Opinion
2834 EDA 2018 J-E02003-21
02-25-2022
MICHAEL CALISTO, Appellant v. MICHAEL RODGERS
Appeal from the Judgment Entered, November 2, 2018, in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil Division at No(s): 160801903.
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.; BENDER, P.J.E.; BOWES, J.; LAZARUS, J; OLSON, J.; DUBOW, J.; KUNSELMAN, J.; MURRAY, J.; and McCAFFERY, J.
OPINION
KUNSELMAN, J.
I. Introduction
This action for quiet title involves the ownership of three townhouses in Philadelphia. The Seller of the townhouses, Michael Calisto, appeals from the judgment entered in favor of the Buyer, Michael Rodgers, following a non-jury trial. Because Buyer's three deeds to the properties bore a dead woman's "signature" as grantor, a panel of this Court initially invalidated those deeds, vacated the judgment, and remanded. Both parties petitioned for en banc reargument. We granted their request and withdrew the panel decisions.
This author and the Honorable Kate Ford Elliott, P.J.E. (retired) formed the panel majority. The Honorable Mary Jane Bowes, J. dissented.
The signature is illegible. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 at 3.
After further review, we conclude Seller is not entitled to relief. Sitting as finder of fact, the trial court determined that Seller signed the deeds using his late mother's name as the grantor. Because those deeds satisfy the statute of frauds, we affirm. 1
II. Procedural Background & Factual Findings
In his operable complaint, Seller sought quiet title to the three townhouses. The matter proceeded to a bench trial in 2018. The trial court related the relevant facts of this case as follows:
Instead of filing a counterclaim, Buyer initiated a separate action for quiet title against Seller. Buyer's action was later dismissed. He did not appeal.
On September 18, 2001, [Seller's] mother, Joan Calisto, passed away leaving the three properties to [Seller] as sole executor and beneficiary under the Will of Joan Calisto. Since the date of his mother's passing, [Seller] probated the will, but he never paid the appropriate transfer tax that would [permit recordation of his interests in the properties]. Instead, [Seller] took up residence in the 647 N. 16th Street property, while allowing John Callaway to occupy the 651 N. 16th Street and the 424 N. 32nd Street property to remain uninhabited for several years.
[Fifteen years after Joan's death, Buyer] met with [Seller] after viewing the properties. They agreed that [Buyer] would pay [Seller] $150,000.00 in cash for the properties.
On July 27, 2016, a day after agreeing on the aforementioned sale price, [Buyer] returned to [Seller] in order to pay $10,000.00 in consideration for an agreement of sale. Over the next week and a half, [Buyer] withdrew money from his personal bank accounts and received cash advances in order to compile the requisite cash funds to conduct the transaction with [Seller]. Once [Buyer] had the promised $150,000.00 cash in his possession, he returned to [Seller] to finish the deal. [Buyer] gave [Seller] the cash in exchange for three deeds, one for each of the properties. [Buyer] subsequently recorded the deeds.
Based on the entirety of the recorded testimony and evidence at trial . . . [Buyer] was more credible than [Seller]2
regarding the alleged, fraudulent transaction for the deeds to the properties.
. . . [Seller] testified that he . . . never met with [Buyer] and John Callaway at any point during the subject time period. [Seller] never called John Callaway as a witness to corroborate this fact. However, [Buyer] testified that when he went to meet with [Seller] to execute the transaction, both [Seller] and John Callaway were present. Additionally, Hattisha Rodgers testified to facts that strengthened the credibility of [Buyer's] version of events. Specifically, Ms. Rodgers testified that on the day that the transaction took place, she witnessed [Buyer] take a "duster bag" filled with cash to the 651 N. 16th Street property, exit the vehicle to meet with [Seller] and another gentleman outside of the house, and re-enter her car with a folder filled with papers that [Buyer] received in exchange for the cash. Thus, this court determined that [Buyer's] version of the facts, supported by his witness' testimony, was more credible than [Seller's] uncorroborated testimony.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/28/18, at 2-3, 6-8 (citations omitted).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that Seller delivered three executed deeds for the three townhouses to Buyer. Thus, the court impliedly inferred that Seller had signed the deeds in his mother's name and rejected Seller's allegation that Buyer forged Joan's signature in an attempt to steal the properties. The trial court ruled that Buyer had "received the deeds from [Seller] without reason to question the validity of the signatures, as they were received from [Seller] as executor and beneficiary of his mother's property." Id. at 10-11. The court entered a non-jury decision in favor of Buyer.
