Opinion
No. 14-17245
12-16-2015
JAMISI JERMAINE CALLOWAY, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. RANGEL, Sergeant; et al., Defendants - Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 1:12-cv-00193-GSA MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
Gary S. Austin, Magistrate Judge, Presiding Before: WALLACE, RAWLINSON, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Calloway consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Jamisi Jermaine Calloway, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a 2003 alleged excessive force incident. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 2011) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (dismissal on the basis of a statute of limitations). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Calloway's action because, even with the benefit of statutory tolling due to incarceration, Calloway failed to file his action within the applicable statute of limitations and failed to demonstrate he was entitled to equitable tolling. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 335.1, 352.1 (two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims; two-year tolling period due to incarceration); Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 486 F.3d 1128, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2007) (forum state's personal injury statute of limitations and tolling laws apply to § 1983 actions); see also Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1999) (three-pronged test for equitable tolling in California; plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling where "actions were not a reasonable and good faith effort to pursue his claims in an alternate forum or case" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. Gilliland, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 520, 524 (Ct. App. 2002) ("In the absence of a statute, a party cannot deduct from the period of the statute of limitations applicable to his case the time consumed by the pendency of an action in which he sought to have the matter adjudicated, but which was dismissed without prejudice to him." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
We reject Calloway's contentions that his claims are not time-barred due to his pro se status, or because of his alleged incapacitation after the statute of limitations had already expired.
AFFIRMED.