Opinion
No. 631 C.D. 2014
11-17-2014
Clay Caldwell, Appellant v. The Dept. of Corrections Agency
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
In this appeal, Clay Caldwell (Caldwell), representing himself, asks whether the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County (trial court) erred in dismissing his complaint with prejudice based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the vexatious nature of the litigation. Caldwell contends the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction over his complaint, which involved state tort and constitutional claims based on incidents occurring within Greene County. He maintains his pursuit of these claims was not vexatious or intended to harass. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I. Background
In November 2009, Caldwell, an indigent inmate currently serving a life sentence at the State Correctional Institution (SCI) at Greensburg, following a transfer from SCI-Greene, filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), to proceed without liability for court fees or costs. Certified Record (C.R.), Item No. 42. The trial court denied the motion for failure to file a complaint, stating "[t]here is no pending lawsuit or action." Tr. Ct. Order, 11/25/09; C.R., Item No. 39. The trial court instructed Caldwell that he may file a revised petition to proceed IFP when he files his complaint. Id.
In January 2010, Caldwell filed a second petition to proceed IFP. C.R., Item No. 38. The trial court denied his petition pursuant to Section 6602(f)(1) of the act commonly referred to as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(f)(1), also known as the "three strikes rule." Tr. Ct. Order, 1/6/10; C.R., Item No. 37. The trial court explained that Caldwell, on more than three occasions, filed lawsuits concerning the conditions of his confinement, which were dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. (citing Caldwell v. Folino, 2009 WL 3055298 (W.D. Pa., No. CV-09-217, filed September 21, 2009) (unreported); Caldwell v. Folino, 2009 WL 1929905 (W.D. Pa., No. 2:08-cv-00122, filed July 1, 2009) (unreported) (Folino I), vacated in part and remanded, 2020 WL 3610169 (3rd Cir., No. 09-3104, filed September 17, 2010) (Folino II); Caldwell v. Beard, 2008 WL 2887810 (W.D. Pa., No. CV-07-727, filed July 23, 2008) (unreported), aff'd, 2009 WL 1111545 (3rd Cir., No. 08-3286, filed April 27, 2009)).
The Third Circuit's decision to vacate and remand occurred after the trial court entered its order.
Three years later, in March 2013, Caldwell filed a third IFP motion. In addition, he filed a complaint naming Secretary Jeffrey A. Beard, SCI-Greene Superintendent Louis Folino, seven correctional officers from SCI-Greene, "M.A. Price, Gagnon, J. Miller, Lukachyk, Topka, Norman, Sokol," (Individual Defendants), and the Department of Corrections (Department) (collectively, Defendants) as defendants. C.R., Item No. 35. In an affidavit accompanying his filings, Caldwell explained he delayed filing his complaint with the trial court until final judgment in his federal court action involving the same incidents and Defendants. Id.; see Folino I; Folino II.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (district court) dismissed Caldwell's complaint for failure to state a claim, and subsequently denied him leave to file an amended complaint. Caldwell v. Folino, 2009 WL 1929905 (W.D. Pa., No. 2:08-cv-00122, filed July 1, 2009) (unreported) (Folino I), vacated in part and remanded, 2020 WL 3610169 (3rd Cir., No. 09-3104, filed September 17, 2010) (Folino II). On appeal, the Third Circuit determined the district court erred in dismissing Caldwell's Eighth Amendment claim that he was sexually harassed during pat down searches on the basis he did not comply with the exhaustion requirement. Folino II. The Third Circuit explained it was not facially apparent from the complaint that Caldwell failed to exhaust the claim. Id. In addition, the Third Circuit concluded the district court did not address Caldwell's Equal Protection claim alleging religious discrimination. Id. The Court remanded for further proceedings limited to those two issues. Id. Ultimately, on remand, the matter proceeded to a jury trial in March 2012, which resulted in a verdict for the defense. See Caldwell v. Folino (W.D. Pa., No. 2:08-cv-00122, filed May 29, 2013) (order denying relief from judgment) (unreported).
In the complaint, he alleged the correctional officers: touched him in a sexual manner during pat-down searches; filed false disciplinary charges against him; wrongfully subjected him to restrictive housing; transferred him from SCI-Greene to SCI-Greensburg in retaliation for filing grievances and civil suits; wrongfully seized and destroyed his personal property in retaliation for filing grievances and civil suits; handcuffed him too tightly; required him to obtain a permit for his Native American religious items; and, mishandled and mocked his religious items. According to Caldwell, the first of these incidents - the pat-down search - occurred in November 2007.