Seller moved for post-trial relief. Seeking judgment as a matter of law, Seller claimed that the trial court "violated Pennsylvania's statute of frauds." Seller's Motion for Post-Trial Relief at 2. In the alternative, Seller requested 3 a new trial, because the trial court "abused its discretion by not allowing [him] to question [Buyer] about [Buyer's] criminal history and by not allowing [Seller] to produce a document detailing [Buyer's] criminal convictions and sentences." Id. The court denied post-trial relief, and this timely appeal followed.
III. Analysis
Seller raises the following three claims of error:
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in misapplying the statute of frauds?
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by not allowing evidence of [Buyer's] criminal conviction?
3. Did the trial court commit errors of law by treating this case as competing claims of fraud . . . ?
Seller's Brief at 4.
A. Statute of Frauds
In his first issue, Seller asserts the trial court erroneously refused to invalidate the three deeds. He claims the deeds are invalid under the statute of frauds, because they bear the "signatures" of the late "Joan Calisto" as the grantor. Seller argues that his mother bequeathed the properties to him in her will, and, because the deeds are invalid, no legally sufficient evidence proved that he granted those properties to anyone. Thus, he asked the trial court to strike the deeds from the property records and to order the Clerk of Records of Philadelphia County to convey the properties to him. 4
When reviewing an equitable decision, like a quiet-title action, our scope and standard of review are deferential. As this Court has explained:
Quiet title is a legislatively created action that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania eventually incorporated into the Rules of Civil Procedure. See Pa.R.C.P. 1061-1067. Although of statutory origins, a suit to quiet title is actually an equitable proceeding "descended from two suits in chancery - the bill of peace and the bill to remove cloud." Enhancing the Marketability of Title: The Suit to Quiet Title, 68 YALE L.J. 1266 (1959).
We will reverse only where the trial court was palpably erroneous, misapplied the law, or committed a manifest abuse of discretion. Where there are any apparently reasonable grounds for the trial court's decision, we must affirm it. Moreover, the function of this Court on an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute our view for that of the lower tribunal; [we are] to determine whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all the evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the conclusion of that tribunal . . . when reviewing the results of a non-jury trial, we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact, unless those findings are not based on competent evidence.Nebesho v. Brown, 846 A.2d 721, 725-726 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations and some punctuation omitted).
We begin by emphasizing that the trial court found, as a factual matter, that Seller executed the deeds in question and delivered them to Buyer in exchange for $150,000. Seller's use of Joan's signature, rather than his own, does not change the fact that Seller volitionally put pen to paper and signed the deeds. Thus, the three deeds were, in fact, "signed by the party . . . granting" title, as the statute of frauds requires. 33 P.S. § 1.
Disputing the trial court's factual determination that he signed the deeds in his mother's name, Seller asserts that "nothing support[s] that allegation 5 besides the bald-faced accusation made by [Buyer]." Seller's Brief at 31. However, what Seller calls an "allegation" is no longer so. At trial, Buyer and his witness testified that Seller executed and delivered the deeds to Buyer. Their testimony, which the trial court credited, supports the inference that Seller executed the deeds in his mother's name.
Since the Seller had the exclusive right to transfer the properties, how he signed the documents is of no moment. He could have used his name as executor, or his mother's name. What matters is that he signed the deeds with the intent to transfer his interest, and as such, he is bound by his action.
