Calkins v. Albi

15 Citing cases

  1. People v. Home Insurance

    197 Colo. 260 (Colo. 1979)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that medical information was not a "thing of value" within the meaning of the theft statute because the General Assembly had not defined it as such

    [1] In determining the meaning of criminal statutes, we are guided by the principle that such statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and they cannot be extended either by implication or construction. People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 280, 450 P.2d 1013, (1969); Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). [2] As far as we have been able to determine, and no cases have been cited by the People to the contrary, confidentiality has never been considered as intangible personal property.

  2. Ekberg v. Greene

    196 Colo. 494 (Colo. 1978)   Cited 35 times
    Finding that the "[t]he court of appeals was mistaken . . . in taking the determination of proximate cause away from the jury" and noting that, "[r]ather than resting on mechanistic rules of law to determine tort liability, a court should ordinarily allow the jury to make a determination of what is reasonable in each factual setting"

    Rather than resting on mechanistic rules of law to determine tort liability, a court should ordinarily allow the jury to make a determination of what is reasonable in each factual setting. See Kiefer Concrete, Inc. v. Hoffman, supra; Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, supra; Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). [7] There was sufficient evidence pertaining to foreseeability in the present case to allow the issue of proximate cause to be submitted to the jury.

  3. Flournoy v. McComas

    175 Colo. 526 (Colo. 1971)   Cited 12 times

    [7] We hold, under the circumstances of this case, that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, from the language of the complaint that defendants McComas or Oberholtzer, by reason of their alleged negligence, respectively, did not proximately cause the death of plaintiffs' decedent. See Prosser, supra, § 52 and Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17, wherein this court discusses at length the subject of intervening cause and held that a directed verdict was properly denied because the issues of proximate cause and intervening cause were properly submitted to the jury. It is to be noted that this holding in no way imputes any validity or lack of validity to the merits of plaintiffs' claim against the School District or against defendants McComas and Oberholtzer.

  4. Cokley v. People

    168 Colo. 280 (Colo. 1969)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that a shotgun was not a "firearm" for purposes of a criminal statute because the General Assembly had not defined it as such

    It is well to observe here the rule of construction that requires criminal statutes to be construed strictly and in favor of those against whom such statutes are sought to be enforced. Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17; O'Brien v. People, 118 Colo. 58, 192 P.2d 428; O'Day v. People, 114 Colo. 373, 166 P.2d 789; Polly v. People, 107 Colo. 6, 108 P.2d 220; Failing v. People, 105 Colo. 399, 98 P.2d 865; People v. Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 290 P. 271. We believe the phrase "as defined by law" as used in this statute, which creates a new criminal offense, means "as defined by statutory law" rather than "by case law" or judicial interpretation.

  5. Bixenman v. Hall

    251 Ind. 527 (Ind. 1968)   Cited 26 times
    In Bixenman, the supreme court adopted the generally-held rule that "where a minor is charged with negligence or contributory negligence by reason of his violation of a safety statute while engaged in an activity not requiring adult qualifications, the standard of care to be applied to such minor is that degree of care which would ordinarily be exercised by a child of the same age, experience, intelligence and educational level."

    " See Mertz, The Infant and Negligence Per Se in Pennsylvania, 51 Dickenson L. Rev. 79. In support of this view see Calkins v. Albi (Colo. 1967), 431 P.2d 17; Powell v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. (Tenn. 1966), 398 S.W.2d 727; Simmons v. Holm (1961), 229 Or. 373, 367 P.2d 368; Kuhns v. Brugger (1957), 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395. It is admitted that children riding bicycles are subject to the motor vehicle code, where applicable, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 47-2101 et seq.

  6. DeBose v. Bear Valley Church

    890 P.2d 214 (Colo. App. 1994)   Cited 14 times
    Reversing a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that the cleric could not be held liable if his massage of the minor plaintiff "was engaged in solely in a sincere effort to facilitate the minor's communication with God"

    Generally, a child seven years of age or older is under a duty to exercise the degree of care that would reasonably be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience. See Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967); Benallo v. Bare, 162 Colo. 22, 427 P.2d 323 (1967). A child who fails to exercise such ordinary care in protecting himself or herself from an unreasonable risk of harm may be found negligent in contributing to his or her own injuries.

  7. Cartwright v. State Board of Accountancy

    796 P.2d 51 (Colo. App. 1990)   Cited 7 times
    In Cartwright, relied upon by Sears, the enabling statute at issue there gave the accountancy board authority to make rules necessary for the administration of the article.

    As a criminal or penal statute, it is axiomatic that § 12-2-120 must be strictly construed, even where the statutory construction issue arises in a civil proceeding. Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). Thus, because the statutory prohibition set forth in § 12-2-120(6) involves auditing functions only, and because subparagraph (e) contains no language of prohibition, we hold that the Board's attempt to extend the prohibition to include the review function as well exceeded the Board's statutory authority, and Regulation 9.3 is therefore void.

  8. Crespin v. Largo Corp.

    698 P.2d 826 (Colo. App. 1984)   Cited 7 times

    Indeed, to have so ruled would have been to refuse to recognize statutory negligence, which Colorado courts have recognized on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). The Hull court properly ruled that the statute was not a civil damage act or dram shop act.

  9. Loveless v. City of Aurora

    639 P.2d 1084 (Colo. App. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443. Cf. Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). Consequently, the two questions on the special verdict form relating to Officer Lines' conduct having been answered in an internally inconsistent manner, the case must be retried.

  10. Kulik v. Public Service

    43 Colo. App. 139 (Colo. App. 1979)   Cited 6 times

    Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct in instructing the jury on intervening causes. See Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973). III.