In addition, Caldwell averred Defendants improperly filed misconduct reports and denied his grievances. He claimed the Department's policies, customs and practices violated his constitutional rights. He asserted state tort claims for gross negligence and violations of his state constitutional rights.
For relief, Caldwell demanded nominal and punitive damages in the amount of $74.4 million from the Department and $580,000 from each of the Individual Defendants as well as 35% of their gross yearly income for 10 years. He also requested injunctive relief in the form of modified prison policies, single-cell status, magazine subscriptions, family visitations, personal property, sentence reduction, expunged misconduct reports, nonparticipation in prison programs, and unrestricted phone calls.
The trial court granted Caldwell's third IFP motion. Tr. Ct. Order, 3/28/13; C.R., Prothonotary Docket Entries. Caldwell then filed a "Motion to Enter Judgment by Default against the Defendants, for Failure to Plead, and the Relief Sought by the Plaintiff in his Complaint." C.R., Item No. 30. The trial court issued a rule to show cause why Caldwell's relief should not be granted. Tr. Ct. Order, 7/1/13; C.R., Item No. 29. The Department responded, stating none of the named Defendants were served with original process in the matter, and, thus, they were not parties to the action. C.R., Item No. 22.
In the interim, Caldwell filed a "Motion for Damages against the Defendants for Delay in Actions for Bodily Injury, Death or Property Damage," as well as a "Petition for Order for Protection From Abuse of Authority and from Destruction of Property and Official Oppression." C.R., Item Nos. 21, 27. The trial court denied these motions, and it instructed Caldwell to properly serve his complaint on the Defendants. See Tr. Ct. Order, 7/17/13; Tr. Ct. Order, 9/25/13; C.R., Item Nos. 14, 26.
In addition, Caldwell requested appointment of counsel. C.R., Item No. 18. He also filed two motions for special injunctive relief - one for a PFA from abuse of authority and destruction of property, the other requesting that the court direct the sheriff to serve his complaint on the Defendants. C.R., Item Nos. 12, 13.
Ultimately, the trial court denied Caldwell's request for counsel. Tr. Ct. Order, 11/13/13; C.R., Item No. 9. The trial court explained his action is civil in nature and the appointment of counsel is not a matter of right. Id. On its own accord, the trial court dismissed Caldwell's complaint with prejudice, citing lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the litigation's vexatious nature. Id. From this decision, Caldwell appealed to the Superior Court, which transferred the matter here.
II. Contentions
On appeal, Caldwell raises numerous contentions. He contends the trial court erred by: not appointing him counsel; determining it lacked jurisdiction over his complaint; not addressing his motion for judgment by default; not allowing him to amend his complaint; not providing assistance or protection to him as a pro se litigant; holding him to a higher standard in his pleadings; not finding the Defendants retaliated against him for pursuing his legal rights; determining his litigation was vexatious; and, dismissing the case with prejudice without consideration of Caldwell's lack of knowledge of procedural rules or the merits of his constitutional claims. For ease of discussion, we group Caldwell's claims into five categories: legal representation; judicial assistance; subject matter jurisdiction; judicial error; and, vexatious litigation.
We review whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. R.H.S. v. Allegheny Cnty. Dep't of Human Servs., 936 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
III. Discussion
A. Legal Representation
First, Caldwell contends the trial court erred by not appointing him counsel. He argues the appointment of legal counsel is necessary for him to navigate the rules and procedures in pursuing his complaint.
A litigant does not have a right to counsel in a civil matter. Harris v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 714 A.2d 492 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). As this Court explained, due process does not require the appointment of counsel to an indigent inmate in a civil action because the interest at stake is financial, which commands a lower level of due process protection than life or liberty interests. Mason v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 886 A.2d 724 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005); Harris.
Here, Caldwell's civil complaint seeks monetary damages in excess of 74 million dollars as well as injunctive relief against the Defendants for property damage. We discern no life or liberty interest at stake. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Caldwell's request for appointment of counsel.
B. Judicial Assistance
Next, Caldwell claims the trial court erred by not assisting him with his case or relaxing the procedural rules for him. Caldwell attempts to argue that, by proceeding pro se, that is without legal representation, the trial court was required to assist him with the procedural requirements or absolve him from complying with the same, particularly those relating to service. Such is not the case.
