Opinion
No. CV02 039 26 37
February 26, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT'S SPECIAL DEFENSE
By this motion the plaintiff, Irena Callahan, Adminstratix of the Estate of Curtis Bucci, asks this court to strike the defendant's State of Connecticut, special defense for the reasons that it is deficient as a matter of law.
Standard of Review
It is the obligation of the trial court "to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). "A party wanting to contest the legal sufficiency of a special defense may do so by filing a motion to strike. The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted). Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 64 Conn. App. 9, 13, 779 A.2d 198 (2001).
Facts
Based on the plaintiff's complaint, the court finds the following facts. On December 24, 1990 the plaintiff's minor decedent, Curtis Bucci was incarcerated at the Bridgeport Correctional Institution. After his incarceration, Curtis Bucci's mother and school psychologist contacted the prison and advised correctional personnel that Bucci had a history of mental illness, and was at risk of harming himself. In response to these concerns Bucci was examined by agents of the correctional institution, including a physician named James Alexander. On February 2, 1991, Curtis Bucci committed suicide by hanging himself with his shoelaces.
The plaintiff, Irena Callahan was granted permission to sue the defendant State of Connecticut by the Claims Commissioner on May 4, 2001. This action was commenced by writ with a return date of June 18, 2002. The defendant filed an Answer and Special Defenses on April 9, 2003, in which the defendant claims that the decedent himself was negligent for failing to express his suicidal thoughts or plans to the staff at the Bridgeport Correctional Center.
Discussion
It is the plaintiff's position that, as a matter of law, contributory negligence is not a defense where the decedent's suicide is the foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff relies heavily on the reasoning of Cole v. Multonomah County, 39 Or. App. 211, 5992 P.2d 221, 223 (1978), a case in which a prisoner mentally deteriorated over the course of month and was injured when he set his bed on fire. That plaintiff brought an action claiming that the defendant was negligent in failing to appreciate and prevent the plaintiff's suicidal behavior. In Cole, the defendant pled as special defense that the plaintiff's actions at the time he set the bed aflame were negligent. The Appellate Court held that contributory negligence was not available as a defense when the decedent's mental illness caused him to commit the acts the defendant had a duty to prevent. Id.
In this case, the defendant's defenses do not address the decedent's actions of committing suicide. Rather, the claim is that the defendant did not provide accurate information at the time he was questioned by correctional personnel; accordingly, Bucci was negligent. The pleadings do not describe the specifics of such conversations, or the decedent's mental capacity at those times. Clearly, at the time the suicide occurred the decedent was seriously afflicted with mental illness; however, there was a period of approximately six weeks between the time the decedent was incarcerated and the point of suicide. Whether this individual's mental state was the same or fluctuated during that time is a question of fact, presumably for an expert at the time of trial.
When evaluating the applicability of a contributory negligence defense in a mentally ill plaintiff, "the modern trend appears to favor the use of a capacity-based standard . . . This standard tolerates a reduced standard of care for such persons. It measures the conduct of the mentally disturbed plaintiff in light of his or her capacity." Cowan v. Doering, 111 N.J. 451, 163, 545 A.2d 159 (1989) (citations omitted). Accordingly, without facts substantiating the decedent's mental capacity at the time of his alleged contributory negligence, the court cannot determine, as a matter of law, what duty the plaintiff owed, or whether contributory negligence is available as a defense.
The plaintiff also cites to cases in which decedents were institutionalized specifically to protect them from suicidal actions. In McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 546 N.E.2d 139 (1989), the decedent was admitted to a psychiatric hospital because he was "suicidally active." The Supreme Court held that there can be no comparative negligence in such an instance "where the defendant's duty of care includes preventing the self-abusive or self-destructive acts that caused the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 55. The decedent, Bucci, was incarcerated for acts unknown; he was not admitted to a health care facility because of suicidal activity. Moreover, the court in McNamara acknowledged that "[m]entally ill people who are capable of forming an intent and who actually do perform an act that causes damage will be held liable for that damage . . . [i]t follows that mentally ill people can comparatively negligent in some circumstances." Id.
In accordance with the above the court cannot conclude at this time that contributory negligence is unavailable as a defense as a matter of law. The plaintiff's motion to strike is denied.
WOLVEN, J.