[1] In determining the meaning of criminal statutes, we are guided by the principle that such statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and they cannot be extended either by implication or construction. People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 280, 450 P.2d 1013, (1969); Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). [2] As far as we have been able to determine, and no cases have been cited by the People to the contrary, confidentiality has never been considered as intangible personal property.
Rather than resting on mechanistic rules of law to determine tort liability, a court should ordinarily allow the jury to make a determination of what is reasonable in each factual setting. See Kiefer Concrete, Inc. v. Hoffman, supra; Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, supra; Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). [7] There was sufficient evidence pertaining to foreseeability in the present case to allow the issue of proximate cause to be submitted to the jury.
[7] We hold, under the circumstances of this case, that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, from the language of the complaint that defendants McComas or Oberholtzer, by reason of their alleged negligence, respectively, did not proximately cause the death of plaintiffs' decedent. See Prosser, supra, § 52 and Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17, wherein this court discusses at length the subject of intervening cause and held that a directed verdict was properly denied because the issues of proximate cause and intervening cause were properly submitted to the jury. It is to be noted that this holding in no way imputes any validity or lack of validity to the merits of plaintiffs' claim against the School District or against defendants McComas and Oberholtzer.
It is well to observe here the rule of construction that requires criminal statutes to be construed strictly and in favor of those against whom such statutes are sought to be enforced. Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17; O'Brien v. People, 118 Colo. 58, 192 P.2d 428; O'Day v. People, 114 Colo. 373, 166 P.2d 789; Polly v. People, 107 Colo. 6, 108 P.2d 220; Failing v. People, 105 Colo. 399, 98 P.2d 865; People v. Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 290 P. 271. We believe the phrase "as defined by law" as used in this statute, which creates a new criminal offense, means "as defined by statutory law" rather than "by case law" or judicial interpretation.
" See Mertz, The Infant and Negligence Per Se in Pennsylvania, 51 Dickenson L. Rev. 79. In support of this view see Calkins v. Albi (Colo. 1967), 431 P.2d 17; Powell v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. (Tenn. 1966), 398 S.W.2d 727; Simmons v. Holm (1961), 229 Or. 373, 367 P.2d 368; Kuhns v. Brugger (1957), 390 Pa. 331, 135 A.2d 395. It is admitted that children riding bicycles are subject to the motor vehicle code, where applicable, Ind. Anno. Stat. § 47-2101 et seq.
Generally, a child seven years of age or older is under a duty to exercise the degree of care that would reasonably be expected of a child of like age, intelligence, and experience. See Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967); Benallo v. Bare, 162 Colo. 22, 427 P.2d 323 (1967). A child who fails to exercise such ordinary care in protecting himself or herself from an unreasonable risk of harm may be found negligent in contributing to his or her own injuries.
As a criminal or penal statute, it is axiomatic that § 12-2-120 must be strictly construed, even where the statutory construction issue arises in a civil proceeding. Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). Thus, because the statutory prohibition set forth in § 12-2-120(6) involves auditing functions only, and because subparagraph (e) contains no language of prohibition, we hold that the Board's attempt to extend the prohibition to include the review function as well exceeded the Board's statutory authority, and Regulation 9.3 is therefore void.
Indeed, to have so ruled would have been to refuse to recognize statutory negligence, which Colorado courts have recognized on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). The Hull court properly ruled that the statute was not a civil damage act or dram shop act.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 443. Cf. Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967). Consequently, the two questions on the special verdict form relating to Officer Lines' conduct having been answered in an internally inconsistent manner, the case must be retried.
Under these circumstances, the trial court was correct in instructing the jury on intervening causes. See Calkins v. Albi, 163 Colo. 370, 431 P.2d 17 (1967); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 33 Colo. App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973). III.