Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate, Los Angeles County, No. BC371990, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge.
Berman, Berman & Berman, Karen E. Adelman, for Petitioners Rob Calvert and Second Son Consulting, Inc.
Soltman, Levitt & Flaherty, Garth M. Drozin, for Petitioners Steven Leebove and MacRescue, LLC.
No appearance for Respondent.
Huron Law Group, Jeffrey Huron, for Real Party in Interest Lisa Marie.
CROSKEY, J.
The proceeding before us involves a number of procedural and substantive issues that must be resolved in the trial court. Accordingly, on our own motion, we have determined a peremptory writ of mandate must be issued in order to permit the trial court to clarify the confusion present in this case, caused in part by the change of plaintiffs to defendants and possibly back to plaintiffs and exacerbated by the failure of the court to explain to the parties the problems and act to correct those problems or dismiss the action.
DISCUSSION
1. Trial court proceedings prior to the filing of the instant petition for writ of mandate.
On May 31, 2007, Lisa Marie, acting as a plaintiff, filed a complaint against defendants Steven Leebove and MacRescue, LLC. On July 10, 2007, Lisa Marie filed a fictitious name amendment identifying Rob Calvert as a defendant. On July 16, 2007, Leebove and MacRescue filed demurrers to the entire complaint. On October 2, 2007, Calvert filed a demurrer to the entire complaint.
On November 8, 2007, Judge Maureen Duffy-Lewis sustained the demurrer and gave Lisa Marie leave to amend. The time to file the amended complaint ran on December 8, 2007. Lisa Marie did not file an amended complaint.
On December 10, 2007, Lisa Marie filed a fictitious/incorrect name amendment to the complaint. Lisa Marie stated she had incorrectly designated Lisa Marie as a defendant in the complaint (she had not) and substituted the name of Marie Music Group, LLC as a defendant. On December 19, 2007, Lisa Marie filed a second fictitious name amendment to the complaint identifying defendant Second Son Consulting Inc. Both of these documents were filed after the time to amend the complaint had expired. As of that time, there was no plaintiff of record and no operative complaint.
On December 24, 2007, Marie Music Group, which had been designated as a defendant, filed an amended complaint, listing itself as the sole plaintiff.
On January 4, 2008, defendants Leebove, MacRescue, and Calvert applied ex parte for dismissal of the action with prejudice for failure to timely file an amended complaint. The ex parte application was heard by Judge David L. Minning because Judge Duffy-Lewis’s courtroom was dark. Lisa Marie, calling herself a plaintiff, filed opposition to the ex parte application for dismissal. After reviewing the opposition and hearing argument, Judge David L. Minning granted the application and dismissed the action with prejudice for failure to file an amended complaint.
The order dismissing the action with prejudice was entered in the court’s Register of Actions on January 4, 2008. The defendants’ notice of the ruling was filed on January 7, 2008, with a copy of Judge Minning’s minute order attached.
On January 8, 2008, Lisa Marie (who had either changed her designation to defendant or eliminated herself altogether by substituting Lisa Marie Music Group in her place) again identified herself as a plaintiff and filed an ex parte application seeking reconsideration and asking for revocation of Judge Minning’s order.
Judge Duffy-Lewis granted the ex parte application without a hearing. The minute order, dated January 8, 2008, states only: “Ex parte application to reconsider and revoke order of January 4, 2008. [¶] Ex parte application is granted.” The order of Judge Duffy-Lewis had the effect of revoking Judge Minning’s order and reinstating the action. On the same day, Judge Duffy-Lewis signed an order removing Lisa Marie as a defendant and substituting Marie Music Group as a defendant.
On January 4, 2008, Leebove and MacRescue, the original defendants, filed a motion seeking revocation of the order of Judge Duffy-Lewis which vacated the order of Judge Minning and repeated the request for dismissal of the action. They later withdrew the motion and filed this petition instead.
The relief initially requested in the petition was: (1) dismissal of the action following failure to timely file an amended complaint after a demurrer was sustained with leave to amend (Code Civ. Proc., § 481, subd. (f)(2) and Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1320(h)); (2) reinstatement of the January 4, 2008 order of Judge David L. Minning dismissing the complaint for failure to file the amended complaint; (3) vacation of the January 8, 2008 order of Judge Maureen Duffy-Lewis in which Judge Duffy-Lewis vacated Judge Minning’s order and permitted the filing of an amended complaint by a party previously added to the action as a defendant.
