Caldwell v. Parker

26 Citing cases

  1. Owens v. United States

    383 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa. 1974)   Cited 13 times
    Noting district court had concurrent jurisdiction to entertain a guilty plea by a serviceman to circulating bad checks on military base because "the jurisdiction to try and punish for a crime is not vested exclusively in a military court but is concurrent with the civilian tribunal having jurisdiction over the locus criminis." (citing Caldwell v. Parker , 252 U.S. 376, 382, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621 (1920) )

    Petitioner has cited no authority which supports the proposition that the civilian prosecution of a soldier for conduct amounting to a civilian, albeit service-related, offense denies the latter the due process of law. In Caldwell v. Parker, 1920, 252 U.S. 376, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621, the Court held that the jurisdiction to try and punish for a crime is not vested exclusively in a military court but is concurrent with the civilian tribunal having jurisdiction over the locus criminis. O'Callahan, supra, does not disturb this rule of law, and it is certainly of continuing validity.

  2. Ex Parte Quirin

    317 U.S. 1 (1942)   Cited 268 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a saboteur's U.S. citizenship was irrelevant to a commission's authority to try him for law-of-war offenses

    If it be suggested that these are matters which do not affect the jurisdiction of the Commission or the validity of the proceedings, but are merely questions which may be raised on appeal or review, the answer is that the Order deprived the petitioners of such appeal or review. Citing Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378; Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376; Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1; Home Building Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398; Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 330; 55 Harvard L. Rev. 1295; 31 Ops. A.G. 363.Attorney General Biddle, with whom Judge Advocate General Myron C. Cramer, Assistant Solicitor General Cox, and Col. Erwin M. Treusch were on the brief, for respondent.

  3. Kahn v. Anderson

    255 U.S. 1 (1921)   Cited 80 times
    Rejecting idea that military courts must use jury because it would “directly den[y] the existence of a power Congress exerted from the beginning”

    Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146. It is therefore difficult to appreciate the reasoning upon which it is insisted that, although the Government of the United States was officially at war, nevertheless, so far as the regulation and control by it of its army is concerned, it was at peace. Nor is it any less difficult to understand why reliance to sustain that proposition is placed on Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, since that case involved no question of the want of jurisdiction of a court-martial over a crime committed by a soldier, but solely whether the jurisdiction which it was conceded such a court possessed was intended to be exclusive of a concurrent power in the state court to punish the same act, as the mere result of a declaration of war and without reference to any interruption, by a condition of war, of the power of the civil courts to perform their duty; and moreover in that case the question here raised was expressly reserved from decision. Coming now to consider that question in the light (1) of the rulings in Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509; Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696, and Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376; (2) of the differences between the Articles of 1874 and those of 1916 showing a purpose to rearrange the jurisdiction of courts-martial; (3) of the omission of the qualification, "except in time of war," from the clauses of the latter artic

  4. United States v. Canella

    63 F. Supp. 377 (S.D. Cal. 1945)   Cited 12 times

    These rulings are in strict accord with the powers of the Congress and the President under the Constitution. United States Constitution, Article I, Sec. 8, Clauses 1, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18; Article 2, Sec. 1, Cl. 1; Article 2, Sec. 3, Cl. 1; and see Ex parte Quirin, 1942, 317 U.S. 1, 25-27, 63 S.Ct. 2, 87 L.Ed. 3; see Article of War 2, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1473; Article 15, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1486; Article 74, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1546; Article 92, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1564; Article 93, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565; Article 94, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1566; and see the following cases, arranged chronologically, which have applied the principle both in peace and war time: Coleman v. Tennessee, 1878, 97 U.S. 509, 24 L.Ed. 1118; Ex parte Mason, 1881, 105 U.S. 696, 26 L.Ed. 1213; United States v. Clark, C.C.Mich. 1887, 31 F. 710; Neall v. United States, 9 Cir., 1902, 118 F. 699; Drury v. Lewis, 1906, 200 U.S. 1, 26 S.Ct. 229, 50 L.Ed. 343; Franklin v. United States, 1910, 216 U.S. 559, 30 S.Ct. 434, 54 L.Ed. 615; Caldwell v. Parker, 1920, 252 U.S. 376, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621; People v. Denman, 1918, 179 Cal. 497, 177 P. 461; In re Koester, 1922, 56 Cal.App. 621, 624, 206 P. 116; United States v. Hirsch, D.C. 1918, 254 F. 109; United States v. McDonald, D.C.N.Y. 1920, 265 F. 754, 760; United States v. Matthews, D.C.Ala. 1943, 49 F. Supp. 203; and see, Billings v. Truesdell, 1944, 321 U.S. 542, 547, 64 S.Ct. 737, 88 L.Ed. 917; 36 Am.Jur., Military, § 96; Winthrop's Military Law, 1929, p. 671. About the only legal advantage that can be gained from courts martial lies in the fact that they are courts of limited jurisdiction and their judgments, even after they become final, may be attacked collaterally.