The courts are "under no duty to provide personal instruction on courtroom procedure or to perform any legal 'chores' for the defendant that counsel would normally carry out." Fraisar v. Gillis, 892 A.2d 74, 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 4th Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)). More particularly, the courts are not required to accomplish service for a pro se litigant or explain to a litigant requesting such assistance that it does not perform the same. Id. To the contrary, "[r]equiring trial courts to advise a pro se litigant in such a manner would undermine the court's role as an impartial decision maker." Id.
Further, a pro se litigant is not absolved from complying with procedural rules. Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245 (Pa. Super. 2003); City of Phila. Water Rev. Bureau v. Frempong, 744 A.2d 822 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). "The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Jones v. Rudenstein, 585 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. Super. 1991) (quoting Farretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975)). Although the courts may liberally construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status does not confer any special benefits. Lyons. A court may properly dismiss a complaint if a pro se litigant fails to conform to the procedural requirements. See Lyons.
With limited exceptions, not applicable here, the Rules of Civil Procedure require original process to be made by sheriff. Pa. R.C.P. No. 400; Reaves v. Knauer, 979 A.2d 404 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Proper service is a prerequisite to a court acquiring personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Fraisar. However, dismissal for lack of service is appropriate only if the plaintiff demonstrated an intent to stall the judicial machinery or where the failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure prejudiced defendant. McCreesh v. City of Phila., 888 A.2d 664 (Pa. 2005).
Here, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by declining to provide legal assistance to Caldwell. Although the trial court advised Caldwell to file his complaint and to serve the same on Defendants, the trial court was not responsible for bringing Caldwell's suit into compliance with the rules.
In addition, the trial court was not required to relax the service rules or effect service for Caldwell. Caldwell did not serve Defendants by sheriff as required by Pa. R.C.P. No. 400. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. Rather, the trial court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the vexatious nature of the litigation. Therefore, we review these grounds for dismissal.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Caldwell contends the trial court improperly dismissed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. He claims the trial court possessed jurisdiction over his state tort and constitutional claims arising from incidents occurring at SCI-Greene, which is located in Greene County.
Subject matter jurisdiction is jurisdiction over the nature of the cause of action and relief sought that allows a court to exercise its power. Commonwealth v. Perez, 941 A.2d 778 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The courts of common pleas enjoy unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases, actions, and proceedings, and are empowered, subject to a few statutory exceptions, to decide any matter arising under the laws of this Commonwealth. See PA. CONST. art. V, §5(b); Section 931 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §931; Perez. Of relevance here, the common pleas courts have subject matter jurisdiction "over tort actions for money damages that are premised on either common law trespass or a civil action for deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983," including retaliation claims. Wilson v. Marrow, 917 A.2d 357, 362 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Miles v. Beard, 847 A.2d 161, 164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004)).
Here, the trial court denied jurisdiction to the extent that Caldwell's pleadings and allegations refer to administrative process, incidents within SCI-Greensburg, and federal court proceedings. We address each basis for denying subject matter jurisdiction in turn.
1. Administrative Process
First, the trial court declined to exercise subject matter jurisdiction to the extent Caldwell's complaint challenged intra-prison administrative matters. Pursuant to Section 933 of the Judicial Code, the courts of common pleas have jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of certain government agencies. 42 Pa. C.S. §933. However, this does not include appeals from final orders of government agencies having statewide jurisdiction, such as the Department. Section 763 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §763. Rather, this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction over such appeals. Id.
Notwithstanding, the Department's decisions addressing internal prison operations are beyond this Court's appellate or original jurisdiction. Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998); Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 913 A.2d 301 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). As our Supreme Court opined, "internal prison operations are more properly left to the legislative and executive branches, and ... prison officials must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain security free from judicial interference." Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358. The limitations placed upon the judiciary to rule on issues of internal prison operations as set forth in Bronson apply equally to the common pleas courts. Brown. Thus, to the extent Caldwell's complaint challenges the prison administrative process and seeks to overturn misconduct reports and grievance denials, we agree the trial court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction.
2. SCI-Greensburg
Second, the trial court denied jurisdiction to the extent Caldwell's complaint alleged incidents occurring at SCI-Greensburg, which is located in Westmoreland County and not within the trial court's jurisdiction of Greene County. However, review of Caldwell's complaint reveals the incidents giving rise to his complaint transpired at SCI-Greene while he was incarcerated there, not SCI-Greensburg.
