of the Property exceeded its fair market value as of January 1, 2014, and would be changed from $240,581 to $144,000.
Camp David appealed the property tax assessment, which was heard before the County's Assessment Appeals Board in May 2016, with the board issuing its findings of fact in September 2016. Camp David challenged the value of the assessment, which it sought to reduce to zero, the penalties assessed for nonpayment, and the amount of a special assessment levied against the Property. The board described the Property as a 320-acre undeveloped parcel of land, zoned for both residential and open space use. The topography was hilly and rugged, with limited off road access throughout the parcel, and there was "no infrastructural development" on either the Property or the neighboring properties.
The board determined the only issue before it was the appropriate value to place on the tax roll, as it did not have jurisdiction to determine the validity of a special assessment levied by a local district or review penalties for failure to timely pay property taxes. The board found the fair market value of the Property was $450 per square foot, or $144,000, based on the assessor's comparable sales analysis of properties that "similarly have no electrical, water or other infrastructure." The board rejected Camp David's argument the Property was worth nothing because of the special assessment, as property with the same special assessment sold at $432 per square foot. Consequently, the board found the currently enrolled value was correct and supported by the evidence.
Peter Bekey, a civil engineer, testified he reviewed the plans and engineering reports for AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3. On a copy of one of the plan pages for AD 1991-3, Bekey colored areas in red, blue and yellow. The Property contained both red and blue areas. Bekey explained the blue area was the approximate area that "would be covered by gravity" from the Dawn Road reservoir, while the red area was the approximate area that "would be above the elevation that would be typically served from a gravity reservoir and if it was developed, part of that may require a pump station to serve it with water."
Following posttrial briefing, the trial court issued a proposed statement of decision, to which Camp David filed objections. The trial court overruled the objections, and executed the proposed statement of decision and judgment of foreclosure. The trial court found the District established a prima facie case in judicial foreclosure under section 8834, and therefore was entitled to judgment in judicial foreclosure for the delinquent assessments levied against the Property in AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3. The judgment stated Camp David was indebted to the District for unpaid assessments, penalties, interest, administrative costs, attorney fees, and foreclosure costs totaling $14,301,060 as of January 5, 2017, which became a lien on the Property, and ordered the sale of the Property.
As pertinent here, a complaint in a foreclosure action brought pursuant to section 8830 need only allege: (1) the legislative body passed its resolution ordering certain work to be done; (2) an assessment to pay the cost of the work was made and authorized to be collected, but remained unpaid; (3) certain property was assessed a stated amount and bonds upon the security of the assessment were issued; and (4) a certain sum came due against the described property on the assessment and had not been paid, and the legislative body ordered the action to foreclose. (§ 8834, subds. (a), (c)-(e).)
The trial court found Camp David had no defense to the District's claims because: (1) its ability to challenge the validity of the special assessments was barred by the 30-day statute of limitations of section 10400, and the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel; (2) it could not rely on "the proposition that a special assessment must confer a 'special benefit' upon the property assessed beyond that conferred generally," as stated in Silicon Valley Taxpayers' Assn., Inc. v. Santa Clara County Open Space Authority (2008) 44 Cal.4th 431 (Silicon Valley), as that case is distinguishable; and (3) even if that standard applied, the Property received a special benefit from the construction of the sewer and water transmission lines.
DISCUSSION
This appeal concerns Camp David's defense to the District's foreclosure action, namely, that the special assessments are invalid because they violate Proposition 218. Camp David argues "overwhelming evidence" produced at trial showed the Property obtained no special benefits from the assessments, and even if the Property received some special benefit, the assessments were not proportional to that benefit.
