However, because this issue was not raised below on the petition for writ of mandate, we decline to reach it on appeal. (See California Indemnity Ins. Premium Finance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1641 [ 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 743].) If the Clarks believe that any councilmember other than Benz should be disqualified in connection with the new hearing, they can raise that point during the administrative proceedings after remand.
Mountain West's compliance with the requirements of § 673 is not at issue here. The California cases upon which the parties rely do not resolve the issue presented here. For example, plaintiff cites California Indemnity Insurance Premium Finance Company v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1633 (1996), for the proposition that a premium finance agreement is invalid absent written authorization by the insured. That case, however, addresses only whether the lender or insurer should bear the risk for the loss of a premium in a case in which the insured's agent fraudulently entered into a premium finance arrangement without the insured's knowledge.
Thus, the court strongly suggested that a fraud cause of action could be based on a duty to disclose pricing information, as long as all the other elements of fraud were present. Similarly, SCIF asserts that “[t]here is no duty to give financial advice to an insured,” citing California Indemnity Ins. Premium Finance Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1633. What that case actually stated, however, was: “[W]e find no legal duty on the part of an insurer which would reach beyond the scope of its relationship with its insured, and would extend to advising a third party regarding financial transactions.
The equal dignities rule is generally applicable to situations where an agent's authority to bind a principal to a written agreement must be in writing. (See Civ. Code, § 2309; California Indemnity Ins. Premium Finance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1637; Carlton Browne Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 35, 46.) The only authority cited by plaintiffs for the proposition that the rule applies to amendment of an ordinance is 6 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations (3d ed. 1998 rev. vol.) section 21.04, page 251.
( Kardly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1748-1749, fn. 1.) Other of her issues have been waived by failure to present them to the trial court. (See California Indemnity Ins. Premium Finance Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1641; Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 113). We further find no support for Stanley's request that this court issue findings of fact pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 23, or her request for sanctions.
(Kardly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1748-1749, fn. 1.) Other of her issues have been waived by failure to present them to the trial court. (See California Indemnity Ins. Premium Finance Co. v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1633, 1641; Santantonio v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 102, 113). We further find no support for Stanleys request that this court issue findings of fact pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 23, or her request for sanctions.