Opinion
Civil Action 24-CV-2320
06-27-2024
JESSE CALLOWAY, IV, Plaintiff v. TEMPLE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, et al., Defendants
ORDER
NITZA I. QUINONES ALEJANDRO Judge.
AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff Jesse Calloway, IV's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 6), and Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5), it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2. The Amended Complaint is DEEMED filed.
3. For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum, the Amended Complaint is dismissed as follows:
a. All claims against Temple University College, Richard M. Englert, Jennifer Griffin, Enoch McCoy, Monica H. Padilla, P.O. Garrett, and P.O. Austin are DISMISSED, without prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
b. All claims against Temple University Police are DISMISSED, with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
4. Calloway may file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Any amended pleading must identify all defendants in the caption in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint and shall state the basis for Calloway's claims against each defendant. The Second Amended Complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on prior pleadings or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his Second Amended Complaint, Calloway should be mindful of the Court's reasons for dismissing the claims in his Amended Complaint as explained in the Court's Memorandum. Calloway may not reassert a claim that has been dismissed with prejudice. Upon the filing of a Second Amended Complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
5. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Calloway a blank copy of this Court's current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the above-captioned civil action number. Calloway may use this form to file his Second Amended Complaint if he chooses to do so.
6. If Calloway does not wish to file a Second Amended Complaint and instead intends to stand on his Amended Complaint as originally pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Amended Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when the district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
7. If Calloway fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Calloway intends to stand on his Amended Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff's intent to stand on his complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective complaint).
The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on her complaint. See Weber, 939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend her complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).