According to Buyer, after he paid Seller the purchase price in full, Seller "gave [Buyer] deeds." N.T., 3/27/18, at 58. Seller told Buyer that he could trust the documents Seller gave him, because Seller owned the properties "by way of his mother." Id. at 60.
Additionally, when Seller's attorney cross-examined Buyer, the following exchange occurred:
Q: So, it was your understanding that Joan Calisto was alive at [the time this sale occurred]?
A: No, I already knew that Joan Calisto was deceased.
Q: But you understand that there's a difference between an Estate and an individual, correct?
A: No, I didn't - - at the time, no, I didn't know. Now I know these things.
[Seller] explained to me that he had every right to do what he did as far as executing the sale of the property, because he, with his deceased mother, gave him all of the rights to do these things. So I took that under consideration, thinking that [Seller] was telling6
me the right thing, because I had no knowledge . . . of that until meeting [Seller].
Q: But was it ever represented to you that [Seller] owned the properties?
A: Of course.
Q: But he never wrote his name on this document?
A: [Seller] said he didn't have to write - - he controlled,
I guess, he controlled the property. The property was his, because his mother gave him the property.
Q: So did you ask [Seller] why he just didn't sign his name?
A: No, I didn't think anything of it. [Seller] told me what he told me, and I had no knowledge. Had I known it now, it would have never happened.Id. at 158-59. In light of Buyer's above responses, the trial court could reasonably conclude that Seller signed Joan Calisto's name on the deeds.
Given the state of the public records for the properties, using Joan's name was the only way for Seller to convey title to Buyer without first recording deeds into himself. In the 15 years since Joan's death, Seller neglected to record deeds reflecting that title had passed from Joan, through her estate, to him.
Seller's failure to record deeds in his name left a gap in Philadelphia's property records. He could only fill that gap by recording deeds from Joan's estate into himself. The trial court rationally inferred that Seller signed his late mother's name on the three deeds, so that record title would skip him and go directly from Joan to Buyer. 7
As stated above, "we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact, unless those findings are not based on competent evidence." Nebesho, 846 A.2d at 726. The testimony of Buyer and his witness is competent evidence adequately supporting the trial court's decision. Accordingly, as a factual matter, Seller signed the deeds.
Significantly, the statute of frauds does not require that the signer of a document to use only his own name. "As early as 1814, Lord Ellenbrough removed any doubt that 'signed' as used in the statute did not require [the] handwritten signature" of the party to be charged. Murray on Contracts § 75 at 371 (5th ed. 2011) (citing Schneider & Another v. Norris, 105 Eng. Rep. 388 (1814)). "No particular . . . signature is essential." Id. Indeed, "there is no requirement in the statute of frauds or the decisional law that a signature be in any particular form." Zuk v. Zuk, 55 A.3d 102, 107 (Pa. Super. 2012) (some punctuation omitted) (emphasis in original).
Any signature or mark, "when coupled with an intent by the maker that it be a signature, will satisfy the statute of frauds is so well settled that citations to the legions of cases so holding are unnecessary." The Restatement (Second) OF Contracts § 134. The "essential question has little to do with the particular symbol used" on the contract or deed. Murray at 372. "Rather, the question is, did the party execute . . . the symbol with a present intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as the signer of the writing?" Id. (emphasis in original). Whether the signer manifested that intention "is a question of fact." Id. As such, the statute of frauds does 8 not mandate that the conveyor use his own name, because the law has never restricted an individual to use only his name when signing a document in order to be bound thereby.
Nearly a century ago, in Coltun v. Getz, 97 Pa.Super. 591 (1930) (en banc), this Court enforced a land contract against a person who signed it using someone else's name. There, Getz contracted to purchase a hotel and to maintain it, along with other co-purchasers. Getz told his co-purchasers that he would use his wife's name and signature on the contract, but "he personally would be a party to the enterprise and [co-purchasers] could look to him for the fulfillment of all terms and obligations . . . ." Id. at 593.