In fact, Caldwell's complaint makes only two references to SCI-Greensburg. Specifically, Caldwell alleges he was transferred to SCI-Greensburg from SCI-Greene in retaliation for his grievances and civil suits. C.R., Item No. 35, Complaint at ¶32. He fears similar conduct will continue at SCI-Greensburg if he does not prevail with his complaint. See id. at ¶36. Significantly, he does not allege any conduct occurring at SCI-Greensburg as the basis for his complaint. Rather, he alleges tortious acts and state constitutional violations occurring at SCI-Greene.
As the alleged conduct underlying Caldwell's action occurred within Greene County, we conclude the trial court possessed subject matter jurisdiction. Caldwell's subsequent transfer to SCI-Greensburg in Westmoreland County did not affect the trial court's jurisdiction.
3. Federal Litigation
Third, the trial court denied jurisdiction to the extent Caldwell's "pleadings refer to [f]ederal [c]ourt proceedings." Tr. Ct. Order, 11/13/13; C.R., Item No. 9. However, Caldwell's complaint does not extend to or otherwise challenge matters occurring in federal court. Rather, Caldwell merely referenced the federal litigation as part of the history of his case.
More particularly, Caldwell alleged he filed a similar complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania (district court) based on the same events against the same Defendants. The district court addressed Caldwell's federal constitutional claims. Folino I. Specifically, the district court construed his complaint as one invoking the court's jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. Id. It analyzed Caldwell's claims under the First and Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the doctrines of Due Process and Equal Protection. Id. Although Caldwell also raised state law claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. Id.
In any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction "the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." 28 U.S.C. §1367(a). However, "[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if-- ... (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. §1367(c)(3).
Because the federal court did not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Caldwell's state law claims, Caldwell did not lose his right to pursue these claims in state court. Oleski v. Dep't of Public Welfare, 822 A.2d 120 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); see Boyd v. Rockwood Area Sch. Dist., 907 A.2d 1157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Thus, the trial court erred in determining it lacked jurisdiction on this basis.
D. Judicial Error
Next, Caldwell argues the trial court erred by not addressing his motion for judgment by default or allowing him to amend his complaint. Contrary to Caldwell's assertions, the trial court addressed his motion for judgment by default by issuing a rule to show cause. Tr. Ct. Order, 7/1/13; C.R., Item No. 29.
As for Caldwell's claims that the trial court erred by not allowing him to amend his complaint, Caldwell did not seek leave to file an amended complaint. Nevertheless, an amended complaint would not have cured the ultimate basis for the trial court's dismissal -- the vexatious nature of his litigation. Thus, Caldwell's allegations of judicial error in these respects are unavailing.
E. Vexatious Litigation
Finally, Caldwell argues the trial court erred or abused its discretion by dismissing his suit as "vexatious." Tr. Ct. Order, 11/13/13; C.R., Item No. 9. Caldwell claims he filed his case to protect himself, not to abuse the judicial process or harass the Defendants. He asserts his delay in filing his complaint was justified in light of the pending federal litigation. Any failure to comply with the rules is due to his lack of legal expertise, not a malicious intent.
Section 6602(e) of the PLRA provides:
[T]he court shall dismiss prison conditions litigation at any time, including prior to service on the defendant, if
the court determines ... [t]he prison conditions litigation is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or the defendant is entitled to assert a valid affirmative defense, including immunity, which, if asserted, would preclude the relief.42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e) (emphasis added). Not only is a court permitted to dismiss a complaint that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a claim, but it is required to do so by the mandatory language of "the court shall dismiss." Id.
Pursuant to Section 6601 of the PLRA, a "frivolous" case lacks "an arguable basis either in law or in fact." 42 Pa. C.S. §6601; Williams v. Beard, 67 A.3d 182 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). However, the PLRA does not define "malicious." "When statutory words or phrases are undefined by the statute, the Court construes the words according to their plain meaning and common usage." Harmer v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 83 A.3d 293, 299 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 97 A.3d 746 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). "A statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Id. Where a court needs to define an undefined term, it may consult definitions in statutes, regulations or the dictionary for guidance, although such definitions are not controlling. See Adams Outdoor Adver., LP v. Zoning Hr'g Bd. of Smithfield Twp., 909 A.2d 469 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
According to Black's Law Dictionary, "malice" is "[t]he intentional doing of a wrongful act, without just cause or excuse, with an intent to inflict an injury ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (6th ed.)Id. at 956. A "malicious prosecution" is "[o]ne begun in malice without probable cause to believe the charges can be sustained. ... See also ... Vexatious proceeding." Id. at 958.
