In order to pursue a cause of action, the plaintiff's standing must be established in some appropriate manner. ( Parker v. Bowron (1953) 40 Cal.2d 344, 351; Friendly Village Community Assn., Inc. v. Silva Hill Constr. Co. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 220, 224; see California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 349 (conc. opn. of Blease, J.).) Code of Civil Procedure section 1086 provides in pertinent part that a writ of mandate "must be issued upon the verified petition of the party beneficially interested."
In our opinion, County errs by intertwining the issues of standing, capacity to sue, and exhaustion of administrative remedies. (See California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 349 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 110], Blease, J., conc.: "This requirement [standing] is sometimes confused with the entirely separate issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine "bars the pursuit of a judicial remedy by a person to whom administrative action was available for the purpose of enforcing the right he seeks to assert in court, but who has failed to commence such action and is attempting to obtain judicial redress where no administrative proceeding has occurred at all; it also operates as a defense to litigation commenced by persons who have been aggrieved by action taken in an administrative proceeding which has in fact occurred but who have failed to `exhaust' the remedy available to them in the course of the proceeding itself." ( California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 110] ( California Aviation).) As our Supreme Court has stated it: "In brief, the rule is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act."
(See Environmental Law Fund, Inc. v. Town of Corte Madera, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 112.)" ( California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 340-341, fn. omitted.) Section 14.5 of chapter 1514 of the statutes of 1984, the measure by which section 21177 was enacted, "states that the`intent of the Legislature in adding Section 21177 . . . [is] to codify the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.'
The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine "bars the pursuit of a judicial remedy by a person to whom administrative action was available for the purpose of enforcing the right he seeks to assert in court, but who has failed to commence such action and is attempting to obtain judicial redress where no administrative proceeding has occurred at all; it also operates as a defense to litigation commenced by persons who have been aggrieved by action taken in an administrative proceeding which has in fact occurred but who have failed to `exhaust the remedy available to them in the course of the proceeding itself." (California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 (California Aviation).) As our Supreme Court has stated it: "In brief, the rule is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act."
"The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well settled: it is commonly held that if an administrative remedy is provided by statute or ordinance, a litigant must show that he invoked and exhausted the remedy before he may obtain judicial review of the administrative action taken." ( Environmental Law Fund, Inc. v. Town of Corte Madera (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 105, 111 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 282]; California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 340-341 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 110].) In 1984 the Legislature codified the exhaustion doctrine in CEQA cases in section 21177 (Stats.
Because the rule is jurisdictional, the doctrine is not open to judicial discretion. ( California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 110] .) The rule is applicable whether the petitioner is seeking ordinary mandamus ( Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby (1971) 5 Cal.3d 1, 7 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 329, 485 P.2d 529, 46 A.L.R.3d 351]) or administrative mandamus.
(8) The district contends that the courts should not entertain petitioner's contentions because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. This requirement of exhaustion has been applied to claims of inadequacy of environmental impact reports (EIR's) ( Sea Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417-419 [ 194 Cal.Rptr. 357, 668 P.2d 664]; Resource Defense Fund, supra, 191 Cal.App.3d 886, 894), and negative declarations ( Coalition for Student Action v. City of Fullerton (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 1194, 1197-1198 [ 200 Cal.Rptr. 855]; California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 345 [ 246 Cal.Rptr. 110]). In this connection, the district persists in citing Gorsuch v. City of Sonora (Cal.App.), although petitioner pointed out in the trial court that this decision has been depublished.
The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement " 'operates as a defense to litigation commenced by persons who have been aggrieved by action taken in an administrative proceeding which has in fact occurred but who have failed to "exhaust" the remedy available to them in the course of the proceeding itself.' (California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 341 (California Aviation).) As our Supreme Court has stated it: 'In brief, the rule is that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute, relief must be sought from the administrative body and this remedy exhausted before the courts will act.' (Abelleira v. Dist. Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 292.)
Notice in this context can be constructive, it need not be actual. ( Resource Defense Fund v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 886, 895, 236 Cal.Rptr. 794 [if the agency provides notice as required by law, the petitioner is on constructive notice and "cannot ... complain of an alleged lack of [actual] notice"], disapproved on another ground by Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 257 P.3d 81 ; California Aviation Council v. County of Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 337, 344, 246 Cal.Rptr. 110 ( California Aviation ) [the petitioners could not establish exhaustion exception where the county published hearing notice in the newspaper and there was "nothing in the record to suggest that [the petitioners] had previously requested notice but failed to receive it"].) As relevant here, the Brown Act requires the college to post meeting agendas at least 72 hours in advance in a publicly accessible location, which includes the college's website.