" 'A claimant has the right to show that the execution which is levied on the property claimed by him is void or inoperative as a valid process.'" Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65, 66 (3) ( 5 S.E.2d 41). 7. If the execution is not void but is regular and valid on its face when it is levied upon the mortgaged property, and no counter-affidavit is filed but a claim is interposed, the claimant cannot upon the trial of the issue amend the claim by alleging that the mortgagor is not indebted to the mortgagee, nor will he be allowed to introduce testimony to show it. Collier v. Blake, 16 Ga. App. 382 ( 85 S.E. 354).

This case has been before this court on one occasion, when the judgment was reversed on special grounds of the motion for a new trial. Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 ( 5 S.E.2d 41). The plaintiff in error has strongly urged that the evidence shows that the claimant did not purchase the property "for a valuable consideration," as required by the Code, § 110-511. Doubtless this same question will arise on another trial, and, in case of a verdict for the claimant, will again be made the basis of a motion for a new trial, unless it is here ruled on. It is hoped that by making a decision on this question we may assist in bringing the litigation to an earlier conclusion.

It is generally true that an execution must follow the judgment and "describe the parties thereto as described in such judgment" (Code, § 39-104); and that an execution which fails to so follow the judgment is not admissible in evidence over the objection of a claimant. Williams v. Atwood, 52 Ga. 585; Smith v. Lockett, 73 Ga. 104 (2); Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65 (3) ( 5 S.E.2d 41). This rule is also applicable to an execution issued on a money decree in equity. Code. § 37-1207.

In view of this order of introducing evidence, it must be treated as if the claimant assumed the burden of proof. Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65, 66 ( 5 S.E.2d 41). Therefore, the claimant having assumed the burden of proof, admitted a prima facia case for the plaintiff in fi. fa. Krasner v. Croswell, 76 Ga. App. 421, 422 ( 46 S.E.2d 207). Since the plaintiff alleged that Cooper was indebted to it on the conditional-sale contract, which was transferred to it by Walker Buick Company, this admission of a prima facia case necessarily meant that the claimant conceded that the plaintiff had a valid transfer of the conditional-sale contract under which the indebtedness was claimed.

FELTON, J. The levy, which appears in the brief of evidence, was so inaccurate as to fail completely to show that the defendant in fi. fa. was in possession of the property at the time of the levy, or, in fact, upon whose property the levy was made. Under such circumstances the burden of proof would ordinarily have been upon the plaintiff in fi. fa. to establish ownership of the property in the defendant in fi. fa. ( Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Crawford, 34 Ga. App. 719, 131 S.E. 103), unless the claimant admitted a prima facie case in behalf of the plaintiff in fi. fa. ( Jarrard v. Mobley, 170 Ga. 847, 154 S.E. 251; Code, § 39-904); however, in view of the order of the introduction of evidence, first by the claimant, it is inferred that the claimant assumed the burden of proof ( Calhoun v. Williamson, 189 Ga. 65, 5 S.E.2d 41), and the claimant, having assumed the burden of proof, admitted a prima facie case for the plaintiff in fi. fa. Strickland v. Smith, 17 Ga. App. 505 ( 87 S.E. 718); Sexton v. Burruss, 144 Ga. 192 ( 86 S.E. 537). Under such circumstances, it was incumbent upon the claimant to prove her title to the property by evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie case of the plaintiff in fi. fa. The claimant introduced to support her claim of title the testimony of her husband, Norman Krasner, of her brother-in-law, David W. Krasner, who had acted as her agent and attorney in purchasing the property involved, and the testimony of R. L. Henry Sr., one of her grantors. She also testified in her own behalf and introduced in evidence bills of sale and two checks which were used in purchasing the property.