Proposition 218
When AD 1990-2 and AD 1991-3 were formed and the assessments levied, "courts reviewed quasi-legislative acts of local governmental agencies, such as the formation of an assessment district, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard." (Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 443.) "[T]he power to specially assess property to pay for public improvements is based upon existence of a special benefit to the assessed property," and "[w]hen the special benefit exists, the formula on which the assessments are made must be based on the benefit received." (Harrison v. Board of Supervisors (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 852, 856, 857.) A special assessment would not be set aside " 'unless it clearly appears on the face of the record before [the legislative] body, or from facts which may be judicially noticed, that the assessment as finally confirmed is not proportional to the benefits to be bestowed on the properties to be assessed or that no benefits will accrue to such properties.' " (Silicon Valley, at p. 444.) An assessment's validity was presumed and the party challenging the assessment required to "show that the record before the legislative body 'clearly' did not support the underlying determinations of benefit and proportionality." (Ibid.)
In November 1996, California voters passed Proposition 218 as a constitutional amendment regarding special assessments. (Barratt American, Inc. v. City of San Diego (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 809, 815-816.) Proposition 218 changed the standard of review to require courts to "exercise their independent judgment in reviewing whether assessments that local agencies impose violate article XIII D." (Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 450.) Moreover, under article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f), it is now the agency's burden to demonstrate "special benefit and proportionality in any legal action contesting the validity of any assessment." (Silicon Valley, at p. 445.)
Article XIII D, section 4, subdivision (f) provides: "In any legal action contesting the validity of any assessment, the burden shall be on the agency to demonstrate that the property or properties in question receive a special benefit over and above the benefits conferred on the public at large and that the amount of any contested assessment is proportional to, and no greater than, the benefits conferred on the property or properties in question."
Only special benefits are assessable under Proposition 218, and if a proposed project confers both general benefits to the community and special benefits to particular properties, the agency must separate the general and special benefits, and impose an assessment based only on the special benefits. (Silicon Valley, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 450.) "[P]re-Proposition 218 cases ... are not instructive in determining whether a benefit is special under Proposition 218. Instead, under the plain language of article XIII D, a special benefit must affect the assessed property in a way that is particular and distinct from its effect on other parcels and that real property in general and the public at large do not share." (Id. at p. 452, citing art. XIII D, § 2, subd. (i) (fn. omitted).) In addition, "the properties must be assessed in proportion to the special benefits received: 'No assessment shall be imposed on any parcel which exceeds the reasonable cost of the proportional special benefit conferred on that parcel.' (Art. XIII D, § 4, subd. (a).)" (Silicon Valley, at p. 456.)
Under Proposition 218, "an assessment may be imposed only if (1) it is supported by an engineer's report [citation], (2) it does not exceed the reasonable cost of the proportionate special benefit conferred on each affected parcel [citation], and (3) it receives, by mailed ballot, a vote of at least half of the owners of affected parcels, weighted 'according to the proportional financial obligation of the affected property.' " (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of Riverside (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 679, 682 (Howard Jarvis).)
"In general, an assessment already in existence on the effective date of Proposition 218 (preexisting assessment) must comply with Proposition 218 by July 1, 1997. Four specified classes of preexisting assessments, however, are 'exempt from the procedures and approval process set forth in Section 4.' " (Howard Jarvis, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 682, citing art. XIII D, § 5.) "A preexisting assessment which is not exempt could be reauthorized by taxpayer consent in one of two ways": (1) "as an assessment, provided it met Proposition 218's 'special benefit' requirement, it was supported by an engineer's report, and it received a weighted majority vote of owners of the affected property in a mail election"; or (2) "as a special tax, provided it received a two-thirds vote of the general electorate." (Howard Jarvis, at p. 683.) "Unless either properly reauthorized or exempt, however, a preexisting assessment is now unconstitutional." (Ibid.)
As pertinent here, exempt preexisting assessments include (1) an assessment "imposed exclusively to finance the capital costs or maintenance and operation expenses for sidewalks, streets, sewers, water, flood control, drainage systems or vector control" (art. XIII D, § 5, subd. (a)); or (2) "[a]ny assessment the proceeds of which are exclusively used to repay bonded indebtedness of which the failure to pay would violate the Contract Impairment Clause of the Constitution of the United States" (art. XIII D, § 5, subd. (c)). Although not raised by the parties, it appears the assessments at issue here could fall under one of these exemptions. However, we do not decide the issue.
Camp David's Challenge is Time-Barred
We begin by addressing Camp David's claim the trial court erred when it found its attack on the validity of the special assessments was barred by the limitations period set forth in section 10400, as it is dispositive of this appeal.