  5. Scott v. State

    22 So. 2d 529 (Ala. 1945)   Cited 11 times

    State courts do not lack authority to try soldiers in time of war for commission of crime. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 24 L.Ed. 1118; Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621; United States v. Hirsch, D.C., 254 F. 109; Castle v. Lewis, 8 Cir., 254 F. 917; In re Kelly, C.C.Wis., 71 F. 545; United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, C.C.Pa., 129 F. 823; Id., 200 U.S. 1, 26 S.Ct. 229, 50 L.Ed. 343; In re Koester, 56 Cal.App. 621, 206 P. 116. Provision of Articles of War for delivery to civil authorities of persons accused of crime, but subject to military law, except in time of war, is designed merely to modify the duties of the military authorities to surrender persons in military service charged with offenses against laws of the state, and the war time exception merely relieves military authorities of the duty to deliver accused persons to civil authorities.

  6. Matter of Baer

    180 Misc. 330 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943)   Cited 3 times

    Nevertheless, as a general rule, the jurisdiction of civil and military tribunals is concurrent, and not exclusive. ( Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 385, 388.) "Undoubtedly the general rule is that the jurisdiction of civil courts is concurrent as to offenses triable before courts-martial."

  7. Madsen v. Kinsella

    343 U.S. 341 (1952)   Cited 30 times
    Upholding a military commission's jurisdiction to try a civilian for murder in occupied Germany

    This section of the Act of 1863 was enacted so as to place soldiers who committed certain nonmilitary crimes under the jurisdiction of military courts. See Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376. The section did not relate to the jurisdiction of courts or commissions over civilians not in the military service.

  8. United States v. Hodge

    487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973)   Cited 47 times
    In United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945 (5 Cir. 1973), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that a confession obtained under circumstances remarkably similar to those in the instant case was admissible.

    Schmitt v. United States, 413 F.2d 219, 225 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 959, 90 S.Ct. 432, 24 L.Ed.2d 423 (1969); Kennedy v. Sanford, 166 F.2d 568, 569 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 864, 68 S.Ct. 737, 92 L.Ed. 1143 (1948). Accord, Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621 (1920); Peek v. United States, 321 F.2d 934, 936, 937 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954, 84 S. Ct. 973, 11 L.Ed.2d 973 (1964). We think that O'Callahan did not change the concurrent jurisdiction rule, but only limited the crimes over which a military court could assert jurisdiction.

  9. Hackworth v. Taylor

    283 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1960)   Cited 1 times
    In Hackworth v. Taylor, 10 Cir., 283 F.2d 250, the Court held that a soldier convicted by court-martial of murder was not entitled to release upon a writ of habeas corpus on the ground he came within the protection of individual rights afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

    The contention has long since been considered and rejected and there can be no doubt that murder can be prosecuted within the field of military offenses when proper jurisdiction exists. Coleman v. State of Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 24 L.Ed. 1118; Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 79 S.Ct. 276, 3 L.Ed.2d 260; Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621; Bennett v. Davis, 10 Cir., 267 F.2d 15. See also Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 15 S.Ct. 773, 39 L.Ed. 914. Affirmed.

  10. Robinson v. United States

    175 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1949)   Cited 11 times

    But even had Robinson at all times covered by each count of the indictment been in active military service and subject to court-martial such would in no wise have prevented his being indicted by the grand jury. See United States v. Canella, 9 Cir., 157 F.2d 470, affirming D.C., 63 F. Supp. 377; also Caldwell v. Parker, 252 U.S. 376, 40 S.Ct. 388, 64 L.Ed. 621. The sixth and last main contention of Robinson is that the acquittal of the conspiracy count made the convictions of the substantive counts void.