Likewise, the state legislature's having expressly provided for the sale of firearms at gun shows may imply that local ordinances, like that of Los Angeles, banning the sale of such weapons are preempted. More recently, however, in California Rifle and Pistol Ass'n. v. City of West Hollywood, 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 591 (1998), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District of California appears to have disavowed the logic underlying the district court's conclusion and the pertinent part of Doe. In California Rifle, the court confronted a challenge, on preemption grounds, to a city ban on sales of certain handguns known as Saturday Night Specials.
Likewise, the state legislature's having expressly provided for the presence of firearms at gun shows may imply that local ordinances, like that of Los Angeles, banning the possession of such weapons are preempted. More recently, however, in California Rifle and Pistol Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood, 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 78 Cal. Rptr.2d 591 (1998), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District of California appears to have disavowed the logic underlying the district court's conclusion and the pertinent part of Doe. In California Rifle, the court confronted a challenge, on preemption grounds, to a city ban on sales of certain handguns known as Saturday Night Specials.
With narrow exceptions, section 3 of Prop. H bans the possession of handguns by San Francisco residents, including handgun possession within the sanctity of homes, businesses, and private property. The trial court identified two state statutes, "each of which specifically preempts a narrowly limited field of firearms regulation," which the trial court found preempted section 3. ( California Rifle Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1318 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591] ( CRPA).) These two code sections are Penal Code section 12026, subdivision (b) [prohibiting localities from restricting handgun possession in an individual's home, business, or private property] and Government Code section 53071 [indicating an express intent by the Legislature to occupy the whole field of firearms licensing and registration].
The Attorney General's analysis finds some support in two recent cases: Benjaminv. Bailey 234 Conn. 455 662 A.2d 1226 ( Benjamin), and California Rifle Pistol Assn. v. City of WestHollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302 ( California Rifle). In Benjamin, the Supreme Court of Connecticut, in the course of considering various constitutional challenges to an assault weapons ban, stated: "The equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions apply only to 'persons.'
) Thus, mortgage lending is unlike the area of gun control law, on which the City and the dissent rely, in which courts have concluded that the Legislature has chosen to legislate narrowly, and "rather than intending to deprive municipalities of their police power to regulate handgun sales, . . . has been cautious about depriving local municipalities of aspects of their constitutional police power to deal with local conditions." ( California Rifle Pistol Assn.,Inc. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1318 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591]; see Great Western Shows, Inc. v. County ofLos Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 853, 865, 866 [ 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 746, 44 P.3d 120] ( Great Western) [noting state laws regulating gun shows expressly refer to applicable local laws]; dis. opn., post, at pp. 1267, 1272.) As one amicus curiae notes, the City does not demonstrate that in the area of regulating residential mortgages, the Legislature has attempted "to tread lightly on a narrow path."
(Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 864.) These two decisions, both of which were cited approvingly by the Great Western court, are California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302 (CRPA)and Suter v. City of Lafayette (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1109 (Suter), a decision by our colleagues in Division One of this court. Both rejected claims that state law preempted local ordinances regarding gun control.
( Great Western, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 864–873, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 746, 44 P.3d 120.) These two decisions, both of which were cited approvingly by the Great Western court, are California Rifle & Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591 (CRPA ) and Suter v. City of Lafayette (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1109, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 420 (Suter ), a decision by our colleagues in Division One of this court. Both rejected claims that state law preempted local ordinances regarding gun control.
"In the absence of state preemption, every municipality is authorized by the California Constitution to exercise its police power to deal with local situations." ( California Rifle Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1307-1308 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 591] ( California Rifle).) Article XI, section 5 of the California Constitution, embodying the "home rule" doctrine, reserves to charter cities the authority to adopt and enforce "all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs" even if they conflict with state laws.
If the Legislature has the power to regulate a certain area, municipalities have the power to regulate that same area. (California Rifle Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1310 (California Rifle).) The issue is not whether Oakland is constitutionally authorized to regulate predatory lending practices within its borders, but whether the Legislature has acted to remove that power from Oakland.
The ordinance is presumed valid; appellants have the burden of proving otherwise. ( California Rifle Pistol Assn. v. City of West Hollywood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1331.) Appellants assert that the Oakland ordinance is invalid because it conflicts with state law.