After title passed to Getz and his co-purchasers, Getz failed to contribute his share of taxes. The co-purchasers sued him for breach of the contract. Getz moved for judgment as a matter of law, on the grounds that his name did not appear within the four corners of the contract. The trial court ruled in Getz's favor. On appeal, we reversed.
This Court held "that a man, either in his general dealings or in a particular transaction, may adopt whatever name he chooses, and he will be bound accordingly." Id. at 594. "All that the law looks to is the identity of the individual, and, when that is ascertained and clearly established, the act will be binding on him and others." Id. It was irrelevant "whether the name used [was] purely artificial and fictitious or that of another person, if the party using it [was] the [person] interested in the transaction." Id. Merely because Getz signed his wife's name - and not his own - did not deprive the co- 9 purchasers "of their right to sue [Getz] on a contract to which he was a party in fact, if not in name." Id.
Like Getz, Seller here signed legal documents using someone else's name. Seller thereby led Buyer to believe these signatures would bind Seller and transfer his title to the townhouses to Buyer. The mere fact Seller used Joan's name, instead of his own, to complete the transaction does not deprive Buyer of his right to rely upon Seller's representations during negotiations and at delivery that the deeds were properly executed.
See also, Scott v. Penn Title Ins. Co., 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 129, 134 (C.C.P. Berks 1957) (finding a mortgage to be valid and "proper in order to pass a good title of record" to mortgagee, despite mortgagor having signed mortgage and note using the name of a third party).
Seller's invocation of the statute of frauds to invalidate a transaction "to which he was a party in fact, if not in name," fails. Id. The statute of frauds does not create a legal fiction that the three deeds bear the signature of a dead woman and, therefore, are invalid, as Seller contends. Obviously, Joan did not sign the deeds from beyond the grave. Seller signed them using her name. As we have held, "There is no sanctity in a name that right and justice should be sacrificed to it." Coltun, 97 Pa.Super. at 594.
The trial court found that Seller and Buyer, in fact, made a contract to transfer title to the three townhouses. Seller may not shirk his contractual obligations, simply because he signed the deeds using someone else's name. The statue of frauds "is to be used as a shield and not as a sword, as it was 10 designed to prevent frauds, not to encourage them." Empire Properties, Inc. v. Equireal, Inc., 674 A.2d 297, 302 (Pa. Super. 1996). Seller's first issue is meritless.
B. Evidence of Buyer's Criminal History
Next, Seller seeks a new trial, because the trial court prohibited him from impeaching Buyer based on Buyer's prior conviction of robbery. While cross-examining Buyer, Seller's attorney asked, "Can you tell me if you've ever been convicted of any crime that involves dishonesty?" N.T., 3/27/18, at 141-42. Believing Seller needed certified records of a conviction to impeach a witness, Buyer objected.
Seller's lawyer produced a printout of a court docket to reflect Buyer's prior conviction. See id. at 141-46. The docket showed Buyer was convicted of robbery and received a minimum sentence of three years. Because Buyer should have been released in 2009, the release date was within the ten-year period required for admission of the conviction to impeach him under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609.
The trial court sustained the objection, because Seller's attorney did not have a certified copy of the court record. The court stated:
[Seller's] counsel failed to present credible documentation of [Buyer's] conviction. Instead of a certified record, [Seller] presented an uncertified computer printout. Assuming, arguendo, [Buyer's] conviction could have been properly admitted into evidence, this court does not believe that failing to admit it into evidence constitutes reversible error, as the court was aware that [Buyer] had a criminal history. Despite having considered [Buyer's] criminal past, this court made its determination based on the credibility of11
the parties' testimony with regards to the subject transaction. The court's decision would have remained the same even if [Buyer's] past criminal conviction was admitted into evidence.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/28/18, at 9 (citation omitted).
On appeal, Seller argues that Buyer's conviction in 2006 for robbery (infliction of serious bodily injury) is crimen falsi. In his view, the trial court should have admitted the evidence for impeachment purposes, under Rule 609. Seller further asserts the misapplication of this rule was harmful error, because the court ruled in favor of Buyer based on his credibility.