Where, as here, the facts relevant to the application of the statute of limitations are not in dispute, the issue may be decided as a question of law. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1995) 9 Cal.4th 606, 611-612; Citizens for Beach Rights v. City of San Diego (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 230, 237-238.)
Under section 10400, any challenge to the validity of an assessment imposed under the 1913 Act must be filed within 30 days after the assessment is levied. The limitations period is brief due, in part, to "the need for finality in the levying of assessments." (City of Saratoga v. Hinz (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1218 (City of Saratoga).) "It is a fact of common knowledge that the mere existence of a lawsuit usually prevents the sale of bonds and the raising of the funds required to do the work of improvement for which the special assessment has been levied. [Citation.] The short statutes of limitations such as section 10400 are essential to the consummation of the proceedings and to provide assurance to bond buyers that their investment will be reasonably safe and secure." (Allis-Chalmers v. City of Oxnard (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 876, 883 (Allis-Chalmers).) The limitations period applies not only to causes of action, but also to affirmative defenses which challenge an assessment's validity. (City of Saratoga, at pp. 1214-1218.) It also applies to all persons, not merely to those who were the original property owners when the assessment proceedings commenced. (Id. at p. 1214.)
"Section 10400 provides that the cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins to run when the assessment is 'levied.' For the purposes of section 10400, an assessment is levied when the governing body passes a resolution that confirms the assessments and orders the proposed improvement to be made." (City of Saratoga, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1213; see Allis-Chalmers, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at p. 883; Fahey v. City Council (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 667, 676-679.)
Here, the assessments were levied on December 12, 1990, in AD 1990-2 and on October 14, 1992, in AD 1991-3, when the District adopted resolutions which approved the engineer's report for each assessment district, confirmed the assessments, and ordered the improvements. Thus, Camp David, or its predecessor in interest, had 30 days from those dates to contest the assessments in a legal action. This action, however, was not commenced until October 28, 2014, over 20 years after the 30-day limitations period expired.
Camp David argues the limitations period does not apply here for several reasons. First, Camp David contends the 30-day statute of limitations should not defeat a foreclosure defense based on the failure to comply with Proposition 218 because a property owner "cannot possibly gain sufficient information of lack of special benefit until the improvements are built, which is typically years after a district's approval of the assessment, as is the case herein." Next, it contends that even if section 10400 applies, the trial court "failed to address the key issue of when the 30-day limitation period accrued," and the proper accrual date is when the property owner actually discovered, or should have discovered, the District's failure to provide the required special benefits. Finally, it contends the District "should be equitably estopped from seeking judicial foreclosure in light of its failure to comply with Proposition 218, and the fabrication in the engineering reports that the proposed improvements will provide a special benefit to the property."
As to Camp David's first contention, it essentially is claiming the 30-day limitations period is overly short. Camp David, however, does not cite any cases dealing with this type of statute and no analysis to support this contention. As pointed out in Allis-Chalmers, California law provides numerous 30-day statutes of limitation, and "[a]bsent some compelling reason or authority, the legislative prerogative in enacting section 10400 must be upheld." (Allis-Chalmers, supra, 105 Cal.App.3d at pp. 881-882.)
Camp David claims it has advanced a compelling reason not to mechanically apply the 30-day statute of limitations as "it is impossible for a property owner to know within 30 days whether its property will in fact receive any special benefits from the assessments, as required by Proposition 218," especially when "assessments are imposed on the promise of future improvements that may or may not materialize." The engineer's reports and construction plans, however, provided the basis for determining whether special benefits would be conferred on the Property.
