Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387, 98 S.Ct. at 681. In contrast to its ruling in Zablocki, the Court in the same term upheld a Social Security provision that terminated benefits to a secondary beneficiary if he or she married a person ineligible for Social Security benefits. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977). As the Court explained in Zablocki,
The Supreme Court has also upheld a provision of the Social Security Act from an equal protection challenge where the Act specified that a beneficiary who married a non-beneficiary would lose the rights to benefits. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977). The provision was not invalid "simply because some persons who might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were burdened thereby." Id. at 54, 98 S.Ct. at 99.
In our view such a loss does not significantly or legally interfere with a decision to enter a new marital relationship. Directly in point is Califano v. Jobst (1977) 434 U.S. 47 [54 L.Ed.2d 228, 98 S.Ct. 95]. Jobst concerned a provision of the Social Security Act which terminated benefits to the child of a deceased wage earner if the child married, but continued benefits if the child married another beneficiary.
TIMBERS, Circuit Judge: On this appeal from an order entered in the Eastern District of New York, Jack B. Weinstein, District Judge, on remand from the Supreme Court for further consideration in light of its decision in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977), the question presented is whether the Secretary of HEW has construed properly § 202(d)(6) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(6) (1976) (the Act), so as to bar appellant permanently from re-entitlement to child's disability insurance benefits simply because her spouse, now deceased, was not entitled to receive social security benefits, and, if so construed, whether the statute is constitutional. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the district court properly adopted the Secretary's construction of the statute, and that the statute as construed is constitutional. We affirm.
We now consider whether the Johnsons have stated a claim for deprivation of their liberty interests so as to support a cause of action under § 1983. In Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a Social Security Act provision that discontinued benefits to a disabled dependent child upon marrying a person who was ineligible to receive social security benefits. The Court noted that "there can be no question about the validity of the assumption that a married person is less likely to be dependent on his parents for support than one who is unmarried."
Subsequent to the decisions in Johnson and Mapes, the Supreme Court made explicit in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978), what had been implicit in earlier decisions, that the right to marry is "fundamental". The Court, however, citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977), took care to explain that it did "not mean to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may be legitimately imposed.
Of course, not every classification which may affect the marital relationship in any way warrants strict scrutiny. For example, in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977), the Court had applied the rational basis test in rejecting an equal protection challenge to a provision of the Social Security Act terminating, under certain circumstances, a dependent child's Social Security benefits when the child married. The Court subsequently characterized Califano v. Jobst as a case involving "legislation providing governmental payments of monetary benefits that has an incidental effect on a protected liberty."
(Footnotes omitted.) In analyzing appellants' equal protection arguments, this court is further aided by the Supreme Court's decision in Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 98 S.Ct. 95, 54 L.Ed.2d 228 (1977), which involved an equal protection challenge to the Social Security Act's child benefit provisions. The relevant sections of the Act provided that a person who became totally disabled before the age of 18 was entitled to receive benefits if his or her parent was a contributor to the social security fund.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 776." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53 (1977). The rationality of the amendment denying a family the right to exclude a supported child from the filing unit is also supported by the Government's separate interest in distributing benefits among competing needy families in a fair way.
"General rules are essential if a fund of this magnitude is to be administered with a modicum of efficiency, even though such rules inevitably produce seemingly arbitrary consequences in some individual cases." Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47. 53 (1977). A process of case-by-case adjudication that would provide a "perfect fit" in theory would increase administrative expenses to a degree that benefit levels would probably be reduced, precluding a perfect fit in fact.