Opinion
76559.
DECIDED JUNE 15, 1988.
Armed robbery, etc. Charlton Superior Court. Before Judge Blount.
John B. Adams, for appellant.
Harry D. Dixon, Jr., District Attorney, Margaret M. Edwards, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted of armed robbery and aggravated assault upon a peace officer. Appellant appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered by the trial court on the jury's verdicts.
1. The trial court's admission into evidence of certain of appellant's in-custody statements is enumerated as error. Before allowing appellant's in-custody statements into evidence, the trial court conducted a Jackson-Denno hearing and concluded that those statements had been voluntarily made and were, therefore, admissible. "Factual and credibility determinations of voluntariness made at a Jackson-Denno hearing must be accepted by appellate courts unless clearly erroneous. [Cit.]" Mungin v. State, 183 Ga. App. 290, 291 (1) ( 358 S.E.2d 673) (1987). Our review of the transcript of the Jackson-Denno hearing reveals that, in the light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances, the trial court's finding as to the voluntariness of appellant's in-custody statements was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.
2. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court's failure to charge on the crime of simple battery as a lesser included offense of the alleged aggravated assault. The evidence adduced at trial showed that the victim of the assault had been stabbed with a knife and was then hit repeatedly on the head with a pistol. "[T]he offense of simple battery is not reasonably raised by [this] evidence, [and] it is not in issue so as to require instructions. [Cit.]" Guthrie v. State, 147 Ga. App. 351, 353 (2) ( 248 S.E.2d 714) (1978). See also Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 584, 588 (6) ( 218 S.E.2d 297) (1975).
3. Appellant enumerates the general grounds. Our review of the entire record reveals that, from the evidence which was produced at trial, a rational prior of fact could reasonably have found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).
Judgment affirmed. Deen, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.