We felt obliged to apply this rule in O'Brien v. Lane, 40 App. D.C. 493 (1913), where, in order to determine whether or not an applicant was entitled to make a homestead entry as the assignee of one claiming rights under the homestead laws, it was necessary for the Secretary of the Interior to construe the statutes. And more recently in Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536 (1935), certiorari denied 297 U.S. 718, 56 S.Ct. 595, 80 L.Ed. 1003 (1936), wherein, in order to determine the dutiability of certain leather imports, it was necessary for the Secretary of the Treasury to construe a customs statute, we held that the writ of mandamus could not issue, saying: "It is of course settled that if a duty imposed by law is plain, an administrative officer must perform that duty and is subject to mandamus if he refuses.
It is the rule in the District of Columbia as well as elsewhere that "mandamus" should not go when another adequate remedy exists. United States ex rel. Frey v. Robertson, 1933, 61 App.D.C. 394, 63 F.2d 457; Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 1935, 65 App. D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536, 542. Therefore, the affirmance of the judgment below necessarily presupposed that no action for infringement would lie in which the question of "registration" could be decided.
We have previously held that the remedy there provided is appropriate. Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 1935, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536, 542, certiorari denied, 1936, 297 U.S. 718, 56 S.Ct. 595, 80 L.Ed. 1003. It is thoroughly settled that "* * * no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted." Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 1938, 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463, 82 L.Ed. 638; Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 1954, 347 U.S. 535, 553, 74 S.Ct. 745, 98 L.Ed. 933; National Enforcement Commission v. Slim Olson, Inc., 1955, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 218, 221 F.2d 92.
As such, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Sections 514 and 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 734, 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 1514, 1515; Section 195 of the Judicial Code, as amended, 46 Stat. 762, 28 U.S.C.A. § 308; State of Louisiana v. McAdoo, 1914, 234 U.S. 627, 34 S.Ct. 938, 58 L.Ed. 1506; Cottman Co. v. Dailey, 4 Cir., 1938, 94 F.2d 85; Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 1935, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536. Appellants argue that Waite v. Macy permits this action to lie.
The rule is, of course, too well settled to require discussion that mandamus will not issue to interfere with the discretion of an administrative officer in construing a statute even though the court would construe the statute otherwise, provided the officer's construction is reasonably possible. United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 51 S.Ct. 502, 75 L.Ed. 1148 (1931); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 50 S.Ct. 320, 74 L.Ed. 809 (1930); Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536 (1935). And we may concede, without ruling, that there is the same limitation upon the issuance of an injunction to control the action of administrative officers.
United States ex rel. International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, 155 U.S. 303, 308, 15 S.Ct. 97, 39 L.Ed. 160; Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 612, 26 L.Ed. 861; United States ex rel. Stowell v. Deming, 57 App.D.C. 223, 224, 19 F.2d 697, 698. See, also, United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 420, 51 S.Ct. 502, 504, 75 L.Ed. 1148; United States ex rel. International Contracting Co. v. Lamont, Ex parte Rowland, both supra note 2; United States ex rel. White v. Coe, 68 App.D.C. 218, 95 F.2d 347; Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 99, 80 F.2d 536, 542; Reichelderfer v. Johnson, 63 App.D.C. 334, 335, 72 F.2d 552, 553. In response to appellant's contention that it had power to grant the relief sought, the Commission made an exhaustive analysis of the various sections and cases cited; decided that the contention was unfounded; concluded that ". . . in none of the sections of the act relied upon is there an express grant of authority for us to accord the relief sought", and held that "We cannot, in order to carry out what we conceive to be the legislative intent, exercise powers which are neither expressly delegated, nor reasonably necessary in order to effectuate powers which are expressly delegated."
The Commissioner adopted the construction approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. His action in so doing was neither arbitrary nor capricious, as that interpretation of the statute is possible and fair. United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, supra, 283 U.S. 414, at page 419, 51 S.Ct. 502, 504, 75 L.Ed. 1148. The adoption of one of several possible interpretations of a doubtful statute involves the exercise of judgment and discretion, and where the duty of an officer to perform a particular act depends thereon, it cannot be controlled by mandamus. Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536; United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 47, 9 S.Ct. 12, 32 L.Ed. 354; United States ex rel. Hall v. Payne, 254 U.S. 343, 41 S.Ct. 131, 65 L.Ed. 295; Work v. Rives, 267 U.S. 175, 45 S.Ct. 252, 69 L.Ed. 561; Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 50 S. Ct. 320, 74 L.Ed. 809. Nor will the writ be used to direct the retraction or reversal of action already taken in such exercise of judgment and discretion. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, supra, 281 U.S. 206, at page 218, 50 S.Ct. 320, 324, 74 L.Ed. 809. Compare Wettlaufer v. Robins, 92 F.2d 573, certiorari denied, 58 S.Ct. 477, 82 L.Ed. ___, in which the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an applicant successful in an interference proceeding before the Board of Appeals, but unsuccessful before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on an appeal by a patentee-interferent could bring a bill in equity to litigate again the question of priority.
Mandamus will not issue to control discretion. Calf Leather Tanners' Association v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536. The relief sought in Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Atlanta, B. C.R. Co., if allowed, would almost completely have disabled a railroad to perform its public duty.
In addition to the foregoing considerations, which in my opinion should influence our decision, the writ should be denied on the ground that mandamus will not lie in behalf of a party who has other adequate remedies. Ex parte Cutting, 94 U.S. 14, 20, 24 L.Ed. 49; Ex parte Baldwin, 291 U.S. 610, 54 S.Ct. 551, 555, 78 L.Ed. 1020; Calf Leather Tanners' Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 80 F.2d 536, 542, certiorari denied, 297 U.S. 718, 56 S.Ct. 595, 80 L.Ed. 1003; Hineline v. Molyneaux (C.C.A.8) 73 F.2d 925; United States ex rel. Girard Trust Company v. Helvering, 57 S.Ct. 855, 81 L.Ed. ___, decided May 24, 1937. If petitioner's contentions in the District Court and here are sound, it has a complete remedy for relief from "a vexatious and expensive multiplicity of actions" by injunction. "Avoidance of the burden of numerous suits at law between the same or different parties, where the issues are substantially the same, is a recognized ground for equitable relief in the federal courts.
So far as its exercise involves interpretation of the statute in question, the statement made in the preceding paragraph is equally applicable to the point here under discussion. Wilbur v. United States ex rel Kadrie, supra; Work v. United States ex rel Rives, supra; United States ex rel Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, supra; Calf Leather Tanners Ass'n v. Morgenthau, 65 App.D.C. 93, 98, 99, 80 F.2d 536; United States ex rel Bowling v. Hines, 60 App.D.C. 180, 181, 50 F.2d 330; McCarl v. Rogers, 60 App.D.C. 111, 48 F.2d 1023; McCarl v. Walters, 59 App. D.C. 237, 238, 38 F.2d 942. Accordingly the motion for summary judgment will be granted.