Opinion
NO. 01-852
July 19, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are (1) claimant Rickey H. Johnson, Jr.s Motion for Relief from Restraining Order and Stay of Proceedings (Reurged) and Further for an Increase in the Security Given and (2) claimants Eric Climer and Janice Miller's Motion for Relief from Restraining Order and Stay of Proceedings. For the following reasons, the defendants motions are DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2000, Michael Climer was killed and Rickey H. Johnson, Jr. was allegedly injured during an incident on the CAL DIVE BARGE I ("BARGE I") in the Gulf of Mexico. Eric Chimer, as executor of Michael Climers estate; Johnson; and Janice Miller have each filed claims against Cal Dive International, Inc. ("Cal Dive"), the owner of BARGE I, for damages sustained in connection with the accident. On March 30, 2001, Cal Dive filed a complaint in this Court for exoneration from and/or limitation of liability under the provisions of 46 U.S.C. § 183, et seq. This Court stayed all litigation against Cal Dive arising out of the June 24, 2000 incident pending determination of the limitation claim.
In May 2001, claimant Johnson filed a motion to lift the stay, which the Court denied as premature because the time for filing claims had not expired. See Rec. Doc. No. 9. Since the deadline for filing claims has now passed, Johnson reurges his motion. Chimer and Miller have also filed motions to lift the stay.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
There is a recurring and inheretit conflict between the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 183, et seq., and the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Texaco Inc. v. Williams, 47 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). On the one hand, the Limitation Act limits a shipowners liability to the value of the vessel and its freight if the casualty occurred without privity or knowledge of the shipowner.Id.On the other hand, the saving to suitors clause grants claimants the right to pursue common law remedies in state court. Id.
In attempting to resolve this longstanding conflict, the Fifth Circuit has recognized two instances where a district court must allow a state court action to proceed: "(1) when the total amount of the claims does not exceed the shipowners declared value of the vessel and its freight, and (2) when all claimants stipulate that the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation proceeding, and that the claimants will not seek to enforce a damage award greater than the value of the ship and its freight until the shipowner right to limitation has been determined by the federal court. Odeco Oil and Gas Co. Drilling Div. v. Bonnette, 74 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Both instances assume protection of the absolute right of the shipowner to limit its liability, and the shipowner right to limitation takes precedence over the claimants right to proceed in state court. Id. at 674-675.
In the instant case the claimants have filed stipulations in an attempt to protect the shipowners rights. Cal Dive contends that these stipulations are inadequate because (1) the stipulations fail to protect it against claims for indemnity or contribution by potential co-defendants and (2) the claimants have signed separate stipulations instead of a single joint stipulation prioritizing their claims. The Court agrees that lifting the stay is inappropriate due to the claimants failure to protect Cal Dive from claims by potential co-defendants.
The Fifth Circuit has held that co-defendants seeking indemnity or contribution are claimants, and that they too must sign a stipulation protecting a plaintiff-in-limitation. See Odeco, 74 F.3d at 675. Although no co-defendants have yet been named in the limitation action or in the state court cases, before lifting the stay the Court must be satisfied that no additional defendants will be joined in this action or added in a present or future state case, or that they have been joined and have signed the stipulations to the extent that they are claimants. In the Matter of Falcon Drilling Co. Inc., 1996 WL 240005, *3 (E.D.La. May 9, 1996) (Vance, J.) (citing Odeco, 74 F.3d at 675 (holding that federal court remains the sole forum unless stipulation is signed by all claimants)). Because the claimants have not addressed the issue of whether co-defendants may be added to the state court actions, the Court does not find that the stipulations fully protect Cal Dives right to limitation. Accordingly, the claimants motions to lift the stay are DENIED.
Because the stipulations are inadequate on this basis, the Court need not consider the joint stipulation issue.
Claimant Johnson also asks the Court to order an appraisement of the BARGE I and to increase the security provided by Cal Dive. Under Admiralty Rule F(7), a claimant may demand an increase in security given by the plaintiff-in-limitation on the ground that [it is]less than the value of the plaintiffs interest in the vessel and pending freight. When such a motion is made, the Court must cause due appraisement of the plaintiffs interest in the vessel. Id. In the instant case Johnson asks for an appraisement on the grounds that Cal Dives stipulation of value states that BARGE I has a fair market value of at least $900,000.00. Johnson asserts that if the vessel is worth at least $900,000.00, it must be worth more; and therefore Cal Dive's security must be inadequate. However, the Court does not find that Cal Dives phraseology raises a sufficient issue of fact to call the value of the BARGE I into question, and Johnson has not submitted any evidence in support of his contention that the limitation fund is inadequate and should be increased. See In the Matter of D.N.H. Towing Co. Inc., 1998 WL 51835, *5 (E.D.La. Feb. 5, 1995) (Vance, J.) (holding that the mere allegation that the valuation is inaccurate is insufficient to create a fact issue on the value of the limitation fund). Accordingly, claimant Johnson's motion for an increase in security is DENIED.
In addition, Johnson asks the Court to invoke the Flotilla Doctrine and include in the limitation fund the value of one or two powered vessels with which BARGE I allegedly acted in concert. Johnson's Mem. at 2. However, in order to apply the Flotilla Doctrine, Johnson must establish that all such vessels were not only owned by the same person, but were also both engaged in a common enterprise and under a single command.Cenac Towing Co. Inc. v. Terra Resources. Inc., 734 F.2d 251, 254 (5th Cir. 1984). In the instant case, Johnson has not even identified the vessels in question. In the absence of any such evidence, the Court is unable to increase the value of the limitation fund.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that the claimants — stipulations are inadequate, and their motions to lift the stay are DENIED. In addition, because the Court does not find sufficient evidence that the limitation fund is inadequate, claimant Rickey H. Johnson, Jr.'s motion to increase the security is DENIED.