Opinion
04-22-00006-CR
10-05-2022
Paul Reyes CALTZONTZIN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 198th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas Trial Court No. B20-613 Honorable Rex Emerson, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice, Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice, Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Appellant Paul Reyes Caltzontzin appeals his judgment of conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. In one issue, Caltzontzin contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's assessment of attorney's fees against him. We agree, and we reform the judgment as to attorney's fees and affirm the judgment as reformed.
Background
Caltzontzin was charged by indictment with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second-degree felony conviction, enhanced by two prior felony convictions. Caltzontzin pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to sixty years' confinement. The trial court also ordered Caltzontzin to pay court costs in the amount of $290.00 and to reimburse the Kerr County Department of Court Services in the amount of $3,292.00 for his court-appointed attorney's fees. Caltzontzin now appeals.
Assessment of Attorney's Fees
Caltzontzin contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's assessment of attorney's fees against him because he is indigent. According to Caltzontzin, the trial court's appointment of his trial attorney constitutes an implicit finding of his indigency, and there is nothing in the record indicating his financial circumstances have materially changed to justify the assessment of attorney's fees. The State concedes Caltzontzin is indigent, and the trial court's assessment of attorney's fees was erroneous.
In a criminal case, a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting court costs is reviewable on direct appeal. Ginn v. State, No. 10-18-00354-CR, 2020 WL 4360796, at *1 (Tex. App.-Waco July 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Mayer v. State, 309 S.W.3d 552, 554-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)); see Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Gutierrez v. State, No. 04-21-00248-CR, 2022 WL 2135540, at *7 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 15, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the award. Mayer, 309 S.W.3d at 557.
Article 26.05(g) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides a trial court with the authority to order the reimbursement of court-appointed attorney's fees as court costs if it "determines that a defendant has financial resources that enable the defendant to offset in part or in whole the costs of the legal services provided . . . including any expenses and costs." Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 26.05(g). However, the trial court may not assess the reimbursement of court- appointed attorney's fees against a defendant who it determines is indigent because a defendant's indigence is presumed to continue through the remainder of the proceedings "unless a material change in [his] financial circumstances occurs." See Tex. Code Crim. Pro. art. 26.04(p); Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Here, the record shows the trial court appointed an attorney to represent Caltzontzin at trial, implicitly finding Caltzontzin indigent. See Gallegos-Piedra v. State, No. 14-14-01025-CR, 2016 WL 316400, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ("[T]he trial court's appointment of counsel for appellant reflects an implicit finding that appellant was indigent."). The record further shows after the trial court entered its judgment against Caltzontzin, it appointed an attorney to represent Caltzontzin on appeal and granted Caltzontzin's request for a free reporter's record. There is no evidence in the record showing Caltzontzin's financial circumstances materially changed, and the State concedes Caltzontzin is entitled to the relief he seeks. Accordingly, we conclude Caltzontzin is indigent and unable to afford counsel, and the trial court erred in requiring him to reimburse the court for his attorney's fees. See Rivas v. State, 486 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2016, pet. ref'd) (holding trial court erred in assessing appointed attorney's fees against defendant when no evidence of material change in defendant's financial circumstances). We therefore sustain Caltzontzin's sole issue.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we reform the trial court's judgment to delete the assessment of attorney's fees and affirm the judgment as reformed.