Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. CPF-05-505615
Kline, P.J.
Introduction
The Division of Apprenticeship Standards (Division or DAS) authorized the Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors of the Greater Sacramento Area Plumbers Unilateral Apprenticeship Committee (PHCC) to expand the geographic area for its apprenticeship program. PHCC is a nonunion unilateral multi-employer association that sponsors an existing apprenticeship program training apprentices the plumbing trade. Appellants, existing joint labor-management apprenticeship training programs, had objected to the expansion and filed an administrative appeal with the California Apprenticeship Council (Council). The Council affirmed the Division’s action. Appellants petitioned the San Francisco Superior Court for a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) to overturn the decision of the Council. The trial court denied the writ petition. This timely appeal followed.
“[Appellant] California State Pipe Trades [Joint Apprenticeship Committee (JAC)] is a joint apprenticeship committee responsible for establishing work processes and standards of training for joint labor-management apprenticeship training programs in the pipe trades throughout the State of California. [Appellant] Fresno Area Plumbers, Pipe and Refrigeration Fitters [Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee (Fresno JATC)] is a joint labor-management apprenticeship training committee that trains apprentices in plumbing and allied trades in the Fresno area. [Appellant] Los Angeles Plumbers JAC is a joint apprenticeship committee that trains apprentices in plumbing and allied trades in the City of Los Angeles.”
Appellants contend the trial court erred in refusing to issue the writ of mandamus because the Council abused its discretion by upholding the Division’s decision approving expansion where: (1) the Division failed to provide appellants with notice and the opportunity to comment upon substantial revisions to PHCC’s application; (2) the Division Chief failed to make findings of fact required by the governing regulations; and (3) the required findings were not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Appellants further argue the trial court erred (4) in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to set aside the Division’s order or to issue any rulings against the Division because the Division was not a party to the action, and (5) in using a “balancing the equities” test to refuse to terminate PHCC’s present mode of operations.
Background
A. Apprenticeship law
In California, apprenticeship programs are governed by the Shelley-Maloney Apprenticeship Labor Standards Act of 1939. (Lab. Code, § 3070 et seq.; Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 433 (Southern Cal.).) As part of that act, the Department of Industrial Relations set up the Division and the Council. (Southern Cal., at p. 433; Lab. Code, § 3070.) The Division administers apprenticeship programs. (Southern Cal., at p. 433, Lab. Code, § 3073.) “The Chief of the Division, pursuant to Labor Code section 3073, administers the apprenticeship law, acts as secretary of the Council, and is empowered to investigate and either approve or disapprove written standards for apprenticeship programs. (Lab. Code, §§ 3073, 3075, 3090; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 212, 212.1 and 212.2.[])” (Southern Cal., at p. 433.) An apprenticeship program’s standards constitute the rules by which it operates.
Undesignated section references will be to title 8 of the California Code of Regulations. References hereafter to section 212.2(a) are to section 212.2, subdivision (a). Because of its length, section 212.2 is reproduced in full in an appendix at the end of this opinion.
“The Council is established within the Division pursuant to Labor Code section 3070.” (Southern Cal., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 433.) The Council enacts regulations regarding the “standards” of apprenticeship programs, and, among other things, hears appeals from Division decisions involving complaints alleging violations of those standards. (Id. at pp. 433, 434; Lab. Code, §§ 56, 3071, 3081-3082.)
The approval process for apprenticeship programs begins when a program sponsor, such as PHCC (which operates the program), submits written program standards to the Chief of the Division for approval. (Southern Cal., supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 428-429, 433-434; §§ 212, subd. (b)(13), 218; Lab. Code, § 3075, subd. (a).) Among other things, the standards must contain a statement of “the parties to whom the standards apply, the program sponsor’s labor market area . . . for purposes of meeting equal employment opportunity goals in apprenticeship training and the program’s geographic area of operation . . . .” (§ 212, subd. (a)(2).) “ ‘Geographic Area of Operation’ of an apprenticeship program means the geographic area in which the program regularly operates and trains apprentices.” (§ 205, subd. (n).) An apprenticeship program “may provide for local, regional or statewide coverage in its standards.” (§ 218.)
As explained by the California Supreme Court, “[w]hile neither federal nor state approval is required for a sponsor to operate an apprenticeship program, strong financial incentives exist at both the state and federal levels for sponsors to obtain approval. For example, only apprentices participating in an approved apprenticeship program may be paid wages lower than the applicable journeyman wage on federal and state public works projects. (29 C.F.R. § 29.2(k) (1992); Lab. Code, § 1777.5.) As the Ninth Circuit has observed: ‘In order for such an apprenticeship program to work, it is essential that the employer be able to pay lesser wages to the apprentices while they are in training.’ (Electrical Joint Apprenticeship Com. v. MacDonald (9th Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 270, 274, cert. denied [505] U.S.[1204] [120 L.Ed.2d 869, 112 S.Ct. 2991].) In California, additional financial incentives exist in the form of direct financial subsidies for training provided by approved programs. (Lab. Code, §§ 3074, 3074.7; Ed. Code, § 8152.) Finally, an apprentice who completes an approved training program obtains a certificate of completion naming him or her a skilled journeyman in the chosen trade, and hence increases his or her marketability as well as the marketability of his or her employer contractor. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 224.)” (Southern Cal., supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 428-429.)
B. The request for approval and proceedings below
1. PHCC’s previous applications.
In 1994, PHCC was approved by the Division to operate a plumbing apprenticeship program in the greater Sacramento area. In 1997, PHCC submitted its first application to the Division for approval to operate statewide. Fresno JATC filed a complaint challenging PHCC’s recruitment of apprentices outside Sacramento County and the Division’s 1998 approval of the revised standards. The Division interpreted the version of section 212.2 in effect at the time, as applying only to applications for new programs and not to applications for geographic expansion. However, it concluded that the revisions constituted a “new program” and ordered PHCC to cease recruiting or enrolling apprentices outside Sacramento. The Council agreed and, on July 26, 2001, overturned that portion of the Division’s 1998 approval allowing statewide operation and ordered PHCC to operate its program only under its original standards approved by the Council in 1994. In 2003, at the Council’s request, the Division conducted an investigation of PHCC. The investigation noted some deficiencies (which PHCC denied) and sought further information from PHCC. During this period, in addition to its state approved Sacramento area program, PHCC operated a parallel statewide training program. Students were educated in plumbing, but were not eligible for journeymen certificates and the program was not eligible for the direct subsidies the parties call “Montoya funds.”
In November 2002, PHCC submitted its second application for program expansion. It “requested the [Division] to consider PHCC’s 1998 standards and subsequent amendments as an application pursuant to . . . section 212.2 to establish a new program for the training of apprentices in plumbing.” The Division denied the application “on the ground that PHCC had not demonstrated, as required by [section] 212.2(a)(3), the ability to provide related and supplemental instruction [(RSI)] to apprentices in all of California’s 58 Counties.” The Council upheld the Division’s decision in its entirety. The decision was “without prejudice to PHCC’s right to resubmit its application to DAS showing that it is able to provide adequate RSI training to its apprentices throughout its geographic area of operation.”
2. Division approves revised third application.
In March 2004, PHCC submitted its third application for geographic expansion. The application consisted of PHCC’s proposed standards and supplemental material. Appellants were notified of the application and submitted comments opposing it. The proposed standards again included provisions for 10 training centers throughout California. After the Division gave notice of the application to appellants, but before the Division approved the application, PHCC revised its standards to provide for only one expanded, concentrated training facility in Sacramento and smaller training centers in Southern California. No additional notification was provided to appellants at this time. Although it solicited and received comments on the third application and standards, the Division did not conduct a hearing.
On October 5, 2004, the Division approved the application as revised. In doing so, the Division Chief found: “The [Council] previously approved PHCC’s apprenticeship standards. In the context of an expansion request of an existing program, the issues of most concern to the DAS are the program’s ability to provide opportunities for employment and RSI in the additional counties, as well as reasonable access to the committee by apprentices.” In her nine-page “Findings of Fact and Decision” on PHCC’s application for geographic expansion, the Chief of the Division also found: “The proposed standards have been reviewed and they meet the requirements of the Labor Code and the [California Code of Regulations]. I find that PHCC has the ability to provide, and under these standards will provide, worksite facilities and skilled workers for training in all aspects of the occupation of plumber in the selected geographic area. PHCC has made adequate arrangements for [RSI] and on-the-job training, and has provided evidence that it has met the requirements of [section] 212.2. PHCC has also met the requirements of [section] 208[, subdivision] (c).” The decision also addressed specific objections and comments made by appellants, including detailed findings related to those comments concerning PHCC’s past history, curriculum content and instructor quality, diversity in training for the local education agency’s (LEA’s) hiring of instructors, the number of training sites and whether all were adequately covered by the LEA’s charged with developing the curriculum, whether PHCC could provide reasonably continuous employment for apprentices, whether the proposed standards met wage criteria for Fresno County plumbers, PHCC’s success rate, and whether there was a need for an expanded program. As to questions about whether the proposed standards would meet trade competencies or provide sufficient diversity in training, the Chief of the Division also found: “The PHCC program was approved by the [Council] and was in operation prior to this expansion. The work processes and RSI provisions were found to be sufficient at that time. Nothing in the statewide expansion in and of itself would result in lesser quality.” Finally, the Chief also found “PHCC’s proposed apprenticeship standards and selection procedures meet the current requirements of the Labor Code and the [California Code of Regulations], including [sections] 212 and 212.2, as well as those in effect in 1997 when the original expansion request was made.”
