The fact that an arrest is not a sufficient basis for the revocation of probation is true even if probation is conditioned upon the probationer's not being arrested for new offenses, which the circuit court's order appears to indicate was a condition of Nelson's probation. See Calhoun v. State, 854 So. 2d 1209, 1210 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002) ("The trial court's original order of probation provided, in pertinent part: ‘The defendant's probation is conditioned on the defendant['s] complying with the following conditions of probation: [1] The defendant shall not be arrested for any further offenses.’ (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 1197 (citing Calhoun v. State, 854 So.2d 1209, 1210 (Ala.Crim.App.2002)). Thus, this Court reversed the order revoking Nelson's probation because "the circuit court did not find that it was reasonably satisfied that Nelson had committed the new offenses for which he had been arrested but, instead, revoked Nelson's probation based solely on the fact that Nelson had been arrested for those offenses." Id. at 1197.
See also Gates v. State, 629 So.2d 719, 720 (Ala.Crim.App.1993) ("The appellant admitted at the hearing that he had been arrested in Georgia; however, a 'mere arrest' or the filing of charges is an insufficient basis for revoking probation."). As this Court explained in Calhoun v. State, 854 So.2d 1209 (Ala.Crim.App.2002): "'If merely being arrested is sufficient for revocation of probation, then revocation would lie within the discretion of police officers rather than with judicial officers.
" Hill v. State, 350 So.2d 716, 718 (Ala.Crim.App.1977)."Calhoun v. State, 854 So.2d 1209, 1210 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). In the present case, there is simply no oral or written finding by the circuit court that the court was reasonably satisfied that Sims was guilty of the new offense, and merely being charged with a new offense is an insufficient ground for probation revocation.