Hence in the Garvin case we held that an injunction may issue to save the rights of the nonappearing spouse and guard her against "the heavy burden of striking down the prima facie effect of the foreign [sister State's] court's finding of residence" ( 302 N.Y. 102). However, we have never held that any such presumptive legality and validity must be accorded Mexican divorces — which are, of course, beyond the scope of "full faith and credit" (see Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 149; Gaskell v. Gaskell, 189 Misc. 504). Judgments of courts of foreign countries, we said in Martens v. Martens ( 284 N.Y. 363, 365), "differ from judgments of courts of our sister States to which, by constitutional mandate, full faith and credit must be given. They must not contravene our public policy". Thus, under comity — as contrasted with full faith and credit — our courts have power to deny even prima facie validity to the judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, despite whatever allegations of jurisdiction may appear on the face of such foreign judgments.

But says the husband, neither marriage is valid because a divorce which the wife had obtained from her former husband in Chihuahua, Mexico, in 1955 was void and because the two marriages to him occurred during the lifetime of that husband. The divorce, he argues, though not a "mail-order" divorce strictly ( Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146), shares all the vice of such a divorce. The divorce was obtained in this manner:

In cases where a divorce has been obtained without any personal contact with the jurisdiction by either party or by physical submission to the jurisdiction by one, with no personal service of process within the foreign jurisdiction upon, and no appearance or submission by, the other, decision has been against the validity of the foreign decree ( Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146; Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371). Although the grounds for divorce found acceptable according to Mexican law are inadmissible in New York, and the physical contact with the Mexican jurisdiction was ephemeral, there are some incidents in the Mexican proceedings which are common characteristics of the exercise of judicial power.

Monroe Co. Sav. Bank v. Yeoman, while citing the Starbuck holding, stated the rationale a little differently: that is, that the foreign divorce, while not binding on the husband, nevertheless brought it about that the marriage was completely dissolved as to the wife. Petitioner's argument here, from the commission's note and its citation of those earlier cases, runs like this: those cases held to be estopped, from claiming the benefits of continued marital status, one who procured an invalid divorce in a sister State; however, the argument goes on, a totally void Mexican divorce is so entirely without effect in New York that it estops no one in any subsequent situation (citing Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146). So, says petitioner, the commission must have meant, by citing the Starbuck and Monroe Co. Sav. Bank cases ( supra), to attach the penalty of disinheritance only to persons procuring invalid sister State decrees, and not similarly to punish those who, by mail, got themselves worthless papers styled "divorces", but issued by a Mexican court without any jurisdiction over the marriage status or the parties. Of course, all that reads into subdivision (b) of section 87 matter which is not there, and ascribes to the Legislature the making of a distinction between "invalid" and "void" divorces, a distinction not stated or suggested in the statute.

The defendant and Mr. Kaufmann violated the express interdiction of section 51 Dom. Rel. of the Domestic Relations Law of New York which forbids any agreement between a husband and wife "to alter or dissolve the marriage". "They violated our statute embodying our public policy * * *. Their collusive agreement and conduct may not be the foundation for the creation of any rights" ( Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 150). In a penetrating and well-considered opinion, Mr. Justice COLEMAN, in Wood v. Wood ( 41 Misc.2d 112) reached the same conclusion.

" The opinion by CONWAY, J., dissenting, in Matter of Rathscheck ( 300 N.Y. 346, 355) shows clearly that he did not intend his remarks about domicile in Caldwell v. Caldwell ( 298 N.Y. 146, 149) to be taken as a departure from the doctrine of Gould v. Gould. The fact pattern in Gould v. Gould is of course remote from that before us. The Goulds, though not domiciled in France, had resided there for years and the divorce was granted for adultery.

A party obtaining such a "mail-order" divorce is not estopped from questioning its validity; it has no legal effect. In Caldwell v. Caldwell ( 298 N.Y. 146, 149-150) the Court of Appeals pointed out that a judgment of divorce of another State "has prima facie validity in our courts. The absent defendant spouse is customarily served in accordance with the requirements of procedural due process in the other State. Thus the decree is valid unless and until attacked by collateral evidence that the plaintiff was not in fact domiciled in the sister State at the time of its rendition.

It is to recover the additional $15 per week for her own support that plaintiff brings this action. Both parties concede that the Mexican divorce and the subsequent New Jersey marriage were totally invalid ( Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146; Landsman v. Landsman, 302 N.Y. 45). Plaintiff claims that because of said invalidity defendant's obligation to her under the agreement continued at $30 per week. Defendant claims that this action is based on a private claim or demand, and that the Mexican divorce, despite its invalidity, operates as an estoppel against any such action.

It is to recover the additional $15 per week for her own support that plaintiff brings this action. Both parties concede that the Mexican divorce and the subsequent New Jersey marriage were totally invalid (Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146; Landsman v. Landsman, 302 N.Y. 45). Plaintiff claims that because of said invalidity defendant's obligation to her under the agreement continued at $30 per week. Defendant claims that this action is based on a private claim or demand, and that the Mexican divorce, despite its invalidity, operates as an estoppel against any such action.

We think it would be held by the New York courts to be a nullity. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60; Querze v. Querze, 290 N.Y. 13, 47 N.E.2d 423; Vose v. Vose, 280 N.Y. 779, 21 N.E.2d 616. Thus the first marriage of Mr. Magner was in full force and effect when he contracted the ceremonial marriage with the appellee in Connecticut and any presumption which might otherwise be indulged as to the validity of that marriage was overcome. We do not understand that the appellee disputes the invalidity in New York of the marriage in Connecticut but instead she relies on a theory of estoppel which would prevent an attack upon the presumed validity of the ceremonial marriage by proof of the invalidity of the Mexican divorce and the consequent continuation of the previous lawful marriage of the decedent to his first wife. That theory is as follows: This suit involving only the rights to social security benefits, only property rights growing out of the appellee's marriage to the decedent are in issue; and in New York a principle of divisible marriage is given effect under a theory of quasi-est