Opinion
Civil Action No. 17 - 816
10-25-2018
DARYL EUGENE CAMERON, Plaintiff, v. CARLA SWARTZ, et al., Defendants.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 33) that has been converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies (ECF No. 35) be granted.
II. REPORT
A. Procedural Background
Daryl Eugene Cameron ("Plaintiff") is a pro se inmate who is currently in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. He initiated this action by the filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1) and his Complaint was docketed by the Clerk on August 1, 2017 (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on August 28, 2017. (ECF No. 14.) On November 22, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19) that was granted by Order of Court dated March 29, 2018 (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff was sua sponte granted permission to file a Second Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies identified in the Court's Order (ECF No. 24), and he did so on April 23, 2018 (ECF No. 25). On July 18, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 33) that was converted by the Court into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants' Motion on October 10, 2018. (ECF No. 41.) The Motion is now ripe for review.
B. Standard of Review
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
When determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). In order to avoid summary judgment, however, parties may not rely on unsubstantiated allegations. Parties seeking to establish that a fact is or is not genuinely disputed must support such an assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," by showing that an adverse party's factual assertion lacks support from cited materials, or demonstrating that a factual assertion is unsupportable by admissible evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (requiring evidentiary support for factual assertions made in response to summary judgment). The party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Parties must produce evidence to show the existence of every element essential to its case that they bear the burden of proving at trial, for "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992). Failure to properly support or contest an assertion of fact may result in the fact being considered undisputed for the purpose of the motion, although a court may also give parties an opportunity to properly provide support or opposition. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
C. Discussion
In his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to be reasserting claims against newly named Defendants, specifically alleging violations of his Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as claiming violations of the ADA, all arising out of an apparent improper determination that Plaintiff no longer required to be on lower bunk/lower tier status. (ECF No. 25, generally.) Defendants request that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
Through the PLRA, Congress amended the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) to prohibit prisoners from bringing an action with respect to prison conditions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any other federal law, until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted. Specifically, the act provides in pertinent part as follows:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42 U.S.C. § 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is required under this provision regardless of the type of relief sought and the type of relief available through administrative procedures. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). In addition, the exhaustion requirement applies to all claims relating to prison life which do not implicate the duration of the prisoner's sentence, including those that involve general circumstances as well as particular episodes. See Porter v. Nussle, 524 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
The PLRA also mandates that inmates "properly" exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 93 (2006). "Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency's deadlines and other critical procedural rules because no adjunctive system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings." Id. at 90-91. Importantly, the exhaustion requirement may not be satisfied "by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective . . . appeal." Id. at 83; see also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 228-29 (3d Cir. 2004) (utilizing a procedural default analysis to reach the same conclusion). Courts have concluded that inmates who fail to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance process are barred from subsequently litigating claims in federal courts. See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla v. Strickland, 304 F. App'x 22 (3d Cir. 2008); Jetter v. Beard, 183 F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2006).
This broad rule favoring full exhaustion admits of one, narrowly defined exception. If the actions of prison officials directly caused the inmate's procedural default on a grievance, the inmate will not be held to strict compliance with this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (Section 1997e(a) only requires that prisoners exhaust such administrative remedies "as are available"). However, case law recognizes a clear "reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate's] failure to exhaust as the statute requires." Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App'x 365, 368 (3d Cir. 2002). Thus, an inmate's failure to exhaust will only be excused "under certain limited circumstances," Harris v. Armstrong, 149 F. App'x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005), and an inmate can defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by showing "he was misled or that there was some extraordinary reason he was prevented from complying with the statutory mandate." Davis, 49 F. App'x at 368; see also Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 110 (3d Cir. 2002) (assuming that prisoner with failure to protect claim is entitled to rely on instruction by prison officials to wait for outcome of internal security investigation before filing grievance); Camp, 219 F.3d at 281 (exhaustion requirement met where Office of Professional Responsibility fully examined merits of excessive force claim and correctional officers impeded filing of grievance).