Specifically, the AD 1990-2 report described the location of the sewer lines and the construction plans showed their precise location. Camp David claims the sewer lines do not confer a special benefit on the Property because they are a half-mile away from it. The sewer lines, however, were built as called for and their distance from the Property is apparent from the plans. While the AD 1990-2 report included "future sewer improvements" in the assessment, those improvements were not unknown; rather, the report listed what the "future sewer improvements" were comprised of, as well as a bid price of $89,600 for those improvements. With respect to AD 1991-3, the report described the location of the water transmission lines and the construction plans showed their precise location. Camp David contends the water transmission lines do not confer a special benefit on the Property, as Bekey testified a pump station would need to be constructed to provide water to the entire Property. Bekey's testimony, however, was based on his review of the AD 1991-3 report and construction plans. Since the engineer's reports and construction plans showed the proposed improvements that Camp David now claims failed to confer a special benefit on the Property, it was unnecessary to wait until the improvements were constructed to know what was being built and determine whether they specially benefitted the Property.
The "future sewer improvements" consisted of: (1) furnishing and installing 1320 linear feet of 21 inch diameter "VCP" and seven "precast concrete manholes"; and (2) connecting to an existing manhole at Orange Street and 30th Street West. The AD 1990-2 construction plans refer to the future improvements.
While the reclaimed water line was not built as called for in the AD 1991-3 report and construction plans, the Property received a credit against the AD 1991-3 assessments for eliminated improvements.
Camp David next urges us to view the limitations period as beginning to run when the property owner actually discovered, or should have discovered, the District's failure to provide the required special benefits. Camp David asks us to apply the discovery rule to the 30-day limitations period, which is an exception to the general rule of accrual and "postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action. [Citations.] [¶] A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she 'has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.' " (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) "The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action." (Ibid.) "In delayed discovery cases, the limitations period begins to run once the plaintiff has notice or information about circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry notice, i.e., the limitations period begins to run once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing." (Barker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 42, 50.)
Camp David, however, did not raise this issue below. It is well settled that appellate courts ordinarily will not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been, but were not, presented to the trial court. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564; McDonald's Corp. v. Board of Supervisors (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 612, 618.) An argument may be raised for the first time on appeal, however, when it presents a question of law on undisputed facts. (Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742.) Assuming the delayed discovery doctrine is even applicable to the 30-day limitations period of section 10400, an issue we do not decide, a factual question would be presented as to when an owner of the Property could have discovered the absence of a special benefit to the Property through the exercise of reasonable diligence. This factual question prevents Camp David from raising this theory for the first time on appeal. (McDonald's Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, at p. 618.)
In its posttrial brief, Camp David argued that the 30-day limitations period did not apply because section 10400 did not preclude it from defending against judicial foreclosure on constitutional grounds, and it would have been premature for any property owner during the 30 days after the assessments were levied to claim their property received no special benefit.
Camp David does not suggest what the actual accrual date should be, other than to generally state it is "when the property owner actually discovered, or should have discovered, the District's failure to provide the required special benefits." --------
Finally, Camp David claims the District should be estopped from relying on the statute of limitations and seeking judicial foreclosure because the District failed to comply with Proposition 218 and "the fabrication in the engineer's reports that the assessments will provide a special benefit to the property precluded the property owner from having sufficient notice of the Proposition 218 violation until after the initial 30-day statute of limitations had passed." Camp David, however, did not raise this argument in the trial court and therefore cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. (Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 113.) In any event, a required element for estoppel is justifiable ignorance of the true facts by the party claiming estoppel. (Kiernan v. Union Bank (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 111, 117.) As we discussed above, the engineer's reports and construction plans detailed the improvements to be constructed. As the scope of the projects was apparent from those documents, the property owners could determine whether a special benefit was in fact provided to their properties when the assessments were levied.
In sum, the 30-day limitations period of section 10400 applies to Camp David's defense to this foreclosure action, and began to run when the assessments were levied in the early 1990's. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it found the ability to challenge the special assessments expired over 20 years ago and therefore Camp David had no defense to judicial foreclosure. Since Camp David's challenges are time-barred, we do not reach the remaining issues Camp David raises, including whether: (1) the District failed to meet its burden of proving the assessments complied with the special benefit and proportionality requirements of Proposition 218; (2) the trial court applied the correct standard of review; and (3) Camp David's defense is barred by res judicata.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to Rosamond Community Services District.
/s/_________
DE SANTOS, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
LEVY, Acting P.J. /s/_________
PEÑA, J.