Opinion
EDCV 23-0556 SSS (AS)
07-11-2023
PEDRO CAMACHO-CORONA, Plaintiff, v. DR. ORTIZ, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
ALKA SAGAR UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
On March 27, 2021, Pedro Camacho-Corona (“Plaintiff”), a federal inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a civil rights complaint (“Complaint”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against the Warden of the Federal Correctional Institute in Victorville, California (“FCI-Victorville), “Lead Physician” Dr. Ortiz, and “[Mid-]Level [Practitioner] or Nurse” Castillo in their individual capacities. (Dkt. No. 1).
For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend.
PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that on November 7, 2011, July 25, 2012, and August 15, 2012, the Defendants deprived him of his right to proper medical care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Complaint at 3-5 (as paginated on the Court's electronic docket)). He asserts that:
Each defendant was aware that my Eighth Amendment [r]ight was being violated and [was] deliberate in . . . denying my serious medica[l] needs[,] which were caused by the doctors in the [Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)] medical network. By not treating my condition[,] deliberate indifference is clear. The substantial risk of failing to treat my serious medical [condition] caused by malpractice is significant and [unnecessary] infliction of pain. Because [I] followed all the procedures that the BOP policy provides, all defendants were aware and were provided with copies of my needs medically and what [I] was suffering from [as] medical records were in their possession. Prolonging my bleeding and preventing medication [dosages] that would limit my pain and failing to conduct the proper surgery to correct the errors added to my pain and suffering over a long period of time. My [diagnosis] and treatment was not disputed ever. Each defendant at the grievance stage was informed and failed to act.(Id. at 5). Plaintiff also vaguely alleges he has been “promised a surgery.” (Id. at 3). Additionally, Plaintiff complains that Dr. Ortiz “is responsible for my health care and has refused to provide me with quality care and assure that my pain and suffering and medical errors committed are corrected[,]” Castillo “refused to provide medical assistance to cease the blood [that] was coming from my mouth or provide a proper written report so that [Plaintiff could] obtain medical care to stop the flow of blood[,]” and the “Warden is responsible for the employees['] actions and was made aware of the failure to comply with medical care that [Plaintiff] was seeking and choose [sic.] not to intervine [sic.] on [Plaintiff's] behalf[,] which led to [Plaintiff] suffering for a prolonged time frame.” (Id. at 4).
Based on the alleged constitutional violation, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment and $150,000,000 in damages. (Id. at 6).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since Plaintiff is a prison inmate proceeding in forma pauperis and suing prison employees, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to sua sponte review and must be dismissed if it is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (Section 1915(e)(2) applies to all complaints brought by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate if Plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Hartmann v. Cal. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). Although Plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the [complaint] need only give the [Defendants] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
In considering whether to dismiss a complaint, the Court must accept the factual allegations of the complaint as true, Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 755 n.5 (2014); Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93-94, construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the pleading party, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). Pro se pleadings are “to be liberally construed” and are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by a lawyer. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94; Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Iqbal incorporated the Twombly pleading standard and Twombly did not alter courts' treatment of pro se filings; accordingly, we continue to construe pro se filings liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.”). Dismissal for failure to state a claim can be warranted based on either the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of factual support for a cognizable legal theory. See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). A complaint may also be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it discloses some fact or complete defense that will necessarily defeat the claim. Rivera v. Peri & Sons Farms, Inc., 735 F.3d 892, 902 (9th Cir. 2013).
DISCUSSION
The Court has reviewed the Complaint under the aforementioned standards and has concluded the Complaint is deficient and must be dismissed with leave to amend.
First, Plaintiff has filed suit under Section 1983. (Complaint at 1). However, “[t]here is no valid basis for a claim under section 1983, in that [Plaintiff's] allegations are against federal officials acting under color of federal law. Section 1983 provides a remedy only for deprivation of constitutional rights by a person acting under color of law of any state or territory or the District of Columbia. Thus, the only possible action is an action under the authority of [Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)].” Daly-Murphy v. Winston, 837 F.2d 348, 355 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted); see also Billings v. United States, 57 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1995) (Section 1983 “provides no cause of action against federal agents acting under color of federal law[.]”).
This is true to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against the Defendants in their individual capacities. See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A Bivens action seeks to hold federal officers individually liable for constitutional violations.”); Stanley v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 653, 657 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A ‘Bivens action' is a commonly used phrase for describing a judicially created remedy allowing individuals to seek damages for unconstitutional conduct by federal officials.”) . “[R]elief under Bivens does not encompass . . . declaratory relief where . . . the equitable relief sought requires official government action.” Ministerio Roca Solida v. McKelvey, 820 F.3d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016).
If this was the only deficiency, the Court would not dismiss the Complaint. See Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam) (“Federal pleading rules call for ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a) (2); they do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.”); Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530 (2011) (“[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff's claim for relief to a precise legal theory. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires only a plausible ‘short and plain' statement of the plaintiff's claim, not an exposition of his legal argument.”); Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Notice pleading requires the plaintiff to set forth in his complaint claims for relief, not causes of action, statutes or legal theories. . . . A complaint need not identify the statutory or constitutional source of the claim raised in order to survive a motion to dismiss.”).