Similarly, the term "vexatious" means "[w]ithout reasonable or probable cause or excuse." See id. at 1565. A "vexatious proceeding" is one "instituted maliciously and without probable cause"; "[t]ype of malicious prosecution differing principally because based on civil action exists when the party bringing [the] proceeding is not acting bona fide , and merely wishes to annoy or embarrass his opponent, or when it is not calculated to lead to any practical result. ... See Malcious prosecution." Id. (emphases added).
This Court, in a different statutory context, defined "'vexatious' as 'causing or creating vexation' which is then defined as 'a source of annoyance or irritation.'" A.G. Cullen Constr., Inc. v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 898 A.2d 1145, 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Webster's II New College Dictionary 57, 1229 (2001)). We explained, "vexatious conduct is that which is committed without sufficient ground in either law or in fact and with the purpose of causing annoyance." Id. at 1165 (emphasis added); see also Pellegrino Food Prods. Co., Inc. v. The Valley Voice, 875 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding a suit is vexatious so as to support an award of attorney fees if it is filed without sufficient legal or factual grounds and if the suit was served with the sole purpose of causing annoyance).
Upon review, we conclude the terms "vexatious" and "malicious," according to their plain meaning and common usage, are clearly synonymous. See also Baederwood Ctr., Inc. v. Putney, 133 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1957) (using terms malicious and vexatious interchangeably); Menna v. St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 690 A.2d 299 (Pa. Super. 1997) (same). Notably, the definitions of both terms incorporate ill-will and a lack of foundation in law or fact. Consequently, vexatious litigation is "malicious" for purposes of the PLRA and warrants dismissal. See 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e).
Here, the instant action constitutes "prison conditions litigation" within the meaning of Section 6601 of the PLRA. Caldwell is a prisoner and his allegations relate to the conditions of his confinement and the alleged actions of the Defendants. See 42 Pa. C.S. §6601. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice declaring "THAT after three (3) years, and not yet having filed a Complaint, we declare the action vexatious." Tr. Ct. Order, 11/13/13; C.R., Item No. 9.
Contrary to the trial court's statement, Caldwell did file a complaint with the trial court on March 27, 2013. C.R., Item No. 35. However, Caldwell did not file his complaint until more than three years after filing his first request for IFP. In an affidavit accompanying his complaint, Caldwell explained he delayed filing his complaint with the trial court until the resolution of his federal litigation. C.R., Item No. 35. As discussed above, the federal litigation involved the same Defendants and same incidents. See Folino I. Although Caldwell presented his state claims in the federal litigation, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them. Id.
While we do not condone Caldwell's delay in filing his complaint until final resolution of the federal litigation when the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction at an early stage, we do not agree the delay rendered his litigation "vexatious" or "malicious" warranting dismissal. Although the trial court cited general examples of what constitutes vexatious litigation, it provided no other explanation as to why it found Caldwell's case vexatious other than the delay and the failure to file a complaint. Notably, the trial court did not find Caldwell's suit lacked sufficient ground in either law or in fact, which is a component of a malicious or vexatious suit. See Pellegrino Food; A.G. Cullen; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. Further, it made no finding as to whether Caldwell's litigation was frivolous or failed to state a claim. See 42 Pa. C.S. §6602(e). And, it did not find that the lack of service by sheriff showed intent to stall the judicial machinery or prejudiced Defendants. See McCreesh. We, therefore, conclude the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
The trial court defined "vexatious litigation" as "legal action which is brought, regardless of its merits, solely to harass an adversary, and it may take the form of a primary frivolous lawsuit or may be the repetitive, burdensome, and unwarranted filing of meritless motions in a matter which is otherwise a meritorious cause of action." Tr. Ct. Order, 11/13/13; C.R., Item No. 9. --------
IV. Conclusion
For these reasons, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part. As to subject matter jurisdiction, our ruling permits only tort actions for money damages premised on common law trespass and other state claims to proceed. We affirm the dismissal of Caldwell's complaint regarding claims based on alleged violations of federal rights and challenges to the prison administrative process. Our ruling on application of the PLRA is strictly limited to Caldwell's conduct involved with delay in filing of the complaint. We express no opinion as to the application of the PLRA to Caldwell's other litigation conduct.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2014, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Greene County is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the matter is REMANDED for further review, as set forth in the attached opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge