Opinion
No. 3:04-CV-2166-L.
January 9, 2006
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and the order of the District Court dated November 3, 2005, in implementation thereof, came on to be considered Defendant Richard Hults' Second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint brought by a former state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").
Parties: Plaintiff is a former prisoner who was incarcerated in the Dallas County Jail and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division ("TDCJ-CID") at all times pertinent to this lawsuit. Defendant is allegedly the staff physician at the medical clinic attached to the Wallace Unit of the TDCJ.
Procedural History of the Case: Plaintiff Lee Edwin Caldwell, filed this action on October 5, 2004, naming numerous defendants, including Defendant Richard Hults. On April 22, 2005, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff filed a response on May 12, 2005. The Magistrate Judge filed a recommendation on May 23, 2005, which recommended dismissal of Caldwell's claims against Defendant unless Caldwell filed an amended complaint in compliance with the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. However, on August 15, 2005, Caldwell filed an amended complaint. On September 7, 2005, the District Court filed its judgment denying Defendant's motion to dismiss without prejudice because Plaintiff filed an amended complaint in accordance with the Magistrate Judge's recommendation. On September 23, 2005, Defendant filed a second motion to dismiss. Plaintiff did not file a response.
Statement of Case: In his amended complaint, Caldwell argues that during his incarceration at the Wallace Unit he was denied adequate medical care and was denied rights secured to him under Title II of the ADA. He brings his claims against Defendant in his official capacity as an agent of the TDCJ and requests monetary relief.
Caldwell states that he suffered from the following ailments while incarcerated at the Wallace Unit: (1) presence of blood in his urine, (2) diabetes, (3) "digestive" problems, (4) open sores and visible infections, (5) arthritis in both feet, (6) fainting episodes, (7) hypothermia, and (8) episodes of nausea.
Caldwell does not allege that he was completely denied medical care for the aforementioned conditions, instead, he avers that the care he received was inappropriate. Plaintiff states that the staff treated the presence of blood in his urine with "excessive UA's," treated his "emerging" diabetes and "digestive problems" by giving him "more insulin and pills," and responded to his fainting episodes by giving him orange juice to revive him. He also alleges that he was denied pain medications, a medical work release, diabetic footwear, a cell pass so that he could rest during the day, and dental cleaning. Finally, Caldwell alleges that he was forced to work in ill-sized steel toe boots in a position that required standing, was required to sleep in an upper bunk, and was fed a "dangerously inappropriate diet."
Defendant argues that dismissal is proper because Plaintiff failed to state a constitutional claim under § 1983, and, in the alternative, because Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's ADA claim should be dismissed because Title II of the ADA does not provide for a cause of action against a defendant in his individual capacity. Finally, Defendant argues that this court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims.
Findings and Conclusions: A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss are disfavored and rarely granted. Gregson v. Zurich Amer. Ins. Co., 322 F.3d 883, 885 (5th Cir. 2003). To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff's pleadings must show specific, well-pleaded facts, not mere conclusory allegations. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992). The court must accept those well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Woodard v. Andrus, 419 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2005). Thereafter, the court focuses on whether the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts provide the defendant with fair notice of what the plaintiff's claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-513, 122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002). A court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957)).
Claims under § 1983
Hults argues that Plaintiff's § 1983 claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to state a constitutional claim, and, in the alternative because he is immune from suit under the theory of qualified immunity. Defendant's qualified immunity argument takes precedence because, if Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity, this court has no jurisdiction to address the merits of Plaintiff's § 1983 claim.
Defendant mistakenly structures his argument based on the theory that he was sued in his individual capacity. However, Plaintiff's amended complaint clearly states that Hults is sued in his "official capacit[y]" as an agent of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 2.) Caldwell's claim for monetary relief against Hults in his official capacity fails as a matter of law because "a state official sued in his or her official capacity is not a 'person' who can be sued for purposes of liability under § 1983." John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Mem'l Found. v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989)). A suit against a government official in his official capacity is treated as a suit against the governmental entity that employs him, which, in this case, is alleged to be the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Will, 491 U.S. at 71, 109 S. Ct. at 2312. The Texas Department of Criminal justice is deemed an "instrumentality" of the State of Texas and is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See Harris v. Angelina County, 31 F.3d 331, 338 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121 S. Ct. 955, 962 (2001) ("The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in federal court"). Section 1983 does not waive this sovereign immunity. Aguilar v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1145 (1979)). Nor has the State waived its immunity by consenting to this suit. Id. at 340, 99 S. Ct. at 1144. Therefore, the § 1983 claim against Hults in his official capacity should be dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment.
Claims Under Title II of the ADA
Plaintiff's complaint, construed broadly, may state a separate cause of action under Title II of the ADA. Title II of the ADA, which prohibits a public entity from discriminating against a qualified individual with a disability, applies to state prison systems. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209-210, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1954-1955 (1998); see generally 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. (1990). In order to obtain relief under Title II, a plaintiff must show that he: (1) is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) was either excluded from participation or denied the benefits of some public entity's services or programs, and (3) was excluded by reason of his disability. See Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1997). In order to survive a motion to dismiss his disability claims a plaintiff need not plead every element of a prima facie case of discrimination, however, the plaintiff's complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the basis of the plaintiff's claims. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S. Ct. at 999.
Defendant argues that Title II does not provide for a cause of action against a defendant in his individual capacity. However, as previously discussed, Plaintiff brings suit for monetary damages against Hults in his official capacity. Currently, the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes a claim for damages against a state or state official in his official capacity under Title II of the ADA is under review by the United States Supreme Court in the consolidated cases of United States v. Georgia, No. 04-1203, and Goodman v. Georgia, No. 04-1236. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004) (holding that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' § 5 authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Bennett-Nelson v. Louisiana Bd. of Regents, No. 03-31198, 2005 WL 3150630, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 28, 2005) (noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has yet to decide whether the principle of Lane extends to cases involving other rights).
Assuming that Plaintiff's claim against Hults as an agent of the TDCJ is not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Plaintiff nevertheless fails to allege any of the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, and thus fails to give defendant fair notice of his claim. Plaintiff states that he suffers from a laundry list of ailments. However, nowhere in his complaint does Plaintiff allege that these ailments rise to the level of a "disability" as defined in the ADA. See § 12102 (defining "disability" as either: (a) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (b) a record of such an impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment). Likewise, Plaintiff identifies no programs or services that he was excluded from as a result of his disabilities, though his complaint contains an extensive summary of the alleged wrongs that were visited upon him by the medical staff at the Wallace Unit. However, the ADA does not provide prisoners a general federal cause of action for challenging the medical treatment of their underlying disabilities. See, e.g., Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice."); Carrion v. Wilkinson, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (dismissing diabetic prisoner's Title II claim that he was denied a diabetic diet); Galvin v. Cook, No. CV 00-29-ST, 2000 WL 1520231, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 3, 2000) (rejecting diabetic prisoner's Title II claim where prisoner alleged that he was: given improper doses of medication, denied medication, given inadequate treatment and denied treatment). Finally, while Plaintiff alleges that he received inadequate medical care and that the medical staff "regularly patronized" him, he does not state that he was treated inadequately because of his disability. Thus, Plaintiff's ADA claim should be dismissed because the allegations, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, would not entitle him to relief. See Blackburn, 42 F.3d at 931.
While Hults did not substantively brief an argument regarding Plaintiff's failure to properly allege a case of disability discrimination, Defendant Mitchell County Hospital District presented such an argument in its first and second motions to dismiss. Therefore, defendant was on notice that at least one defendant was seeking dismissal based on his failure to properly allege a case of disability discrimination. See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (a court may dismiss a claim sua sponte "as long as the procedure employed is fair").
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Richard Hults' Motion to Dismiss be granted with respect to Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 and Title II of the ADA. It is also recommended that the court decline to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's supplemental state law claims and dismiss the claims without prejudice. See Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 1999); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). A copy of this recommendation shall be transmitted to Plaintiff and counsel for Defendants.