Second, California's two-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to Bivens claims. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. § 335.1; see also Klein v. City of Beverly Hills, 865 F.3d 1276, 1278 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“California has a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions.”); Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (“‘Although federal law determines when a Bivens claim accrues, the law of the forum state determines the statute of limitations for such a claim.'” (quoting Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002))); Yasin v. Coulter, 449 Fed.Appx. 687, 689 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The statute of limitations for a Bivens action is defined by the relevant state's personal injury statute. In California, the applicable statute of limitations is two years.” (citation omitted)). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff's medical care claim is based on injuries sustained in 2011 and 2012, the Complaint appears untimely. (Complaint at 2-3).
Third, in March 2014, in Camacho-Corona v. Ortiz, United States District Court for the Central District of California case no. EDCV 14-0543-VAP(KK) (“Camacho-Corona I”), Plaintiff filed a Bivens action against, inter alia, “Mid-Level Practitioner Lilia Castillo . . . [and] Dr. Angel Ortiz” alleging they, and other defendants, “violated his Eighth Amendment rights by showing deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs” between 2011 and 2013, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at FCI-Victorville. Camacho-Corona v. Ortiz, 2018 WL 11379083, *1-2 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The District Court in Camacho-Corona I ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Ortiz and Castillo, Id. at *8, 10-11, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. Camacho-Corona v. Ortiz, 765 Fed.Appx. 203 (9th Cir. 2019). To the extent Plaintiff is attempting in this action to relitigate claims that were, or could have been raised, in Camacho-Corona I, he is not free to do so. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”).
Pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 201, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket and proceedings in Camacho-Corona I. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969) (federal court may properly take judicial notice of its own files and records); United States v. Raygoza-Garcia, 902 F.3d 994, 1001 (9th Cir. 2018) (“A court may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, which may include court records available through PACER.”); Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (The Court “may take judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or state courts.” (citations omitted)).
Fourth, even if Plaintiff intends to raise a claim based on a denial of medical care occurring later than the 2011 and 2012 dates listed in the Complaint, he has failed to state a viable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim. The government has an Eighth Amendment obligation to provide medical care for those whom it incarcerates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 17-23 (1980); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. “But not every breach of that duty is of constitutional proportions. In order to violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment, there must be a deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104. Deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment exists when a prison official knows an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm to his health and fails to take reasonable measures to abate the risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Toguchi v. Soon Hwang Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004). “Deliberate indifference ‘may appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.'” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104-05. In either case, the indifference to the inmate's medical needs must be substantial; inadequate treatment due to negligence, inadvertence, or differences in judgment between an inmate and medical personnel does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057.
Here, setting aside other issues, Plaintiff's allegations are far too vague and conclusory to state a viable deliberate indifference claim. See Litmon v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014) (vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are insufficient to state a claim); Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (same). Among other deficiencies, the Complaint does not coherently explain how Plaintiff has been injured, or how Defendants have injured him. See Wood, 572 U.S. at 763 (“[I]ndividual government officials ‘cannot be held liable' in a Bivens suit ‘unless they themselves acted [unconstitutionally].'” (citation omitted)); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens . . . suits, a plaintiff must plead that each . . . [D]efendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Lemire v. Cal. Dep't of Corrs. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[P]laintiffs alleging deliberate indifference must also demonstrate that the defendants' actions were both an actual and proximate cause of their injuries.”); OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2012) (“‘[E]ach government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.'” (citation omitted)). For example, the Court is left to guess about what serious medical needs Plaintiff might have, the nature of the surgery Plaintiff has allegedly been promised, what medication Plaintiff has been denied, and, most importantly, what actions Defendants have taken - or failed to take - that have injured Plaintiff. (See Complaint at 3-5).
Plaintiff has attached various documents to his Complaint, including medical records and portions of the civil rights complaint filed against Dr. Ortiz, “MLP Castillo,” and others in Camacho-Corona v. Ortiz, United States District Court for the Central District of California case no. 12-1620-ABC(SS) (“Camacho-Corona II”) . (See Complaint at 7-76); (see also Camacho-Corona II, Dkt. No. 1 (complaint filed August 28, 2012), Dkt. Nos. 13-15 (March 21, 2013 Judgment and related documents dismissing action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies)). While the Court may consider these documents in assessing the viability of Plaintiff's Complaint, see Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (“‘When a plaintiff has attached various exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be considered in determining whether dismissal was proper without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.'” (citation omitted)), the documents do not cure the deficiencies discussed herein.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff is complaining he has been the victim of “medical errors” or “malpractice[,]” allegations of medical malpractice or “[e]ven gross negligence [are] insufficient to [state a claim for] deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1081-82; see also Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106 (1976) (A “complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2016) (“‘A showing of medical malpractice or negligence is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation under the Eighth Amendment.'” (citation omitted)).
ORDER
Plaintiff's Complaint (Docket No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. If Plaintiff still wishes to pursue this action, he shall file a First Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days, which cures the pleading defects discussed herein. The First Amended Complaint shall be complete in itself without reference to any pleading or other document. See Local Rule 15-2 (“Every amended pleading filed as a matter of right or allowed by order of the Court shall be complete including exhibits. The amended pleading shall not refer to the prior, superseded pleading.”). In addition, the First Amended Complaint may not include new defendants or claims not reasonably related to the allegations in the previously filed Complaint. Plaintiff is strongly encouraged to utilize the standard civil rights complaint form when filing any amended complaint, a copy of which is attached.
Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely file a First Amended Complaint, or failure to correct the deficiencies described herein, will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed for failure to prosecute and/or failure to comply with a court order. Plaintiff is further advised that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may file a Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form Notice of Dismissal is attached for Plaintiff's convenience .