When reviewing an evidentiary ruling, this Court defers to the trial court, and we reverse in limited circumstances. As we have said:
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court's determinations regarding the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. To constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.Czimmer v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Conroy v. Rosenwald, 940 A.2d 409, 417 (Pa. Super. 2007)).
An "abuse of discretion" is not merely an error of judgment. Paden v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 658 A.2d 341, 343 (Pa. 1995). A trial court abuses its discretion by making a manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious decision; by failing to apply the law; or by allowing prejudice, bias, 12 or ill will to influence its decision. See, e.g., Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1123 (Pa. 2000).
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 provides:
(a) In General. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo contendere, must be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.
(b)Limit on Using the Evidence After 10 Years. This subdivision (b) applies if more than 10 years have passed since the witness's conviction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible only if:
(1) its probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(2) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.Pa.R.E. 609. Pursuant to subsection (a), when the conviction is less than ten-years-old, its admission is mandatory - the evidence of the conviction "must be admitted." Id. (emphasis added). See also Pa.R.E. 609 Comment (stating, "Where the date or conviction or last date of confinement is within ten years of the trial, evidence of the conviction of a crimen falsi is per se admissible.").
"Robbery and burglary are considered crimen falsi and convictions for these offenses are admissible for impeachment purposes." Commonwealth v. Trippett, 932 A.2d 188, 199-200 (Pa. Super. 2007). Buyer does not dispute this. Instead, he relies on his argument below - which the trial court 13 adopted - that Seller needed to produce the certified record of the conviction. Buyer's contention has no support in either the language of the Rule or case law. Indeed, neither the trial court nor Buyer cite to any authority to support the proposition that Seller needed a certified record of Buyer's conviction to use it for impeachment purposes.
Thus, the trial court grafted a certified-record requirement onto Rule 609, where none exists. By refusing to allow Seller's attorney to cross- examine Buyer regarding his prior conviction of robbery, the court failed to apply Rule 609 as plainly written. It also overrode the comment to that Rule, which made evidence of Buyer's robbery conviction "per se admissible." Pa.R.E. 609 Comment. The trial court abuses its discretion in failing to admit this evidence; Rule 609 and its comment leave no room for discretion in this scenario.
It appears that the trial court confused impeachment by prior conviction with authentication of evidence under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 902. We also note that trial courts may generally take judicial notice of prior violations and convictions under Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 201. See Commonwealth v. Taylor, 137 A.3d 611, 617 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en banc).
However, erroneously barring evidence of a prior conviction to impeach a witness does not automatically require us to grant Seller a new trial. As mentioned, an evidentiary error only warrants a retrial if the mistake harmed the appellant. See Czimmer, supra.
Here, the trial court said it knew of Buyer's prior conviction and that, if it had received the impeaching evidence, its credibility determination would 14 not have changed. Seller's "attempt to impeach the credibility of [Buyer] would not alter the court's determination of [Buyer's] credibility on this issue of the property transfer in the face of the entirety of what was presented at trial." Trial Court Opinion, 11/12/18, at 9. Because the trial court, who viewed the witnesses' body language and heard their testimony, was greatly convinced of Buyer's honesty, its refusal to admit his conviction for purposes of impeachment was harmless error in this bench trial. This issue affords Seller no appellate relief.
C. Competing Claims of Fraud
In his final claim of error, Seller contends the trial court mistakenly treated this case as one of competing claims of fraud and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof. To support this assertion, Seller relies upon one quote from the trial court's Rule 1925(a) Opinion. See Seller's Brief at 35 (quoting page 6 of the trial-court opinion: "As this was a case in which both parties alleged fraud on the part of the other, the court was tasked with determining and weighing the credibility of Plaintiff vs. Defendant.").