Section 208, subdivision (c) relates to wages, benefits and other compensation for apprentices in the building and construction trades employed on non-public works projects.
3. Council’s decision on appeal.
Appellants appealed the Division approval to the Council pursuant to section 212.2, subdivision (k). The chair of the Council appointed a three-member panel to present a recommendation on the appeal. On April 6 and June 13, 2005, the panel held evidentiary hearings on the appeal, in which appellants participated.
A two-person majority of the appeal panel recommended that the geographic expansion be approved only as to 46 Northern California counties, rather than into the entire state. One panel member dissented from approving any expansion. The recommendation was presented to the Council at its July 28, 2005 meeting. The Council adopted the panel’s recommendation, approving in part and reversing in part the Division’s decision approving the PHCC application for revised standards allowing statewide geographic expansion. The Council approved the Division decision insofar as it allowed the PHCC to expand into 46 Northern California counties and reversed the decision allowing expansion into the remaining Southern California counties.
The decision approved PHCC to operate in the following counties: Alameda, Alpine, Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, Contra Costa, Del Norte, El Dorado, Fresno, Glenn, Humboldt, Kings, Lake, Lassen, Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Merced, Modoc, Monterey, Napa, Nevada, Placer, Plumas, Sacramento, San Benito, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Shasta, Sierra, Siskiyou, Sonoma, Solano, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Trinity, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yolo and Yuba.
In its five-page decision and analysis, the Council concluded “that PHCC has met the requirements for a geographic expansion of its program into 46 Northern California Counties.” The decision specifically addressed arguments that appellants had raised concerning PHCC’s compliance with section 212.2(a)([3]) regarding adequacy of RSI and use of a single training facility in Sacramento, and 212.2(a)(5) concerning the welfare of apprentices and PHCC’s graduation rate, as well as agreeing with the Division that previous problems revealed by a Division investigative report of PHCC had been sufficiently corrected to allow expansion.
It appears the Council miscited the subdivision of section 212.2 requiring that the program sponsor provide evidence of adequate arrangements for RSI; that provision is subdivision (a)(3), not subdivision (a)(4), which relates to training and supervision in all work processes. We shall hereafter insert the correct subdivisions.
With respect to appellants’ argument that “DAS failed to determine whether PHCC’s evidence satisfied [section] 212.2(a), ” the Council’s decision stated: “[T]he evidence shows that PHCC has complied with the requirement in [section] 212.2(a)([3]) for adequate RSI. With respect to the requirements in [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5), the DAS decision states:
“ ‘The PHCC program was approved by the [Council] and was in operation prior to . . . this expansion. The work processes and RSI provisions were found to be sufficient at that time. Nothing in the statewide expansion in and of itself would result in lesser quality.’ (DAS Decision, p. 6.)
“This language indicates that DAS reviewed, and found satisfactory, PHCC’s compliance with [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5).
“Appellants apparently fault DAS with not making specific findings concerning PHCC’s compliance with [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5). They are wrong for four reasons. [¶] First, it appears that none of the parties who submitted comments to DAS prior to the DAS decision submitted evidence showing that PHCC was not in compliance with [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5). Absent such arguments, DAS had no reason to state more in its decision than it did. [¶] Second, the Council previously has not required such specificity from DAS concerning the requirements in [section] 212.2(a), and appellants do not explain why DAS’s decision concerning this program should be treated differently than DAS decisions concerning other programs. The Council believes that applying a standard of review to PHCC that it has not applied to other programs would also suggest that the Council has not complied with its duty of fair and equal treatment. [¶] Third, appellants misconceive the appellate process. In any appeal, it is the obligation of the party appealing from the challenged order to show that the order is wrong. Appellants maintain that, if DAS is wrong or has not done what is required, its decision should be reversed. But appellants did not submit any evidence showing that DAS was wrong or has not done what is required concerning PHCC’s compliance with [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5). Appellants ask the Council to overturn a DAS decision on the basis of reasons that have no evidentiary support in the record. [¶] Fourth, since appellants did not submit any evidence concerning alleged non-compliance with [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5), PHCC had no reason to submit evidence showing compliance. The panel has held two hearings on this appeal. The issues were not raised. For basic reasons of fairness, the Council cannot deny PHCC’s application on the basis of issues that PHCC had no reason to believe were in dispute during the hearings.”
4. Appellants’ writ petition to the superior court.
On August 25, 2005, appellants filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) with the superior court. A hearing on the writ was held on December 19, 2005. On December 23, 2005, the trial court signed its statement of decision, denying the writ and finding that the Division had satisfactorily explained its reasons for granting PHCC’s application and that the Council did not abuse its discretion by affirming in part the Division’s decision. Judgment was entered on January 24, 2006. The court also found that because the Division was not a party to the writ action, the court lacked jurisdiction to set aside the Division’s order or issue any rulings against DAS. Finally, the court concluded that PHCC was a functioning program with some 80 apprentices in training, that PHCC was not responsible for any errors by the Division or the Council, and that terminating the PHCC program “would cause irreparable harm to PHCC and its apprentices.” Therefore, the court concluded that “[u]nder the balancing of the equities test [it] may not terminate PHCC’s present mode of operations.”
Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal on January 31, 2006.
Discussion
I. Jurisdiction Over the Division
As a threshold matter, respondent Council contends that the court correctly determined it lacked jurisdiction over the Division, which had not been named as a party to the appeal and that the only relief sought was a writ compelling the Council “to vacate its decision affirming the approval of apprenticeship training standards submitted to the Division . . . by [PHCC].” As a result, Council argues, were this court to reverse the trial court’s denial of the writ petition and effect the reversal of the Council’s decision, the Division Chief’s approval of PHCC expansion would remain in force. Indeed, it argues that under the Division’s decision, statewide expansion would be allowed. The Council relies solely upon Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (f), which provides: “The court shall enter judgment either commanding respondent to set aside the order or decision, or denying the writ. Where the judgment commands that the order or decision be set aside, it may order the reconsideration of the case in the light of the court’s opinion and judgment and may order respondent to take such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law, but the judgment shall not limit or control in any way the discretion legally vested in the respondent.”
Although creative, the Council’s argument is unconvincing. Under regulations adopted by the Council, the Chief of the Division does not ultimately approve apprenticeship programs. The Council does. Under section 212.2, subdivision (k), “[t]he Chief’s decision approving or disapproving a proposed program shall be final and become an Order of the Council if no appeal is filed . . . .” (Italics added.) Consequently, if the Chief’s decision is not appealed, it becomes an order of the Council. If the decision is appealed to the Council, as happened here, section 212.2, subdivision (m) specifies, “[t]he Council may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the Chief or of the appeal panel. The decision of the Council on an appeal shall be final.” Consequently, the Council’s decision replaces that of the Chief where there has been an appeal. In either case, final program approval becomes the Council’s decision, replacing the Chief’s decision. Labor Code section 3083 also supports the conclusion that the Council, not the Chief of the Division, is the final administrative decisionmaker in this process. “The decision of the [Council] as to the facts shall be conclusive if supported by the evidence and all orders and decisions of the [Council] shall be prima facie lawful and reasonable.” (Lab. Code, § 3083.)
Should we determine that the Council abused its discretion in approving the expansion, we would reverse the trial court’s denial of the writ petition under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, and direct it to issue the writ commanding respondent Council to set aside its decision approving the modified expansion of the program and to reconsider the case in the light of our opinion and judgment. At that point, the expanded PHCC apprenticeship program (operating outside the Sacramento area) would be operating without state approval. Apprentices in the program would no longer be eligible for journeymen certificates and the program would not be eligible for Montoya funds. We may also direct the trial court to order respondent Council to “take such further action as is specially enjoined upon it by law” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), including making those findings required by law, if it can do so on the evidence presented, holding new hearings on the petition for expansion, or remanding to the Division for further proceedings. Although neither we nor the trial court ultimately can direct the Council to exercise its discretion to approve, modify, or deny the expansion petition, we can require it to proceed in the manner required by law in deciding the matter.
II. Notice and Comment Procedures
Appellants contend the Council abused its discretion in concluding that the Division had complied with the notice and comment provisions of section 212.2, subdivision (g), where the Division failed to provide appellants with notice and the opportunity to comment upon substantial revisions to PHCC’s application before approving it. It is undisputed that after the Division gave notice of the application to appellants, but before the Division approved the application, PHCC revised its standards from seeking 10 training facilities to provide for only one concentrated training center in Sacramento and three smaller ones in Southern California with a planned concentrated center there also. PHCC planned for two concentrated two-week training sessions at its Sacramento concentrated training center so that apprentices would not have to attend school at night after a day’s work. It also planned to grant apprentices a stipend to defray their costs of attending the concentrated training. The revision also listed San Joaquin County Office of Education as the “statewide LEA” and San Juan Unified School District as its Sacramento County LEA. No additional notification or opportunity to comment or object was provided to appellants in connection with this revision before approval by the Chief.
