Opinion
C21-1613JLR
12-17-2021
ARMAND CALHOUN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF AMERICA NA, Defendant.
ORDER
JAMES L. ROBART, United States District Judge.
Before the court is pro se Plaintiffs Armand Calhoun and Robert Flores's (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filing titled “notice-ancillary affidavit for preliminary injunction, ” which the court liberally construes as a proposed motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (Not. (Dkt. # 7)); Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The court has reviewed Plaintiffs' proposed motion, the balance of the record, and the applicable law. Being fully advised, the court DENIES Plaintiffs' proposed motion.
Plaintiffs appear to request that the court issue a temporary restraining order against Defendant Bank of America NA immediately and hold a preliminary injunction hearing on December 27, 2021. (See Not.) The court, however, will not provide Plaintiffs with the requested relief for the reasons stated below.
First, this action has not yet commenced due to Mr. Calhoun's failure to cure the deficiencies in his in forma pauperis (“IFP”) application and Mr. Flores's failure to file an IFP application. (See IFP Deficiency Letter (Dkt. # 3); see also IFP Application (Dkt. # 1); Dkt.); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007) (“An action may proceed despite a party's failure to pay this filing fee only if the party is granted leave to proceed [IFP] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)”). Because these IFP deficiencies have not yet been cured, Plaintiffs' proposed complaint has not yet been filed with the court. (See generally Dkt.; Proposed Compl. (Dkt. # 1-1).)
Second, Plaintiffs have failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. In addition to having not properly commenced this case, Plaintiffs failed to comply with Local Rule 65(b), which requires that the moving party provide the court with “a proposed order specifically setting forth the relief requested and describing in reasonable detail the act or acts to be restrained or required.” Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 65(b).
Finally, even if the court determined that it could resolve Plaintiffs' motion on the merits, it is unclear what exactly Plaintiffs seek to enjoin or why such relief is warranted. (See generally id.) Like a preliminary injunction, issuance of a TRO is “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), a party seeking a TRO must make a clear showing (1) of a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) of a likelihood of suffering irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of hardship tips in her favor; and (4) that a temporary restraining order in is in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (articulating standard for preliminary injunction); Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order standards are “substantially identical”). A review of Plaintiffs' proposed complaint and motion, which contain mostly incomprehensible assertions, shows that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to prove these elements. (See generally Proposed Compl.; Not.)
Accordingly, the court DENIES Plaintiffs' filing titled “notice-ancillary affidavit for preliminary injunction” (Dkt. # 7). Furthermore, the court again warns Plaintiffs that this action may be dismissed if they fail to correct the deficiencies with their IFP applications by January 3, 2022. (See IFP Deficiency Letter.)