However, Seller did not raise this issue in his post-trial motions or in his Rule 1925(b) Statement. This results in waiver. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). When an appellant "has waived a point below, either expressly or by a failure to assert it, that party cannot assert the point on appeal." 16A Standard Pennsylvania Practice 2d § 91:26 (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)). 15
Seller raises this competing-claims-of-fraud issue for the first time on appeal. Because he did not raise or argue this theory below, Seller has not preserved it for appeal.
We dismiss the final issue as waived.
If Seller signed Joan's name and then reneged on the transaction, he was attempting to defraud Buyer of the purchase price. On the other hand, if Buyer signed Joan's name and recorded the deeds without paying for the properties, he was attempting to defraud Seller (or Joan's estate) of title to the townhouses. Thus, the trial court correctly viewed this as a case of competing claims of fraud. It resolved those claims in favor of Buyer. Even if Seller had preserved this issue for our review, we would reject it. Someone clearly signed Joan Calisto's name on the deeds because she was dead when they were signed. Accordingly, on the facts as the parties alleged them below, one party was attempting to defraud the other.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, the trial court found Seller signed his late mother's name on the three deeds to convince Buyer that Seller could transfer his legal title to the townhouses. Using his mother's name as an alias to sign the deeds satisfied the signature requirement of the statute of frauds, and the trial court properly denied Seller's request for quiet title.
Judgment affirmed.
President Judge Panella, President Judge Emeritus Bender and Judges Lazarus, Olson, Dubow, Murray and McCaffery join this Opinion. 16
Judgment Entered. 17
CONCURRING OPINON
BOWES, J.
I fully agree with the Majority's determination that none of the issues raised by Michael Calisto ("Seller") is cause for us to disturb the trial court's finding that he failed to prove his claims against Michael Rodgers ("Buyer"). I write separately to emphasize that the existence of valid deeds conveying the properties to Seller was not necessary to establish that Buyer no longer held title to those properties, and that the deeds Seller signed on behalf of his deceased mother are not the only writings in evidence that were sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds and defeat his claim for quiet title.
I begin by examining evidence that was before the trial court which was not discussed in the Majority Opinion. Buyer testified that he was in the business of flipping houses and was approached by an intermediary about purchasing some properties in Philadelphia. See N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 23, 1 34-35. After inspecting the properties, Buyer informed Seller that he was interested in buying them at a suitably low price, given their poor condition. Id. at 37, 47-49. Buyer met with Seller again the next day, at which time Seller offered to sell the three properties for $250,000 in cash. Id. at 48-50. Buyer countered at $150,000, and Seller immediately accepted. Id. at 50. Seller represented to Buyer that there were others interested in the real estate, so Buyer needed to act fast and put $10,000 cash down to show that he was serious. Id. at 50-51.
Buyer testified that he gave Seller $10,000 in cash the next day. N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 51. In exchange, Seller provided a written purchase agreement memorializing that Buyer had agreed to purchase 647 North 16th Street, 651 North 16th Street, and 424 North 32nd Street, owned by Joan Calisto, for a total of $150,000 cash, and that the down payment of $10,000 cash would be applied toward the purchase price. See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 at 1. The agreement specified that the properties were dilapidated, were being sold as-is, and that Buyer would assume all liens on the properties. Id. at 2. The writing further indicated with an "X" that Buyer accepted the offer, and the seller's assent was noted with the initials "J.C." Id. Seller signed it on behalf of "Prime Real Estate, LLC," which is listed as the "selling company."1 Id. at 3; N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 165. Seller avowed that Prime Real Estate 2 was his company, and that he had the legal authority to execute the sale of the real estate "because his mother gave him the property." N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 158-59. See also id. at 60 (Buyer testifying that Seller stated that he owned the properties "by way of his mother"). Thereafter, Buyer supplied the remaining purchase price in cash, at Seller's insistence, and Seller provided the deeds discussed in the Majority Opinion.