2. Trial court proceedings subsequent to our issuance of the March 4, 2008 order.
In addition, to the substantive problems with the underlying superior court case, Judge Maureen Duffy-Lewis added to the confusion by vacating an order of dismissal entered by Judge David Minning. On March 4, 2008, we notified the parties that it was our intention to vacate Judge Duffy-Lewis’s improper order and direct that the motion to reconsider be transferred to Judge Minning, the judicial officer who had originally ruled on the order for dismissal.
A judge sitting in one department of the superior court is without power to reconsider, revise, or change a decision made by a judge sitting in another department of the superior court. (Ford v. Superior Court (1986) 188 Cal.App.3d 737, 741-742.) A superior court is but one tribunal, even though composed of many departments. An order made in one department cannot be ignored or changed in a different department. An order or judgment entered in one department is binding in that matter on all departments of the court until such time as that order or judgment is overturned by a higher court. (Id. at p. 742.) Judge Duffy-Lewis clearly acted without jurisdiction in revoking the order entered by Judge Minning. It has long been established that one trial court judge cannot reconsider or overturn a ruling of another judge. (Curtin v. Koskey (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 873, 876-877.)
As an integral part of this court’s notice, we indicated that after Judge Duffy-Lewis vacated her improperly entered order, “the motion for reconsideration shall be transferred to Judge Minning to determine whether the motion satisfies the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 and, if it does, whether the new evidence or facts sufficiently explains the failure to timely file an amended complaint, and clarifies the relevant standing of the parties as plaintiffs or defendants in view of the December 7, 2007, substitution of Marie Music Group as a defendant, followed by the purported filing of a complaint that designated Marie Music Group as a plaintiff and the continued designation of Lisa Marie as a plaintiff. [¶] Following Judge Minning’s determination of the procedural and substantive issues, Judge Minning may determine whether the initial order dismissing the entire action with prejudice should be reinstated, whether the action should be dismissed without prejudice, or whether the motion to reconsider should be granted with directions to the parties as to clarification of the parties’ respective standing in the action.”
Thereafter, Judge Duffy-Lewis exceeded the scope of the authority granted by his court’s order when she directed the filing of a second motion for reconsideration and setting a briefing schedule. Upon learning of Judge Duffy-Lewis’s action, we issued a second order vacating all parts of Judge Duffy-Lewis’s order other than transferring the motion for reconsideration to Judge Minning for determination.
3. Trial court proceedings subsequent to our order of March 20, 2008.
Thereafter, Judge Duffy-Lewis transferred the motion for reconsideration to Judge Minning. However, after reviewing the motion for reconsideration on April 15, 2008, Judge Minning granted the motion and commented, “In the words of Abbott and Costello, who’s on first! Or who is the plaintiff?” While the trial court’s frustration is understandable, its order failed to address the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, on our own motion, we have determined that a peremptory writ of mandate must be issued in order to permit the trial court to clarify the procedural status in this case, caused in part by the confusion about the identity of plaintiffs and intensified by the failure of the court to explain to the parties the problems and to act effectively to correct those problems.
We therefore have determined that “ ‘ “no purpose could reasonably be served by plenary consideration of the issue . . . .” [Citation.]’ ” (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1241) and simply grant the relief deemed by this court to be necessary to clarify the status of the matter.
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted in part and a writ of mandate shall issue directing the trial court to vacate the April 15, 2008 order, and to determine on the merits the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration, including those specified by this court as set forth herein. The issues to be determined by Judge Minning include a determination as to whether: (1) the initial order dismissing the entire action with prejudice should be reinstated; (2) the action should be dismissed without prejudice; or (3) the motion to reconsider should be granted with directions to the parties as to clarification of the parties’ respective standing in the action.
In all other respects, the petition is denied without prejudice to determination by Judge Minning of all issues presented in the motion for reconsideration.
The stay issued March 4, 2008 is lifted.
No costs are awarded in this proceeding.
We concur: KLEIN, P.J., ALDRICH, J.