.OCGA § 16–5–41(a). See Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga.App. 835, 837–838(2)(a), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012) (vacated aggravated assault conviction because evidence did not support finding that defendant pointed a gun at the victim as alleged in the indictment).Viewed in favor of the verdict, the evidence at trial showed that Ford–Calhoun participated in two separate armed robberies of business establishments with Calhoun during late 2007. During the first incident (“Dollar General robbery”), Ford–Calhoun entered the store and, using her cell phone, alerted Calhoun to enter the store at an opportune moment.

Accordingly, counsel did not provide deficient performance in failing to move for a meritless directed verdict.See Calhounv. State, 318 Ga. App. 835, 837 (2), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012) ("When reviewing a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, we apply the same test as when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence[.]"). [24–26] (b) Champion argues that counsel provided deficient performance in failing to object to Champion’s sentence for identity fraud.

It follows that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Cruz's conviction on aggravated assault on a peace officer as that crime was charged in the indictment. See Ford-Calhoun , 327 Ga. App. at 839 (1) (b), 761 S.E.2d 388 (reversing appellant's conviction for the crime of aggravated assault with intent to rob; the indictment alleged that appellant committed the crime by "pointing a gun at [the victim] and demand[ing] money," but no evidence established appellant actually pointed a gun at the victim); see also Calhoun v. State , 318 Ga. App. 835, 837-838 (2) (a), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012). Cruz's conviction on that count is, therefore, reversed.

See McGil v. State, 339 Ga. App. 130 , 131 (1) (793 SE2d 442 ) (2016) (finding that evidence defendant approached victim in parking lot, pointed a gun at him, and then stole his cell phone before fleeing was sufficient to support convictions on charges of armed robbery and aggravated assault with intent to rob); Kiser v. State, 327 Ga. App. 17 , 19-20 (2) (755 SE2d 505 ) (2014) (holding that evidence defendant held victim inside trailer at gunpoint was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction on false-imprisonment charge); Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga. App. 835 , 838-39 (2) (b) (734 SE2d 809 ) (2012) (finding that evidence defendant ordered store manager to front of store to assist other employee in opening cash register was sufficient to support *660 false-imprisonment conviction); Davis v. State, 306 Ga. App. 450 , 450-51 (702 SE2d 736 ) (2010) (holding that evidence defendant pointed gun at victim and demanded money was sufficient to support conviction on charges of aggravated assault with intent to rob). 8

See Crawford v. State, 294 Ga. 898, 900, 757 S.E.2d 102 (2014) (decided under former OCGA § 24–4–8, the precursor to OCGA § 24–14–8); White v. State, 315 Ga.App. 54, 61–62(6), 726 S.E.2d 548 (2012). See Carter, supra; Broyard v. State, 325 Ga.App. 794, 755 S.E.2d 36 (2014); Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga.App. 835, 839(2)(b), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012); see generally Nelson v. State, 242 Ga.App. 63, 64(2), 528 S.E.2d 844 (2000) (defendant's armed robberies of two individual bank tellers at the same site constituted two separate crimes). 2.

]” See, e.g., Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga.App. 835, 838(2)(a), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012) (if an indictment charges a defendant with committing a crime in a particular manner, then “the proof must show it so”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 2.

Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the offenses. See Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga.App. 835, 836, 836–837(1), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012). Judgment affirmed. ANDREWS, P.J., and McFADDEN, J., concur.

(Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga.App. 835, 837(2), 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012). “All that is required to prove false imprisonment is there be an arrest, confinement or detention of the person, without legal authority, which violates the person's personal liberty (i.e., against his or her will).”

See English, 276 Ga. at 347, 578 S.E.2d 413 (affirming the denial of a special demurrer where the indictment “detail[ed] how the aggravated battery was accomplished and the specific injuries that were sustained”). The State, however, must take care to allege only those details that it is prepared to prove at trial. See Calhoun v. State, 318 Ga.App. 835, 838, 734 S.E.2d 809 (2012) (“ ‘No averment in an indictment can be rejected as surplusage which is descriptive either of the offense or the manner in which it was committed. All such averments must be proved as laid, or the failure to prove the same as laid will amount to a variance.