Section 212.2, subdivision (g) requires the Chief to “serve a copy of the proposed standards and any supplement thereto on the sponsor of each existing program in the apprenticeable occupation in the labor market area of the program . . . . Each such existing program may submit comments on the proposed program within thirty days after receipt of the completed standards.”
Section 212.2(a) provides in relevant part: “A revision to change the program’s occupation or to change the program’s geographic area of operation to include a different labor market area is subject to the same application and approval process set out in (a)-(j) of this section for approval of a program, including providing notice of the proposed revision and an opportunity for comment to existing programs in the same apprenticeable occupation in the labor market area.” (§ 212.2(a), italics added; see Independent Roofing Contractors v. California Apprenticeship Council (2003)114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1334, 1337 (Independent Roofing Contractors) [a geographic expansion of a program is subject to the notice and comment regulations for new programs].) The requirement of notice to existing programs furthers the purpose of the regulations in “ ‘promoting careful consideration of proposed programs . . . and insuring that such programs comply with all the requirements of state and federal law.’ ” (Independent Roofing Contractors, at p. 1337.)
The Council counters that the revision did not change the essential nature of the program and therefore, did not make appellants’ previously submitted comments irrelevant. Moreover, it is true that this revision (from 10 centers to concentrating instruction at a single Northern California center and smaller Southern California centers) did not “change the program’s geographic area of operation to include a different labor market area” from that originally proposed. (§ 212.2(a).) Nevertheless, the change from 10 training centers to a single concentrated Sacramento center and three smaller Southern California locations does appear to be substantial revision and a significant “supplement” to the proposed standards.
However, we need not determine whether the notice provided was adequate under the regulations, as the record here shows that any error in this regard was necessarily harmless. The Council held two evidentiary hearings on appellants’ appeal from the Division decision. At the time of the appeal, the revised standards involving a single, concentrated Northern California training center in Sacramento were known to all parties and were a part of the Division’s approval. Appellants challenged the adequacy of PHCC’s arrangements for training facilities under the revised standards at these hearings. Appellants’ attorneys made presentations on these issues and discussed the training facilities issue. Appellants had ample opportunity to comment upon the proposed changes, and did so at length. Finally, the Council approved only the Northern California expansion, mooting objections to the Southern California expansion. In these circumstances, remand to the Division by the Council for further notice would accomplish nothing except further delay. The Council did not abuse its discretion in refusing to overturn the Division decision on the grounds of inadequate notice of the revision to existing programs.
III. Findings
A. Standard of review
Appellants contend that the Council abused its discretion by upholding the Division’s decision approving expansion where the Division Chief failed to make findings of fact required by the governing regulations. The foundational issue in this appeal are what findings were required to be made in connection with the approval of PHCC’s expansion. This is a question of law for our de novo review. (Cal. Administrative Mandamus (Cont.Ed.Bar 3d ed. 2007) § 6.117, p. 254; see, e.g., Vinson v. Snyder (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 182, 186.) “[W]e must ‘independently judge the text of the statute, taking into account and respecting the agency’s interpretation of its meaning . . . . Where the meaning and legal effect of a statute is the issue, an agency’s interpretation is one among several tools available to the court. Depending on the context, it may be helpful, enlightening, even convincing. It may sometimes be of little worth. [Citation.] Considered alone and apart from the context and circumstances that produce them, agency interpretations are not binding or necessarily even authoritative.’ ([Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, ] 7-8 [(Yamaha)]; [citation].) Thus, we exercise our independent judgment in interpreting the . . . statute, while giving ‘presumptive value’ to Department’s views. ([Yamaha, ] at pp. 7, 11.)” (Sneed v. Saenz (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1234-1235.)
Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, subdivision (c), provides: “Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. In all other cases, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.” Labor Code section 3083, providing that “[t]he decision of the [Council] as to the facts shall be conclusive if supported by the evidence and [that] all orders and decisions of the [Council] shall be prima facie lawful and reasonable, ” has been held to be “a direction by the Legislature to the courts to use a substantial evidence standard of review on [Council] decisions. It would thus appear the courts are not ‘authorized by law to exercise’ independent judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)” (Best v. California Apprenticeship Council (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 626, 633.) Therefore, we review the factual determinations of the Council under the deferential substantial evidence standard. However, pure issues of law, such as the proper interpretation of statutes or administrative regulations remain subject to our independent review. (Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, 148; People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432; Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter Group 2006) ¶ 8:111, p. 8-62.)
The importance of agency findings in an administrative mandamus proceedings such as this was recognized by the unanimous Supreme Court in the leading case of Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506 (Topanga). “In that case, the Supreme Court held that any administrative grant of a variance must be accompanied by administrative findings; and that a court reviewing such a grant must determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the conclusion that all applicable legislative requirements for a variance have been satisfied.” (Orinda Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1145, 1160-1161 (Orinda).) An agency rendering an adjudicatory decision reviewable under section 1094.5, “must render findings sufficient both to enable the parties to determine whether and on what basis they should seek review and, in the event of review, to apprise a reviewing court of the basis for the board’s action.” (Topanga, at p. 514.) “[I]mplicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.” (Id. at p. 515.) “By focusing . . . upon the relationships between evidence and findings and between findings and ultimate action, the Legislature sought to direct the reviewing court’s attention to the analytic route the administrative agency traveled from evidence to action.” (Ibid.) “Among other functions, a findings requirement serves to conduce the administrative body to draw legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of its ultimate decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and minimize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from evidence to conclusions. [Citations.] In addition, findings enable the reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 516, fn. omitted; accord, Orinda, at pp. 1160-1161.)
On this appeal, appellants do not reiterate their claim, made below, that a detailed decision was required by Chapter 4.5 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Gov. Code, §§ 11400-11475.70.) Neither the Division nor the Council is required by statute to hold an evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing is discretionary pursuant to the regulations. (§§ 203, 212.2, subd. (l).) Chapter 4.5 does not apply in such cases. (Gov. Code, § 11410.10; Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 32D West’s Ann. Gov. Code (2005 ed.) foll. § 11410.10, p. 269.)
“Administrative agency findings are generally permitted considerable latitude with regard to their precision, formality, and matters reasonably implied therein.” (Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 938, 954; see Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 517, fn. 16; Save Our Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 677, 701 [“The findings of an administrative agency can be informal so long as they serve the purposes of enabling the parties to determine whether and on what basis to appeal and enabling a reviewing court to determine the basis for the decision”].) However, “the findings must enable a reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis and ‘bridge the analytic gap’ between the evidence and the decision.” (Cal. Administrative Mandamus, supra, § 6.115, pp. 251-252, quoting Topanga, at p. 515; see also Save Our Carmel River v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist., at p. 701.)
“In addition to the general requirement for findings, some statutes or ordinances expressly require findings on specific issues.” (Cal. Administrative Mandamus, supra, § 6.116, p. 253.) “[A]n agency’s findings will be found insufficient for failure to comply with statutory finding requirements relating to the particular agency. [Citations.]” (Id., § 6.115, pp. 252.)
B. The regulations
The regulations pertaining to the apprenticeship program require the Chief to make findings. Subdivision (i) of section 212.2 provides in relevant part that the decision of the Chief whether to approve a program “shall be in writing and shall set forth the relevant findings of fact, a discussion of any issues raised by any comments or at any hearing and the reasons for the decision.” (Italics added.) Here, the decision of the Chief, and that of the Council, each set forth a detailed discussion of issues raised by comments made by appellants in their responses at the Division level and at the hearing before the Council, as well as the reasoning of the Chief and of the Council for their respective decisions.
“The Chief’s decision whether to approve a program shall be issued within ninety days after the receipt of the completed application for approval. The decision shall be served on the sponsor and on each party which submitted comments on the proposed program. The decision shall be in writing and shall set forth the relevant findings of fact, a discussion of any issues raised by any comments or at any hearing and the reasons for the decision.” (§ 212.2, subd. (i).)
As we have previously discussed, the Council is the ultimate decisionmaker under the statutory scheme. If unchallenged, the findings of the Chief of the Division become the findings of the Council. Where there is an appeal, the Council may affirm, reverse or modify the decision or findings of the Chief. It may hold its own hearing and make findings of its own. (Lab. Code, §§ 3082 , 3083; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 212.2, subd. (m).) Consequently, we are persuaded that under the statutory scheme, we look both to the findings made by the Council, where it makes findings, and/or to those of the Division where findings made by the Chief of the Division become the findings and decision of the Council in the absence of an appeal or where they are affirmed or approved by the Council. The Council in this case upheld some of the findings of the Division, and made its own findings as well, modifying the decision of the Division.
