Nelson v. Nelson, 1998 OK 10, ¶ 11, 954 P.2d 1219; Fair School Finance Council v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶ 34, 746 P.2d 1135.Nelson v. Nelson, see note 15, supra;Fair School Finance Council v. State, see note 15, supra;McKeever Drilling Co. v.Egbert, 1935 OK ___, 170 Okla. 259, 40 P.2d 32, 35;Callaway v. City of Edmond, 1990 OK CR 25, ¶ 8, 791 P.2d 104. ¶ 9 There is a strong presumption which favors legislative enactments.
¶18 We also find that the classifications here are rationally related to legitimate State purposes and are neither arbitrary nor capricious. See Callaway v. City of Edmond, 1990 OK CR 25, ¶ 10, 791 P.2d 104, 106 (holding age classifications are constitutional if reasonably related to legitimate state interests). Appellant was afforded a judicial determination that he should stand trial as an adult.
See Sawatzky v. City of Oklahoma City, 1995 OK CR 69, ¶ 4, 906 P.2d 785, 786 ("[t]he right to equal protection guaranteed under Oklahoma's Constitution has consistently been interpreted as coextensive with the right to equal protection guaranteed under the federal constitution."); Callaway v. City of Edmond 1990 OK CR 25, ¶ 8, 791 P.2d 104, 106 n. 1 ("[o]ur due process clause in Art. 2 Sec. 7, Okl. Const., has a definitional range that is coextensive with its federal counterpart. . . ."). "
demption periods was equal protection violation where class membership did not correlate with purported class distinctions drawn by legislature); Chicago N.W. Ry., 255 Iowa at 997, 125 N.W.2d at 214 ("It is often said a reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated, and none who are not."); Dunahoo v. Huber, 185 Iowa 753, 756, 171 N.W. 123, 124 (1919) (finding statute violated state constitution because classification made by legislature was unwarranted "where the evil to be remedied relates to members of one class quite as well as to another"); s ee also Ill. Sporting Goods Ass'n v. County of Cook, 845 F. Supp. 582, 591 (N.D.Ill. 1994) (holding ordinance that prohibited location of gun shop within .5 miles of a school or public park was "under-inclusive in violation of the equal protection clause" because the ordinance contained exceptions to the ban that permitted certain businesses to continue to sell guns within the restricted geographical area); Callaway v. City of Edmund, 791 P.2d 104, 107-08 (Okla.Cr.App. 1990) (finding state equal protection violation because ordinance prohibiting persons under eighteen years of age from entering any pool hall or similar establishment "sweeps too broadly" and "is not rationally related to the ultimate objective of regulating gambling": "Singling out poolhalls or other similar businesses from all other amusement establishments is an act of discrimination, not policy."); State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162, 168 (W.Va. 1996) (rejecting as legitimate basis for challenged classification that statute reducing workers' compensation benefits upon receipt of old age insurance benefits under Social Security Act avoided duplication of benefits because the statute did not "in fact avoid 'duplication of benefits'"). Even if this court were to take a more expansive view of potential legislative purposes and assume the general assembly sought to promote economic development in general, the taxing scheme still suffers from an irrational classification.
DuLaney v. Oklahoma State Dept. of Health, 1993 OK 113, 868 P.2d 676, 685; Fair School Finance Council v. State, 1987 OK 114, 746 P.2d 1135, 1148.Fair School Finance Council v. State, see note 12, supra;McKeever Drilling Co. v. Egbert, 1935 OK ___, 170 Okla. 259, 40 P.2d 32, 35; Callaway v. City of Edmond, 1990 OK CR 25, 791 P.2d 104, 106. ¶ 11 There is a strong presumption which favors legislative enactments.
1987).Callaway v. City of Edmond, 791 P.2d 104, 106 (Okla. 1990); Fair School Finance Council v. State, see note 28, supra; McKeever Drilling Co. v. Egbert, 170 Okla. 259, 40 P.2d 32, 35 (1935). The taxpayer relies on Ranschburg v. Toan, 709 F.2d 1207, 1210 (8th Cir. 1983) for the proposition that the City's failure to state a legitimate reason for its classification renders the MAPS Ordinance unconstitutional.
1987).Callaway v. City of Edmond, 791 P.2d 104, 106 (Okla. 1990); Fair School Finance Council v. State, see note 2, supra; McKeever Drilling Co. v. Egberi, 170 Okla. 259, 40 P.2d 32, 35 (1935). The Williams Companies are entitled to the privileges and guarantees found both in the United States and the Oklahoma Constitutions.
Tyler v. State, 777 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Okla. Cr. 1989) (citing Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351, 99 S.Ct. 1742, 1745, 60 L.Ed.2d 269 (1979)). See also State v. Ballard, 868 P.2d 738, 740 (Okla. Cr. 1994); Callaway v. City of Edmond, 791 P.2d 104, 106 (Okla. Cr. 1990); State v. Hunter, 787 P.2d 864, 865 (Okla. Cr. 1990). Legislatures have a wide range of discretion when passing laws which have the effect of treating some differently from others.
Consequently, we address these propositions together. Callaway v. City of Edmond, 791 P.2d 104, 106 n. I (Okla. Cr. 1990) ("Our due process clause in Art. 2 Sec. 7, Okla. Const., has a definitional range that is coextensive with its federal counterpart. . . .").
Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). See also State v. Pratt, 816 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Okla. Cr. 1991); Clegg v. Oklahoma State Election Board, 637 P.2d 103, 105 (Okla. 1991); Callaway v. City of Edmond, 791 P.2d 104, 106 (Okla. Cr. 1990). Appellant argues the procedures in Section 701.10a for re-sentencing affected his right to appeal, therefore the statute must meet the more stringent test.