After Buyer began rehabilitating the properties, Seller filed the instant action claiming that he, not Buyer, was the lawful owner of the three townhouses bequeathed to him by his mother, Joan Calisto. See Amended Complaint, 1/24/17, at ¶¶ 16, 20. The trial court ruled to the contrary. In arguing that the statute of frauds entitles him to relief from this Court, Seller solely focuses on the deeds that Joan Calisto could not have signed after her death. See Seller's Amended Brief at 31-32. In so doing, Seller misapprehends the importance of the deeds and the application of the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds "prevent[s] the enforcement of unfounded fraudulent claims by requiring that contracts pertaining to interests in real estate be supported by written evidence." Strausser v. PRAMCO, III, 944 A.2d 761, 765 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). A writing need not be so formal as a deed to fulfill the requirements of the statute of frauds. Instead, a court "should always be satisfied with some note or memorandum that is adequate to convince the court that there is no serious 3 possibility of consummating fraud by enforcement." In re Beeruk's Estate, 241 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. 1968) (cleaned up). This Court has noted that the writing necessary to satisfy the statute "need only contain a sufficient statement of the terms of the agreement and the signature of the grantor." In re Estate of Dotterrer, 579 A.2d 952, 954 (Pa.Super. 1990). Similarly, "there is no requirement in the Statute or the decisional law that a signature be in any particular form." Hessenthaler v. Farzin, 564 A.2d 990, 993 (Pa.Super. 1989).
Instead, the focus has been on whether there is some reliable indication that the person to be charged with performing under the writing intended to authenticate it. Thus, for example, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that:
The signature to a memorandum may be any symbol made or adopted with an intention, actual or apparent, to authenticate the writing as that of the signer.Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Restatement of Contracts § 134).
Hence, the statute of frauds does not require the existence of a writing which in and of itself constitutes an enforceable contract for the sale of land, let alone a deed which effectuated transfer of title. All that the statute requires is that some signed writing supports the existence of an agreement for the sale of real estate. See, e.g., Beeruk's Estate, supra at 758.
From these facts detailed above, which were credited by the trial court, Seller's statute-of-frauds arguments fail based upon the purchase agreement alone. This document not only listed the properties by address, identified 4 Seller's mother as the owner, and stated the purchase price and the down payment, but it also was signed by Seller, albeit on behalf of a fictitious selling company. As such, the purchase agreement was sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds and establish that Seller contracted with Buyer to transfer ownership of the properties.
Therefore, Seller was no longer the lawful owner of the properties at the time he filed the instant action. From the moment Seller entered into the contract to sell the properties to Buyer, Seller retained only a security interest in them until such time that Buyer fulfilled his part of the bargain by paying the purchase price. See Commonwealth v. Inv. Res. Holding, Inc., 168 A.3d 225, 229 (Pa.Super. 2017) ("It is well-established law here that when the Agreement of Sale is signed, the purchaser becomes the equitable or beneficial owner through the doctrine of equitable conversion. The vendor retains merely a security interest for the payment of the unpaid purchase money.") (cleaned up)). See also Plauchak v. Boling, 653 A.2d 671, 674 (Pa.Super. 1995) (noting that an "equitable owner under contract for sale . . . may maintain suit to quiet title"). Buyer paid the remainder of the purchase money to Seller long before the trial court adjudicated Seller's quiet title claim. See N.T. Trial, 3/27/18, at 16-19, 58 (testimony indicating Buyer paid the remainder of the purchase price to Seller in cash in July 2016).
Therefore, even if Seller never delivered valid deeds to Buyer, the statute of frauds does not serve as a basis for this Court to disturb the trial 5 court's verdict. See, e.g., Woodhouse Hunting Club, Inc. v. Hoyt, 183 A.3d 453, 457 (Pa.Super. 2018) ("The plaintiff bringing a quiet title action has the burden of proof and must recover on the strength of its own title."). I would reject Sellers arguments concerning the statute of frauds on this basis.
I join the Majority's resolution of Seller's other claims of error.
Judges Olson, Dubow and Murray join this Concurring Opinion.