Labor Code section 3082 provides: “The determination of the administrator shall be filed with the [Council]. If no appeal therefrom is filed with the [Council] within 10 days from the date the parties are given notification of the determination, in accordance with Section 1013a and Section 2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the determination shall become the order of the [Council]. Any person aggrieved by the determination or action of the administrator may appeal therefrom to the [Council], which shall review the entire record and may hold a hearing thereon after due notice to the interested parties.”
Appellants contend that the Division was required by section 212.2 to make specific, individual findings that the evidence presented satisfied each of the subparts of section 212.2(a)(1) through (5), and to set forth facts upon which it relied to support each such finding. The Council concluded that particularized findings were made with respect to the requirement for adequate RSI (§ 212.2(a)(3)), and that particularized findings on each of the other four subparts were unnecessary, where extensive relevant findings had been made, including findings specifically addressing objections and arguments that appellants had raised. (See, ante, Background, part B.3, at pp. 7-9.)
Section 212.2(a) provides as follows:
“(a) To be eligible for approval, a program must comply with all applicable federal and state law and regulations. A revision to change the program’s occupation or to change the program’s geographic area of operation to include a different labor market area is subject to the same application and approval process set out in (a)-(j) of this section for approval of a program, including providing notice of the proposed revision and an opportunity for comment to existing programs in the same apprenticeable occupation in the labor market area. The program sponsor shall submit to the Chief, DAS, an application for approval of the program and shall provide the program standards and, either with the application or during the application review process, evidence of:
“(1) commitment to provide safe work site facilities and safe equipment sufficient to train the apprentices;
“(2) commitment to provide skilled workers as trainers at the work site who meet the criteria for journeyman or instructor as defined in Section 205(a) or (b);
“(3) adequate arrangements for related and supplemental instruction [(RSI)] pursuant to Labor Code section 3074;
“(4) ability to offer training and supervision in all work processes of the apprenticeable occupation;
“(5) the program sponsor’s ability, including financial ability, and commitment to meet and carry out its responsibility under the federal and state law and regulations applicable to the apprenticeable occupation and for the welfare of the apprentice.”
Consequently, section 212.2(a) requires the applicant to provide to the Division Chief “the program standards and, either with the application or during the application review process, evidence of” its commitment to a safe and skilled training program and its ability to carry out its commitments and responsibilities related to the training of apprentices, as itemized in the five subparts of subdivision (a)(1) through (5). (Italics added.) However, we are persuaded that in the circumstances here, the requirement that the applicant provide evidence of such commitments and abilities does not mandate the Chief or the Council to make specific and detailed findings as to each subpart of subdivision (a). The findings requirement was met by the extensive, relevant findings made on contested issues and by the Chief’s summary statement: “The proposed standards have been reviewed and they meet the requirements of the Labor Code and the [California Code of Regulations]. . . . PHCC has the ability to provide, and under these standards will provide, worksite facilities and skilled workers for training in all aspects of the occupation of plumber in the selected geographic area. PHCC has made adequate arrangements for [RSI] and on-the-job training, and has provided evidence that it has met the requirements of [section] 212.2. PHCC has also met the requirements of [section] 208[, subdivision] (c).” Section 212.2(a) expressly describes the type of “evidence” that must be provided by the applicant either with the application or during the review process. No part of the regulations nor any statute denominates these section 212.2(a)(1) through (5) subparts as specific “findings” that are required to be made nor do they require the Chief to identify the evidence upon which a finding is based.
Appellants contend that the “relevant findings of fact” required by section 212.2, subdivision (i), must relate to the criteria set forth in subdivision (a)(1) through (5), and that specific findings of fact are required on each of the “regulatory criteria”. We disagree. Subdivision (a)(1) through (5) no more mandates specific findings on each of the subparts than does section 212 of the regulations, which sets forth the content apprenticeship program standards must contain in order to be approved by the Division Chief. The contents of the written apprenticeship standards must satisfy a total of 24 different items (7 statements and 17 provisions) addressing different requirements. The Supreme Court has observed that section 212 sets forth “[a] detailed list of subjects and specifications that must be met in a program’s standards in order for the program to be approved . . . .” (Southern Cal., supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 434.)
Because of its length, section 212 is reproduced in full in an appendix at the end of this opinion.
The Chief has 90 days from the date the application is completed to issue its written decision whether to approve a program. Section 212.2, subdivision (i) requires that the decision “shall set forth the relevant findings of fact, a discussion of any issues raised by any comments or at any hearing and the reasons for the decisions.” The Council argues that the 90-day requirement would render unduly burdensome the type of detailed findings sought by appellants. Were such findings mandated by the statute, the question of burden would not prevent us from upholding the requirement. However, we are persuaded by the Council’s determination that, particularly in light of the short time-frame within which the Chief must act, specific findings under each of these individual subparts are not required and have never been required where the findings made are the “relevant findings” necessary to explain the decision in a manner that addresses the core concerns of the statute and the issues and objections raised by the parties.
Nor do cases cited by appellants persuade us that the written findings required by section 212.2, subdivision (i), must specifically address in detail each of the items of evidence that the applicant must provide the Division pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) through (5).
Appellants cite Yamada Brothers v. Agriculture Labor Relations Board (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112, 123 (Yamada Brothers) for the proposition that, “[w]here a statute mandates a specific finding before a board may render a decision, failure to make such a finding renders the administrative action fatally defective. [Citation.]” We agree. However, Yamada Brothers involved a statute directly requiring specific findings to be made before action could be taken by the Agricultural Labor Relations Board. There, the appellate court held that the board had acted in excess of its jurisdiction by extending a labor union’s certification without making a specific finding, mandated by the applicable statute, that the employer had failed to bargain in good faith. As the court explained: “Under [Labor Code] section 1155.2, subdivision (b), the board may extend certification of a labor organization up to one additional year only if the board finds that the employer has not bargained in good faith. In mandatory and clear language, the subsection requires: ‘. . . the board shall determine whether an employer has bargained in good faith with the currently certified labor organization . . . .’ (Italics added [by Yamada Brothers court].) . . . The [Agriculture Labor Relations Board] failed to make a finding that appellant had not bargained in good faith during the initial certification year.” (Id. at p. 123.)
In City and County of San Francisco v. Board of Permit Appeals (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1099, 1107 (CCSF v. Board of Permit Appeals), this court concluded that the findings of a board of permit appeals overturning the zoning administrator did not support its decision effectively authorizing maintenance of a third dwelling unit on property zoned for single-dwelling use. (Id. at p. 1104.) The owner argued the board had impliedly found that this was a nonconforming use. (Id. at pp. 1106-1107.) The applicable San Francisco City Planning Code section required that “if the determination of the Board differs from that of the Zoning Administrator, it shall, in a written decision, specify wherein there was error in interpretation of the provisions of this Code, or abuse of discretion on the part of the Zoning Administrator, and shall specify in its findings, as part of such written decision, the facts relied upon in arriving at its determination.’ (Italics added.)” (Id. at p. 1107.) We relied upon Broadway, Laguna etc. Assn. v. Board of Permit Appeals (1967) 66 Cal.2d 767, 773 (Broadway, Laguna), which involved virtually identical code language in the context of a variance decision. (CCSF v. Board of Permit Appeals, supra, at p. 1107.) Clearly, both CCSF v. Board of Permit Appeals and Broadway, Laguna involved statutes expressly requiring that specific findings be made and the specification in those findings of the facts relied upon in support. Indeed, Broadway, Laguna distinguished the findings requirement there from previous cases on the grounds that in none of the previous cases “did the governing provisions require the administrative board to specify its subsidiary findings and its ultimate conclusions.” (Broadway, Laguna, at p. 773; see Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 513.)
Similarly, specific findings were mandated by statute in Woodland Hills Residents Assn., Inc. v. City Council (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 825, 837 (Woodland Hills). There, an association of residents sought to vacate decisions of the city council, the planning commission and an advisory agency approving a tract map of a proposed subdivision, arguing it was inconsistent with the general plan for the area. Neither the city council, the planning commission nor an advisory agency had made any finding that the proposed subdivision was consistent with the applicable general plan. (Id. at p. 829-830, 837.) The Court of Appeal observed that “the Legislature has expressly provided [citations] that the advisory agency, appeal board (planning commission), or governing body (city council) shall not approve a tentative subdivision map unless it first finds that the proposed subdivision is consistent with the applicable general and specific plans . . . .” (Id. at p. 837.) Consequently, the “[f]ailure by the council (and planning commission) to make findings to support its ultimate decision resulted in inability of a reviewing court to bridge the analytic gap between the evidence and the ultimate decision of the council (and planning commission).” (Id. at p. 838.)
Citing Orinda, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d at page 1165, appellants argue that where a regulatory scheme sets forth criteria for approval, the relevant agency is required to make findings of fact on those criteria. They urge that findings on other matters not directly related to the regulatory criteria are no substitute. (See Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.2d at pp. 520-521.)
Like Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, Orinda, supra, 182 Cal.App.3d 1145 involved a variance from zoning ordinances. In Orinda, the Court of Appeal held a county board of supervisors grant of a height variance from zoning codes was not supported by the findings it made concerning the desirability of the project and the positive aspects of the overall height and bulk of the structure. The applicable statute, Government Code section 65906 provided: “ ‘Variances from the terms of the zoning ordinances shall be granted only when, because of special circumstances applicable to the property, including size, shape, topography, location or surroundings, the strict application of the zoning ordinance deprives such property of privileges enjoyed by other property in the vicinity and under identical zoning classification. . . . .” (Orinda, at pp. 1162-1163, 1167.) The court rejected the board’s claim that the variance applicant could “earn immunity from one code provision merely by overcompliance with others.” (Id. at p. 1165.) “The facts set forth in the required findings must address ‘the critical issue whether a variance was necessary to bring the [owner of the subject parcel] into substantial parity with other parties holding property interests in the zone. [Citation.]’ ([Topanga], at pp. 520-521.)” (Orinda, at p. 1166.) Consequently, the showing required by law was that the variance was necessary to permit the property owners to enjoy privileges enjoyed by other property in the vicinity. (Orinda, at pp. 1166-1167.) Numerous findings with respect to the project’s perceived desirability were “irrelevant and superfluous” absent findings on the critical issue. (Orinda, at p. 1167.) Moreover, “under Topanga, the Board’s findings must include facts sufficient to show that [the three conditions that must be met before grant of a variance] have been met.” (Orinda, at p. 1165-1166.)
Appellants further argue that the written findings requirement of section 212.2, subdivision (i), like all administrative findings requirements, is intended “to conduce the administrative body to draw legally relevant sub-conclusions in support of its ultimate decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and minimize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from evidence to conclusions.” (Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 516.) We agree. However, we are not persuaded that each of the subparts of section 212.2(a)(1) thorough (5) constitute “criteria for approval” analogous to the statutory requirement set forth in Government Code section 65906 for approval of variances that Orinda and Topanga recognized was the “ ‘critical issue whether a variance was necessary to bring the [owner of the subject parcel] into substantial parity with other parties holding property interests in the zone. [Citation.]’ ([Topanga], at pp. 520-521.)” (Orinda, at p. 1166.)
Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1348 (Topanga II), supports this determination. As the court there recognized, absent an explicit statutory requirement that underlying facts must be stated, “[f]indings are required to state only ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.” (Id. at p. 1362.)
Topanga II, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d 1348, analyzed and applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, in a case involving the same parties, but different property. A county planning agency approved a residential subdivision based on a finding that, “ ‘[t]he design of the subdivision and the proposed improvements will not cause substantial environmental damage or substantial and avoidable injury to fish or wildlife or their habitat, since the project is not located in a Significant Ecological Area and the initial study for the project shows that the proposed development will not have a significant effect on the environment.’ “ (Topanga II, at p. 1356.) The trial court rejected the appellants’ contention that the findings were insufficient under Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, and the appellate court affirmed, observing that the agency’s “findings are to be liberally construed to support rather than defeat the decision under review. [Citation.]” (Topanga II, at p. 1356.) The appellate court also stressed that “ ‘where reference to the administrative record informs the parties and reviewing courts of the theory upon which an agency has arrived at its ultimate finding and decision it has long been recognized that the decision should be upheld if the agency “in truth found those facts which as a matter of law are essential to sustain its . . . [decision].” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Topanga II, at pp. 1356-1357.)
We agree that the agency must make findings that serve the purposes set forth in Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pages 516-517, of: (1) facilitating orderly analysis by the agency; (2) enabling a reviewing court to trace and examine the agency’s analysis; (3) enabling the parties to determine whether and on what basis to seek judicial review; and (4) serving a public relations function by demonstrating that administrative decision-making is careful, reasoned and equitable. (See also Cal. Administrative Mandamus, supra, § 6.110, p. 247.) In short, what is required are findings sufficient to “bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.” (Topanga, at p. 515.) This the Division and the Council have done.
Here, the relevant findings included that there was a “need” for such an apprenticeship program, as required by Labor Code section 3075. This finding was expressly made by both the Division Chief and by the Council and the Chief set forth her reasoning in detail. The finding that the evidence presented by the applicant met the regulatory criteria of sections 212 and 212.2 was expressly made. Moreover, as we have observed, the Chief found: “The proposed standards have been reviewed and they meet the requirements of the Labor Code and the [California Code of Regulations]. I find that PHCC has the ability to provide, and under these standards will provide, worksite facilities and skilled workers for training in all aspects of the occupation of plumber in the selected geographic area. PHCC has made adequate arrangements for [RSI] and on-the-job training, and has provided evidence that it has met the requirements of [section] 212.2.” These findings adequately address the “relevant findings” that must be made by the Chief insofar as subdivision (a)(1) through (5) of section 212.2 is concerned. The decision of the Chief also addressed the comments and objections raised by appellants in the Division and explained her reasons for rejecting them. The Council modified the decision of the Division insofar as the Council did not approve expansion into Southern California and the Council explained why it would permit only expansion into the northern 46 counties: “The Council also concludes that PHCC has met the requirements for a geographic expansion of its program into 46 Northern California Counties. However, the Council does not believe that PHCC is prepared at this time for an expansion into the entire State. The PHCC program is in a period of transition. It is in the process of revising its training design and its curriculum to comply with the new State standards, of moving to a new facility, and of revising its training contributions and structure. The Council believes that PHCC needs time to establish the changes before taking on the burden of an expansion to Southern California. Nevertheless, the Council believes that PHCC is now capable of training throughout the rest of the State.” No more was required.
In so holding, we follow the principle that the agency’s findings must be “liberally construed to support . . . the decision under review.” (Topanga II, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1356.) We also find this case to be more like Topanga II, in which the agency’s decision addressed the relevant issues, albeit in a somewhat summary fashion, than Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d 506, in which both the agency’s decision and the underlying record entirely failed to address the key factor on which the agency was statutorily required to base its decision.
C. No need to address challenge to Council’s reasoning
Appellants argue the Council’s decision is entitled to no deference because it “excused” the Chief’s failure to make specific findings concerning PHCC’s compliance with section 212.2(a)(1) through (5) based on “four arguments utterly at odds with the governing regulations.” Appellants assert that two of these reasons wrongfully place the burden on appellants to prove that PHCC did not meet the regulatory requirements for a program; a third basis was the unsupported statement that the Council had not previously required findings of fact from the Chief; and a fourth reason (the statement by the Council that appellants misconceived the appellate process and did not show that the Chief’s determination was wrong) was “incomprehensible.” These arguments are made in support of appellants’ claim that the Council erred in refusing to overturn the Division’s approval of program expansion in its entirety because the Division had not made express findings on each of the five subparts of section 212.2(a). Appellants claim that the Council’s interpretation is utterly at odds with the governing regulations assumes the conclusion that the specific finding on each of these evidentiary requirements are required by the regulation. We have concluded that such detailed findings were not required in the circumstances presented here. Consequently, we need not address these arguments.
IV. The Chief Reviewed the Proposed Standards
Appellants assert the Division did not conduct a new review of the PHCC standards for program compliance before approving the latest application. The Council interpreted the Chief’s finding that the PHCC program had been previously approved and found sufficient and that “[n]othing in the statewide expansion in and of itself would result in lesser quality” as indicating “that DAS reviewed, and found satisfactory, PHCC’s compliance with [section] 212.2(a)(1), (2), ([4]) and (5).” Appellants argue that the Council and Division erroneously relied upon the previous program approval and that such reliance shows that the Chief did not review evidence of the proposed program’s compliance with the cited provisions, but based her approval of the expansion upon the previous program approval for one county (Sacramento). Appellants contend this is contrary to the provision of section 212.2(a) that “[a] revision . . . to change the program’s geographic area of operation to include a different labor market area is subject to the same application and approval process set out in (a)-(j) of this section for approval of a program . . . .” (See also Independent Roofing Contractors, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1334, 1337 [holding that a geographic expansion of a program is subject to the notice and comment regulations for new programs].) We are not persuaded that this statement demonstrates that the Chief did not review the proposed standards for compliance. Rather, it indicates the Chief determined after review that issues of program scale or geographic expansion would not “necessarily” impact program quality.
In any event, substantial evidence shows that the Chief did review the proposed program standards for compliance. Any gaps in that review were filled by the evidence taken in connection with the administrative appeal and by the Council’s de novo review. (See § 203, subd. (a)(2) & (4).)
First, the Chief expressly stated in her decision that “[t]he proposed standards have been reviewed and they meet the requirements of the Labor Code and the [California Code of Regulations].” Second, the Council also concluded that the Chief had reviewed, and found satisfactory PHCC’s compliance with section 212.2(a)(1) thorough (5). As we have observed, although the Council referenced the language of the Chief’s decision finding that nothing in the statewide expansion in and of itself would result in lesser quality work processes and RSI arrangements, that statement does not demonstrate that the Chief did not review the application or information provided during the review process for compliance with the regulations. Third, the finding that the Chief reviewed the application and the information provided and found PHCC had complied with the regulations is supported by other evidence in the administrative record. There, a two-page checklist of apprenticeship standards, consisting of 60 items relating to the Labor Code and specific regulations (including provisions under former section 212 that are currently encompassed in section 212.2(a)(1) through (5)) were reviewed, checked off and initialed on March 5, 2004 by two Division employees, one of whom was Leo R. Hartland, Apprenticeship Consultant for the Division. This checklist was referenced by counsel for the Division Chief in the hearing before the Council.