In the absence of competent proof that an inmate was misled by corrections officials, or some other extraordinary circumstances, inmate requests to excuse a failure to exhaust are frequently rebuffed by the courts. Thus, an inmate cannot excuse a failure to timely comply with these grievance procedures by simply claiming that his efforts constituted "substantial compliance" with this statutory exhaustion requirement. Harris, 149 F. App'x at 59. Nor can an inmate avoid this exhaustion requirement by merely alleging that the Department of Corrections policies were not clearly explained to him. Davis, 49 F. App'x at 368. Thus, an inmate's confusion regarding these grievances procedures does not, standing alone, excuse a failure to exhaust. Casey v. Smith, 71 F. App'x 916 (3d Cir. 2003). Moreover, an inmate cannot cite to alleged staff impediments to grieving a matter as grounds for excusing a failure to exhaust, if it also appears that the prisoner did not pursue a proper grievance once those impediments were removed. Oliver v. Moore, 145 F. App'x 731 (3d Cir. 2005) (failure to exhaust not excused if, after staff allegedly ceased efforts to impede grievance, prisoner failed to follow through on grievance).
Within DC-ADM 804, the Inmate Grievance System Policy, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections established a three-step Inmate Grievance System to provide inmates with an avenue to seek review of problems that may arise during the course of confinement. Pursuant to DC-ADM 804, after an attempt to resolve any problems informally, an inmate may submit a written grievance to the facility's Grievance Coordinator for initial review. This must occur within fifteen days after the events upon which the claims are based. Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Grievance Coordinator, an inmate may then appeal to the Facility Manager of the institution. Within fifteen days of an adverse decision by the Facility Manager, an inmate may file a final appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate Grievances and Appeals ("SOIGA"). An appeal to final review cannot be completed unless an inmate complies with all established procedures. An inmate must exhaust all three levels of review and comply with all procedural requirements of the grievance review process in order to fully exhaust an issue. See Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289, 293 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (outlining Pennsylvania's grievance review process); Ingram v. SCI Camp Hill, No. 08-23, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127124, at *21-25 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2010) (same).
A copy of this policy can be found online at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections official website, www.cor.pa.gov. --------
Plaintiff attached to his Second Amended Complaint two grievances which he filed with the prison that relate to his claims - Grievance Nos. 637152 & 637153. (ECF Nos. 25-4, 25-7.) He also attached the initial responses to those grievances (ECF Nos. 25-5, 25-8), as well as the Facility Manager's appeal responses (ECF No. 25-6, 25-9) and the final appeal response by the SOIGA (ECF No. 25-10). However, a review of the final appeal response reveals that Plaintiff's appeal was filed without action because it was procedurally defective. Id. Specifically, the "Comments/Action Taken" section states as follows:
Mr. Cameron, your intent is unclear by sending parts of the above numbered grievances to this office. You have nothing labeled as an appeal for either grievance and you fail to include all relevant documents for each grievance. Be advised that you must appeal each grievance separately. You are encouraged to review the policy for clarity. It appears that you have minimal time left to file a proper appeal to Final Review. Future correspondence regarding either grievance/issue may be filed without action or reply.Id. According to Defendants, Plaintiff did not follow up with a properly filed final appeal.
In response to Defendants' request for dismissal for failure to exhaust, Plaintiff states that he was prevented from including the relevant documents in his final appeal to SOIGA because he did not receive a response to his request for copies of his appeal to the Superintendent. (ECF No. 41.) Fatal to Plaintiff's argument, however, is the fact that Plaintiff not only failed to include all relevant documents with his final appeal, but also failed to comply with other aspects of DC-ADM 804 that requires, inter alia, inmates clearly label their appeals and appeal each grievance separately. See DC-ADM 804, Section 2(B)(1)(e)(1), (8). Furthermore, Plaintiff could have requested a time extension for filing his final appeal if he was unable to obtain all relevant documentation as he claims. See DC-ADM 804, Section 2(B)(1)(c). Not only did he fail to do these things, but he also failed to follow-up on the response he received from SOIGA even after he was warned that he had minimal time left to file a proper appeal to final review. Clearly, Plaintiff did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies and his claim that he was prevented from doing so is unmeritorious. As such, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion be granted and that Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 33) that has been converted into a Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of Plaintiff's exhaustion of administrative remedies (ECF No. 35) be granted.
In accordance with the applicable provisions of the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Rules of Court, Plaintiff shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of the service of this report and recommendation to file written objections thereto. Plaintiff's failure to file timely objections will constitute a waiver of his appellate rights.
Dated: October 25, 2018.
/s/ Lisa Pupo Lenihan
Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge cc: Daryl Eugene Cameron
LM 0524
SCI Greene
175 Progress Drive
Waynesburg, PA 15370
Counsel for Defendants
(Via CM/ECF electronic mail)