" A majority of the court hold that the memorandum filed by the trial court in denying the motion to set aside the verdict adequately disposes of the only issue on appeal. The situation is similar to that in Brangi v. Marshall, 117 Conn. 675, 168 A. 21; and see Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 604, 143 A. 881. In the instant case, as in the Brangi case, the jury could have found that when the plaintiff reached the edge of the intersection he reduced his speed before proceeding on through it. If he had the right to proceed, this he might properly do, for "he was entitled to assume that the driver of the truck would grant it to him and have the truck under control so that the plaintiff could proceed through the intersection, in the exercise of reasonable care, without interference."

General Statutes 2489, 2518. No exception was applicable in the instant case. Crowley v. Dix, 136 Conn. 97, 103, 68 A.2d 366; Prato v. Coffey, 135 Conn. 445, 447, 66 A.2d 113; Squires v. Wolcott, 133 Conn. 449, 455, 52 A.2d 305; Lassow v. Bulkley, 132 Conn. 476, 477, 45 A.2d 714; Weimer v. Brock-Hall Dairy Co., 131 Conn. 361, 365, 40 A.2d 277; Feckham v. Knofla, 130 Conn. 646, 648, 36 A.2d 740; Service Fire Ins. Co. v. Brodner, 130 Conn. 223, 225, 33 A.2d 138; Smith v. Usher, 130 Conn. 204, 205, 33 A.2d 137; Alderman v. Kelly, 130 Conn. 98, 100, 32 A.2d 66; Kleps v. Dworkin, 127 Conn. 648, 650, 19 A.2d 421; McNaught v. Smith, 127 Conn. 450, 451, 17 A.2d 771; Mathis v. Bzdula, 122 Conn. 202, 203, 188 A. 264; Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 679, 174 A. 80; Brangi v. Marshall, 117 Conn. 675, 676, 168 A. 21; Rosenberg v. Matulis, 116 Conn. 675, 677, 166 A. 397; Whipple v. Fardig, 112 Conn. 402, 403, 152 A. 397; Hall v. Root, 109 Conn. 33, 35, 145 A. 36; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 604, 143 A. 881; Jackson v. Brown, 106 Conn. 143, 145, 137 A. 725; Friedman v. Cunningham, 104 Conn. 737, 132 A. 401; Rohde v. Nock, 101 Conn. 439, 443, 126 A. 335; Bettilyon v. Smith Son, Inc., 96 Conn. 16, 20, 112 A. 649; Neumann v. Apter, 95 Conn. 695, 699, 112 A. 350. The arrival of the vehicles at the intersection at approximately the same time is the essential element which gives the right of way to the driver of the vehicle on the right.

The defendants claimed that the truck had the right of way under the statute, which provides that where two cars approach an intersection at approximately the same time, the car approaching from the right shall have the right of way. General Statutes, Cum. Sup. 1935, 636c. The plaintiff, on the other hand, claimed that she had passed more than half way through the intersection when the truck entered it and that she therefore had the right of way under the rule set forth in Jackson v. Brown, 106 Conn. 143, 137 A. 725; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 604, 143 A. 881; Brangi v. Marshall, 117 Conn. 675, 168 A. 21, and Fitzhugh v. Bushnell, 118 Conn. 677, 679, 174 A. 80. It thus became material in the case to determine what constituted the intersection of the highways within the statutory provision. The nature of the intersection is shown in the accompanying diagram.

The finding is devoid of any suggestion that a repetition of the "shimmy" played any part in producing the accident, but establishes on the contrary that the accident resulted from negligent operation of the automobile by the defendant's mechanic. The determination of the facts showing the conduct of the parties and whether that conduct measured up to the standard of care, being one peculiarly within the province of the trial court, its conclusions present no occasion for review; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 143 A. 881; Rozycki v. Yantic Grain Products Co., 99 Conn. 711, 122 A. 717; Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. Co., 60 Conn. 239, 21 A. 675, 22 id. 544; in the absence at least of its appearing that they are unreasonable. Rozycki v. Yantic Grain Products Co., supra. Defendant's principal contention is that the plaintiff while riding with its mechanic in the plaintiff's car was its guest and in consequence it can be held liable only if the accident was intentional on the part of its servant or was the result of his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.

This action grew out of a collision between an automobile owned by the plaintiff and one owned by one of the defendants and being operated at the time by her agent, the other defendant. The plaintiff's car was approaching the intersection from the right of the defendant, but the trial court found that that of the defendant arrived at the intersection materially in advance of the plaintiff's so that the car of the latter did not have the right of way, and that its driver was negligent in failing to observe the defendant's car and in failing to stop in time to avoid the collision. If the two cars were not approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and the defendant's entered it first, it would have the right of way. Jackson v. Brown, 106 Conn. 143, 145, 137 A. 725; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 604, 143 A. 881; Horsfall v. Foley, 111 Conn. 722, 150 A. 64. Recognizing this, the plaintiff seeks to have the finding corrected to show that the cars were approaching the intersection at substantially the same time, but we cannot say that there was no evidence reasonably supporting the findings and conclusions of the trial court, and they must stand. Even if there was no evidence to support the finding that the driver of the plaintiff's car gave no signal of his approach, a correction in this regard would not be material as the court based his negligence upon other grounds, which do find reasonable support in the evidence.

The interpretation there given to the statute has since been followed and applied. Jackson v. Brown, 106 Conn. 143, 137 A. 735; Rohde v. Nock, 101 Conn. 439, 126 A. 335; Hall v. Root, 109 Conn. 33, 145 A. 36; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 143 A. 881. No reason is suggested or discernible why this rule should not be applicable where and when — as in Neumann v. Apter and in this case — the course taken by one of two cars which have been approaching each other on the same street is so altered as to change their relation from one of meeting and passing on such street to that of approaching and traversing an intersection, similarly as would cars traveling along separate streets and one approaching the intersection from the right of the other.

We cannot say that, as a matter of law, under the conditions prevailing at the time of this accident, which could not well have been worse, it was not negligent for the plaintiff to operate his car at a speed in excess of twenty miles an hour. Whether the conduct of the plaintiff measured up to the standard of care — that of the ordinarily prudent man — was, under the circumstances, a question of fact for the trial court and its conclusion is not reviewable. Rozycki v. Yantic Grain Products Co., 99 Conn. 711, 122 A. 717; Camarotta v. Kling, 108 Conn. 602, 143 A. 881.