The checklist was apparently one developed before the 2002 amendment to section 212.2. Consequently, section references are to the regulations as they existed in December 1999, when the provisions of current section 212.2(a)(1) thorough (5) were contained in section 212. (See former Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 8, § 212, Register 95, No. 36:9-8-95.)
V. Substantial Evidence Supports the Council’s Decision
A. Standard of review
Appellants contend that substantial evidence does not support the Council’s determination that PHCC satisfied the requirements of section 212.2(a)(1) through (5). They argue that it is insufficient to submit program standards that promise educational excellence. Rather, they contend that the regulation requires that the program sponsor submit other “independent” evidence showing that it can meet the requirements of section 212.2(a)(1) through (5). We disagree.
“In making our determination, we examine all relevant evidence in the entire administrative record. [Citation.] We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, resolving all conflicts in the evidence and drawing all inferences in support of the judgment. [Citations.] Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value[, and]’ “ ’ . . . ‘ “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” ’ . . . .” ’ (Desmond [v. County of Contra Costa (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 330, ] 335, citations omitted; see Rivard [v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 405], 413.) [¶] Moreover, it is presumed that the Board regularly performed its duty. The burden is on appellant to prove an abuse of discretion by failing to proceed in the manner required by law or making a decision unsupported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 225, italics added.)
We believe the program standards themselves may evidence the program sponsor’s “commitment” to comply with the regulations and may supply some evidence of the sponsor’s ability to do so. Furthermore, evidence supporting PHCC’s commitment and ability to meet the requirements of section 212.2 may be provided by the conduct of PHCC’s existing apprenticeship programs, both the state approved program in Sacramento and its statewide parallel program that has not received state approval. The Division and the Council could certainly consider, as they did, PHCC’s experience in operating apprenticeship programs in their determination as to whether PHCC met the regulatory requirements for geographical expansion of its programs. Indeed, appellants argued that that experience demonstrated that PHCC did not have the commitment or ability to provide adequate RSI. Such factual determinations were for the Division initially and ultimately for the Council to make.
Certainly, PHCC’s standards may evidence its “commitment to provide safe work site facilities and safe equipment sufficient to train apprentices” (§ 212.2(a)(1), italics added) and its “commitment to provide skilled workers as trainers at the work site who meet the criteria for journeyman or instructor as defined in Section 205 (a) or (b)” (§ 212.2(a)(2), italics added).
PHCC’s standards require monitoring of training and work site equipment. (Article V, ¶ 2 [functions of apprenticeship committee shall be to “make periodic evaluations of the progress of each apprentice’s on-the-job training related and supplemental instruction”]; Article VI, ¶ 7 [responsibilities of apprenticeship committee shall be to “determine if an employer has the work site facilities, skilled workers as trainers at the work site, and equipment sufficient to train apprentices”].) The standards include compliance with federal standards and a commitment to safety and health training for apprentices. (PHCC federally approved standards, § XV). Employers are required to provide safe training, under supervision of a qualified journeyman or instructor and apprentices have the right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions without the threat of reprisal. (Training Schedule and Working Conditions, Article XVII, ¶¶ 2, 3, 4; PHCC Rules and Regulations, Addendum A, Employer Qualification, Working Conditions, ¶¶ A, B.) Sponsoring contractors must be licensed by the state and insured and are required to provide any and all major tools commonly used in the trade and proper training in the use of these tools. (PHCC Rules and Regulations, Addendum A, Minimum Business Requirements, ¶¶ A, B, C.) PHCC conducts inspections of job sites and evaluations. Job site visits are conducted at least quarterly by journey-level plumbers, an evaluation form is completed, and any deficiencies are followed up on. Time records are monitored monthly to ensure training is appropriate and proper rotation of tasks. (June 13, 2005 letter from PHCC Program Administrator Trish Black, responding to panel members’ questions and attached Job Site Evaluation Form; see Black testimony 4/6/05.)
PHCC’s standards evidence its commitment to provide skilled workers as trainers who meet statutorily defined criteria for journeyman or instructor. (Article VI, ¶ 7 [“skilled workers as trainers at the work site ”]; Article XVII, Attachment B, Work Training, ¶ 1 [“employer shall see that all apprentices are under the supervision of a qualified journeyman or instructor”].) Employers are required to “provide supervised on-the-job training in the work processes, and to comply with 1:1 ratio” set forth in the standards. (PHCC Rules and Regulations ¶ C, 2a; PHCC Rules and Regulations, Addendum A, Minimum Business Requirements, ¶ C [employer “must be able to at all times provide at least one skilled plumbing journeyman to work directly with each apprentice to maintain a ratio of one to one”]; PHCC federally approved standards, §§ VII [required ratio of “one apprentice per journeyworker”], XVI [ensuring apprentice is working under the general supervision of the employer and the “direct supervision” of a “skilled journeyworker”].)
PHCC Administrator Black stated that PHCC currently has one staff member for every 8.33 apprentices, which she maintained was “more than adequate staff to ensure all apprentices are receiving training in accordance with PHCC Standards” and PHCC will increase its staff as its program grows. At the hearing, Black testified that PHCC’s two current instructors in the Sacramento program were full-time instructors with more than 18 years plumbing experience each. In the past, following Division approval of expansion in 1998, PHCC had increased its staffing level to meet the needs of operating in 53 counties, but after the Council’s July 2001 decision overturning that approval, it had reduced its staffing in coordination with the decreased number of apprentices. In addition, Black testified that “PHCC standards require a journeyman to work alongside an apprentice at all times to train him or her” and that PHCC evaluates the job training of apprentices monthly through monitoring of work processes and job site visits to ensure on-the-job training is consistent with their standards. Mike DiMario, a recent graduate of PHCC training, testified at the hearing that he was very satisfied with PHCC training, confirming Black’s testimony about supervision and monitoring and describing PHCC training in detail, including training in all work processes. Current fourth-year PHCC apprentice Arthur Rabinsky also testified very positively about his experience in PHCC’s apprenticeship program.
PHCC presented evidence of “adequate arrangements for related and supplemental instruction pursuant to Labor Code section 3074.” PHCC provided copies of their curriculum with their application and program standards. Black stated in her testimony and in her letter to the panel that PHCC had decided to move to a larger training facility in Sacramento so that it could accommodate all apprentices throughout the state, until the number of apprentices in Southern California warranted opening a Southern California training center. PHCC provided photographs of the current training centers and plans and photographs of its proposed expanded facility and housing for apprentices during the intensive training session in Sacramento. PHCC had arranged for RSI with the San Juan Unified School District, which will continue to serve as the local education agency (LEA) for the new training center in Sacramento. Black stated that the “San Joaquin Unified School District has agreed to work with the PHCC Program when the need arises.” This is consistent with Labor Code section 3074, allowing a program to use “off-campus related and supplemental instruction when approved, developed and operated in cooperation with state and local school boards responsible for vocational education . . . .” These LEAs have the responsibility for administering the RSI of PHCC’s apprentices. (Lab. Code, § 3074.) Letters confirming these commitments were provided to the Chief (exh. Nos. R-1, R-2.) The Council specifically rejected appellants’ arguments regarding the adequacy of these arrangements.
The Council’s decision on appeal states in relevant part: “As shown by Exhibit R-1, the San Juan Unified School District, which is located in Sacramento, currently is serving as PHCC’s local education agency (“LEA”) and agrees to continue its support for PHCC’s Sacramento concentrated training center. Appellants argue that PHCC has not, as it previously had stated, made an agreement with the San Joaquin County Office of Education. However, as shown by Exhibit R-2, the San Joaquin County Office of Education has agreed to serve as a LEA when needed either locally or in Southern California. There is no evidence to show that the San Joaquin County Office of Education will withdraw its commitment. An unsupported fear that the commitment might be withdrawn is not a sufficient reason to reverse DAS’ decision, especially if the commitment would duplicate the RSI that is already being provided by a qualified LEA.”
Black stated that PHCC had taken steps to comply with the Division’s minimum hour requirements for training by changing its standards to a five-year program, with 216 annual hours of RSI before October 2005, and that it was currently developing an additional 56 hours of curriculum in the first year to be in place before October 2005 for any apprentices indentured at that time. Curriculum content and work processes being taught in the field comply with all minimum standards for RSI. At that point, only additional hours needed to be incorporated into PHCC’s training for compliance to be complete.
4. Section 212.2(a)(4).
PHCC provided evidence of its “ability, to offer training in all work processes of the apprenticeable occupation.” PHCC’s standards and its curriculum provide for training in all areas of plumbing, as does its curriculum. (Standards, Article V, Functions, ¶¶ 3, 4 [establish mechanism for rotation between work processes to assure “complete training”; ensure mobility between trainers to provide exposure and training in various work processes], Article XVII, Work Training, ¶¶ 1-4 [“necessary diversified experience and training in order to train and develop the apprentice into a skilled worker, proficient in all the work processes of the trade as outlined herein” (italics added); training “in new equipment, materials, and processes as they come into use in the occupation”; specification of major work processes]; National PHCC Curriculum Plumbing-Level One; PHCC Standards Work Processes and Related Instruction Outline detailing work process and curriculum hourly breakdown for federal compliance.) Moreover, Black testified as to the monthly evaluation of on-the-job training of apprentices through monitoring of work processes and job site visits to assure the standards are being met. In her June 13, 2005 responsive letter to the panel, she describes monitoring of monthly time records for each apprentice “to ensure the apprentice is receiving training in the necessary work processes.” Progress reports are sent to the contractor and to the apprentice so that they know “which areas of training the apprentice needs so the proper rotation of tasks occurs.” Attached to the letter were copies of an Apprentice Daily Record and Monthly Progress Report. Moreover, Black’s testimony also described PHCC monitoring and site visits and she further testified that apprentices are “trained in all facets of plumbing. We teach them commercial, residential, service and repair. Our curriculum encompasses all those areas and in the classroom the teachers touch on all those areas, and also in their own time. They give them experience in all facets of plumbing, because we want them to turn out as well-rounded journeymen.” Also testifying was PHCC instructor, plumbing contractor Dick Carrantine, who affirmed that PHCC apprentices at the training center were “definitely” being trained in accord with the curriculum. He described the physical setup of the training facility and expressed his opinion that “we’re doing a pretty good job of giving them all the different aspects, yes.” Black explained that if an apprentice is working with a contractor who does not have a job in a work process in which the apprentice requires training, PHCC moves that apprentice to another contractor.
5. Section 212.2(a)(5).
PHCC provided evidence of its “ability, including financial ability, and commitment to meet and carry out its responsibility under the federal and state law and regulations applicable to the apprenticeable occupation and for the welfare of the apprentice.” (§ 212.2(a)(5).) PHCC’s standards provided in the wording of this regulation that the apprenticeship committee had the responsibility to “oversee the program’s ability, including financial ability, and commitment to meet and carry out” these responsibilities (Article VI, ¶ 3). Evidence was presented that PHCC had leased a large training facility in Sacramento and secured a nearby facility for lodging its apprentices during their two-week intensive centralized RSI training. According to Black, “PHCC will pay the travel expenses for all Southern apprentices to attend classes in Sacramento and will provide free housing to these students at its Student Housing Facilities to minimize any hardship on the part of the apprentice.” In her June 13, 2005 responsive letter, Black discussed the decision to centralize its training at the Sacramento training center and described how the training center would be financed: through training contributions, Montoya funding, various fundraising activities and donations. She further explained, “[t]he PHCC-GSA PUAC recently voted to increase its training contributions to $1.00 per hour effective September 1, 2005 and to charge a $250 enrollment fee to contractors for all apprentices prior to the first semester of classes each year.” PHCC submitted exhibit No. O entitled “Expected Sources of Revenue during 2005-2006 School Year, ” listing these and other expected sources to fund its Sacramento concentrated training center. Finally, PHCC’s existing programs and successful operations in the past provided evidence of its financial strength and could be considered by the Division and the Council as evidence of PHCC’s ability and commitment to carry out its programs in accordance with law and for the welfare of its apprentices.
Sources listed included: “√ Effective 9/1/05, the PHCC-GSA PUAC Apprenticeship Program will collect $1.00/hour per apprentice on all private work. A minimum of $1.00 per hour per apprentice will be collected on public works jobs and the training contributions per journeyman will be collected according to the prevailing wage determination by county.
B. Conclusions
The foregoing constitutes substantial evidence supporting the Council’s determination that PHCC had supplied evidence sufficient to meet the requirements of section 212.2(a)(1) through (5).
As stated heretofore, we review the factual determinations of the Council under the deferential substantial evidence standard. (Best v. California Apprenticeship Council, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 626, 633.) As we recognized in Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 al.App.4th 635, 678: “ ‘[W]e are bound by the rule that when “a finding of fact is attacked on the ground that there is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial evidence contradicted or uncontradicted which will support the finding of fact.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] [Appellants] raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assume[] a ‘daunting burden.’ [Citation.]”
Appellants recite at length the deficiencies they perceive in PHCC’s evidentiary showing and its program. PHCC disputes the bulk of these assertions, characterizing them as inaccurate, incomplete or exaggerated. The question is not, as the Council and Chief recognized, whether respondents or appellants have the better training program. Rather, “our review is limited to examining the whole administrative record to determine if the [Council’s] findings and order are supported by substantial evidence, it is not our function to reweigh the evidence or the particular factors cited by the [Council] in support of its decision, to which we afford considerable deference. Once we conclude, as we have here, that the [Council’s] findings are indeed supported by substantial evidence, and that those findings in turn support the [Council’s] legal conclusion or ultimate determination, our analysis is at an end.” (JKH Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1046, 1066-1067.)
Appellants assert: (1) there was no evidence of commitments from enough contractors throughout Northern California for training apprentices; (2) there was no evidence that PHCC has examined the credentials of journeymen of participating contractors; (3) PHCC’s relationships with LEAs regarding RSI were not “firmly” in place and the San Joaquin Office of Education was not committed to being an LEA and had inadequate staff to do so in any event; (4) PHCC’s ability to offer training in all phases of the work process was not supported because the training facility was only “an empty shell” at the time of the Council’s decision; (5) there was insufficient evidence of PHCC’s financial ability to run an apprenticeship program and a list of projected sources of income was insufficient; (6) PHCC’s lack of commitment to the welfare of its apprentices was shown by past practices involving reclassification of registered apprentices as “trainees” to avoid state minimum wage laws, plummeting graduation rates in 2002 and 2003 (from 32% to 9%) due to contractors’ unwillingness to comply with the state minimum wage; and (7) PHCC’s failure to follow its own enrollment procedures was the subject of a DAS investigative report in 2003.
VI. “Balancing of the Equities”
In light of our decision, we need not address appellants’ claim that the trial court erred in applying a “balancing of the equities” test to support its determination that “this Court may not terminate PHCC’s present mode of operations.” However, we are troubled by the court’s adoption of such a test here. The principles of equity may not be invoked to avoid a statutory mandate. (Jiagbogu v. Mercedes-Benz USA (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1235, 1244; Ghory v. Al-Lahham (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1492.) That appellants sought a writ of administrative mandamus from the trial court does not provide an exception to this rule. In Independent Roofing, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at page 1338 (an appeal in an administrative mandamus action), the trial court rejected the equitable argument of estoppel on grounds that would apply here. There, the court stated that the appellant “Independent Roofers does not provide any authority for the proposition that the conduct of a subordinate body may estop the body empowered to review its actions from exercising that power, or that it would be reasonable to rely on promises to that effect. This would result in the absurdity of insulating a rogue entity from review. . . .” (Id. at p. 1338, italics added.) Similarly, the Council has provided no authority in support of its claim that the trial court here could “balance the equities” if the Council had not proceeded in the manner required by law. Such a balancing of equities would deny effective judicial review to parties in almost every case where the agency approved a program and no stay was imposed. Were the findings insufficient or unsupported by substantial evidence, abuse of discretion would be established and a reversal required, despite countervailing equitable concerns.
Disposition
We affirm the judgment of the trial court denying appellants’ petition for a writ of mandate.
We concur: Lambden, J., Richman, J.
APPENDIX
I.
Title 8, California Code of Regulations, section 212.2 reads in full:
“Eligibility and Procedure for DAS Approval of an Apprenticeship Program.
(a) To be eligible for approval, a program must comply with all applicable federal and state law and regulations. A revision to change the program’s occupation or to change the program’s geographic area of operation to include a different labor market area is subject to the same application and approval process set out in (a)-(j) of this section for approval of a program, including providing notice of the proposed revision and an opportunity for comment to existing programs in the same apprenticeable occupation in the labor market area. The program sponsor shall submit to the Chief, DAS, an application for approval of the program and shall provide the program standards and, either with the application or during the application review process, evidence of:
(1) commitment to provide safe work site facilities and safe equipment sufficient to train the apprentices;
(2) commitment to provide skilled workers as trainers at the work site who meet the criteria for journeyman or instructor as defined in Section 205(a) or (b);
(3) adequate arrangements for related and supplemental instruction pursuant to Labor Code section 3074;
(4) ability to offer training and supervision in all work processes of the apprenticeable occupation;
(5) the program sponsor’s ability, including financial ability, and commitment to meet and carry out its responsibility under the federal and state law and regulations applicable to the apprenticeable occupation and for the welfare of the apprentice.
(b) The training must be in an apprenticeable occupation as defined in Section 205(c) and must conform to the requirements of Section 215 concerning equal opportunity in apprenticeship;
(c) Within thirty days after receipt of an application for approval of a program, or for approval of a revision to change the occupation or to change the program’s geographic area of operation to include a different labor market area, the Chief DAS shall notify the sponsor in writing either that: (1) the application is complete and accepted for filing; or (2) the application is incomplete and specified additional information is required;
(d) Where a collective bargaining agreement exists, a program shall be jointly sponsored unless either party to the agreement waives its right to representation in writing;
(e) If the standards or collective bargaining agreement of a program proposed by an employer or employers’ association provide for participation by a union in the operation of the program, the sponsor shall provide evidence that the union accepts or does not oppose the program. The union may submit comments on the proposed program within thirty days after receipt of the proposed standards. The Chief may, in his or her discretion, consult with such union concerning the proposed program;
(f) If the standards and collective bargaining agreement of a program proposed by an employers’ association do not provide for participation by a union in the operation of the program, the sponsor shall serve a copy of the proposed standards and any supplement thereto on the union, if any, which is the collective bargaining agent of the employees to be trained. The union may submit comments on the proposed program within thirty days after receipt of the completed standards. The Chief may, in his or her discretion, consult with such union concerning the proposed program;
(g) Upon receipt of the proposed standards of a program, the Chief shall serve a copy of the proposed standards and any supplement thereto on the sponsor of each existing program in the apprenticeable occupation in the labor market area of the program, unless the program has advised the Chief DAS that it does not wish to be so notified. Each such existing program may submit comments on the proposed program within thirty days after receipt of the completed standards. The Chief may, in his or her discretion, consult with such existing program concerning the proposed program;
(h) The Chief may, in his or her discretion, hold a hearing on any issue relating to the compliance of a proposed program with federal and state law and regulations. The Chief shall provide notice of, and an opportunity to attend, the hearing to the sponsor and to any union or existing program that is entitled to submit comments under this section. The hearing shall be conducted informally without the application of formal rules of evidence or procedure;
(i) The Chief’s decision whether to approve a program shall be issued within ninety days after the receipt of the completed application for approval. The decision shall be served on the sponsor and on each party which submitted comments on the proposed program. The decision shall be in writing and shall set forth the relevant findings of fact, a discussion of any issues raised by any comments or at any hearing and the reasons for the decision;
(j) The median time for processing an application to train apprentices, from the receipt of the initial application to the final approval decision, based on the experience in the two years preceding the proposal of this Section, is two years. The minimum time is one and a half years, and the maximum time is three years.
(k) The Chief’s decision approving or disapproving a proposed program shall be final and become an Order of the Council if no appeal is filed within 30 days following service of the decision on the parties. The appeal may be filed by the sponsor or by any union or existing program which was authorized to and did submit comments under this section;
(l) The chairperson of the Council shall refer the appeal, if any, to a three member panel which shall submit a recommendation to the full Council. The Panel’s recommendation shall be submitted no later than the second regularly scheduled meeting of the Council after the filing of the appeal. The panel may, in its discretion, hold a hearing if the Chief did not hold a hearing in the consultation process. The hearing shall be conducted in compliance with Section 203.
(m) The Council may affirm, reverse, or modify the decision of the Chief or of the appeal panel. The decision of the Council on an appeal shall be final.
(n) All documents, notices and appeals filed or served under this Section shall be filed or served in accordance with Section 229.”
II.
Title 8, California Code of Regulations, section 212 reads in full:
“Content of Apprenticeship Program Standards.
Apprenticeship programs shall be established by written apprenticeship standards which must be approved by the Chief DAS under Section 212.2. In order to be approved, the standards must cover all work processes within the apprenticeable occupation. The standards must contain:
(a) A statement of:
(1) the occupation(s) and an outline of the work processes in which the apprentice will receive supervised work experience and training on the job, and the allocation of the approximate time to be spent in each major process;
(2) the parties to whom the standards apply, the program sponsor’s labor market area, as defined by Section 215 appendix 2(l), for purposes of meeting equal employment opportunity goals in apprenticeship training and the program’s geographic area of operation as defined by section 205(n);
(3) the duties of the apprentice;
(4) the apprentice’s working conditions unique to the program;
(5) the progressively increasing wage, employee benefits and other compensation of the apprentice, as set by Section 208;
(6) the ratio of apprentices to journeymen, or the number of apprentices to be employed and the method used to determine the ratio whether by job site, workforce, department or plant;
(7) the local education agency which has agreed to provide the related and supplemental instruction, and a description of the courses to be provided;
(b) Provisions for:
(1) establishment of an apprenticeship committee, if applicable;
(2) administration of the standards;
(3) establishment of rules and regulations governing the program. An apprenticeship program’s standards or rules may provide for a period of probation which may not be for more than the combination of 1, 000 hours of employment and 72 hours of related instruction;
(4) determining the qualifications of employers if other than single employer programs and an orientation, workshop, or other educational session for employers to explain the apprenticeship program’s standards and the operation of the apprenticeship program;
(5) determining the qualifications of apprentice applicants and fair and impartial treatment of applicants for apprenticeship selected through uniform selection procedures, which shall be an addendum to the standards, pursuant to Section 215;
(6) the incorporation of the provisions of the standards into the apprentice agreement either directly or by reference;
(7) a procedure to be utilized for the recording and maintenance of all records concerning apprenticeship and otherwise required by law including a system for recording the apprentice’s worksite job progress and progress in related and supplemental instruction and a system for the periodic review and evaluation of the apprentice’s progress in job performance and related instruction;
(8) discipline of apprentices for failure to fulfill their obligations on-the-job or in related instruction, including provisions for fair hearings;
(9) terminating, or recommending the cancellation of, apprentice agreements in accordance with section 207;
(10) recommending issuance of State Certificates of Completion of Apprenticeship pursuant to Section 224;
(11) training and supervision, both on the job and in related instruction, in first aid, safe working practices and the recognition of occupational health and safety hazards;
(12) training in the recognition of illegal discrimination and sexual harassment;
(13) approval of the standards, and revisions to the standards, by the Chief DAS;
(14) an adequate mechanism to be used for the rotation of the apprentice from work process to work process to assure the apprentice of complete training in the apprenticeable occupation including mobility between employers when essential to provide exposure and training in various work processes in the apprenticeable occupation; and an adequate mechanism that will be used to provide apprentices with reasonably continuous employment in the event of a lay-off or the inability of one employer to provide training in all work processes as outlined in the standards;
(15) the on-going evaluation of the interest and capacity of individual employers to participate in the apprenticeship program and to train apprentices on-the-job and provisions for the evaluation of on-the-job training and related and supplemental instruction;
(16) compliance with training criteria where such have been adopted pursuant to Section 212.01; and
(17) meaningful representation of the interests of apprentices in the management of the program, which is shown where:
(A) In a joint labor-management sponsored program, the apprentices participating in that program are represented by a labor organization pursuant to one of the following: National Labor Relations Act, the Railway Labor Act, the California Public Employee Relations Act, Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the Meyers-Milias Brown Act;
(B) In a program sponsored by more than one employer or an association of employers, the apprentices participating in that program are at least equally represented on an advisory panel established by the apprenticeship committee responsible for the operation of the program. The apprentices shall be represented on the advisory panel by at least three representatives of the apprentices’ choice who shall have full voice and vote on the panel except as to financial matters or matters that relate to the administration or structure of an employee benefit plan or the administration or operation of a trust fund. The representatives of the apprentices shall be selected by way of a secret ballot election among the apprentices conducted by the apprenticeship program not less than once every two (2) years. This advisory panel shall meet not less than once every quarter to address issues and concerns raised by and affecting the apprentices in the program.
(c) The names and signatures of the parties.”
In exercising our de novo review on questions of interpretation of the statutes and regulations, we must keep in mind that “[i]n general, an agency’s interpretation of statutes within its administrative jurisdiction is given presumptive value as a consequence of the agency’s special familiarity and presumed expertise with satellite legal and regulatory issues. (Yamaha, supra, 19 Cal.4th 1, 11 . . . .)” (PG & E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1194.) Except where the issue is the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction, the agency’s interpretation of such statute generally will not be disturbed on appeal unless the agency’s interpretation “ ‘fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language.’ ” (Ibid.) A fortiori, the same rule of limited deference applies to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. (See Lab. Code, § 3083.) Even so, despite this general rule of deference, the standard of review on our appeal remains de novo. (Eisenberg et al., Civil Appeals & Writs, supra, ¶ 8:111.1, pp. 8-62 to 8-63, citing Sneed v. Saenz, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1234-1235; PG & E Corp. v. Public Utilities Com., at pp. 1194-1195; see also Jim Beam Brands Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 514, 521[“[d]eference is appropriate where the administrative agency’s expertise indicates it has a comparative interpretive advantage over the courts”].)
“√ PHCC receives training contributions from contractors performing public works jobs.
“√ PHCC will receive a $250.00 per apprentice enrollment fee from the employing contractor prior to the first semester of classes.
“√ PHCC will receive Montoya Funding from its LEA’s at a rate of $3.88 per apprentice RSI hour (80% of $4.86, 20% retained by LEA).
“√ PHCC collects revenue from various Journeyman Upgrade Courses during the year.
“√ PHCC sponsors various Fundraisers throughout the year.
“√ PHCC receives donations from contractor and affiliate members.
“√ PHCC will also receive funding from its members participating in its Federal Apprenticeship Program and Parallel Training Program. Hourly training contributions are at the same rate as the apprenticeship program.”