Opinion
No. 77-233
Decided January 19, 1978. Rehearing denied February 16, 1978. Certiorari granted May 1, 1978.
From trial court's refusal to grant plaintiff's post-judgment motion for attorney fees and costs after a satisfaction of judgment was signed, plaintiff appealed.
Order Reversed
1. JUDGMENT — Two Parts — Money Judgment — Additional Attorney Fees — Satisfaction — Not Waiver — Plaintiff's Right — Additional Fees — Entitled — — Post-Judgment Hearing. Where judgment entered in plaintiff's favor consisted of two parts: one of which established the amount owed by defendant to plaintiff, including $1,000 attorney fees, and the second of which established plaintiff's right to a post-judgment hearing on additional attorney fees, the second part of the judgment was of an entirely different character than the settled money judgment and was not expressly included in subsequent satisfaction of judgment executed by the parties; thus, plaintiff did not, by that satisfaction, waive his right to additional attorney fees under the judgment, and he was entitled to a post-judgment hearing thereon as provided in the judgment.
Appeal from the District Court of Arapahoe County, Honorable Richard D. Greene, Judge.
Robert W. Smedley, for plaintiff-appellant.
T. B. Thurman, for defendants-appellees.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's refusal to grant its post-judgment motion for attorney fees and costs after a satisfaction of judgment was signed. We reverse.
This matter arose from a series of purchase and sale transactions between plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff sued to collect its account of $20,187.83 plus $1,000 attorney fees. On May 6, 1976 a pretrial order was entered that incorporated a stipulation of the parties as to the amount owed, including $1,000 attorney fees earned to the time of the pretrial order, and that set trial for August 10 on the question of set-offs and additional attorney fees. After that trial, a judgment entered on August 10 provided:
"Judgment therefore enters for the plaintiff and against the defendants, and each of them, as follows:
$15,187.33 Principal 548.24 Interest 1,000.00 Attorney Fee 444.40 Costs $16,880.97 Amount of Judgment
"2. The plaintiff is entitled to a post judgment hearing to determine whether it is entitled to an award of additional attorney fees, for which an amended or supplemental judgment shall enter if established and awarded by the Court."
On September 10, 1976, a satisfaction of judgment was signed and filed with the court, providing:
"Plaintiff hereby acknowledges and accepts full satisfaction of the Judgment of the Court entered on the 10th day of August 1976."
On September 17, 1976, a minute order was issued vacating the hearing on additional attorney fees which had been set on the court docket
On September 24, 1976, however, plaintiff moved for a supplemental hearing to determine the amount of judgment for additional attorney fees and costs. A hearing was held on this motion on November 15, 1976. The court denied the motion, holding that the right to additional attorney fees and supplemental judgment had been waived when the satisfaction of judgment was signed by counsel for plaintiff by September 10.
[1] The general rule is that the satisfaction of a judgment by the one liable thereunder and the receipt by the opposite party operates to extinguish the judgment for all purposes. Scott v. Denver, 125 Colo. 68, 241 P.2d 857. The August 10 judgment, however, had two parts: one part established the amount owed by defendant to plaintiff, including $1,000 attorney fees, while the second part established plaintiff's right to a post judgment hearing on additional attorney fees. The satisfaction of judgment of September 10 operated to extinguish only that portion of the dispute that had been settled, the amount owed on the account plus interest, costs and the $1,000 attorney fees. It did not claim or operate to destroy plaintiff's further right to a hearing on additional attorney fees. The matter of additional fees was still at issue and had not been heard or decided by the court.
The satisfaction of a judgment extinguishes the claim insofar as the judgment has decided the controversy. When the judgment does not, however, decide the controversy at issue, the satisfaction necessarily cannot extinguish the claim. A court can base its decision only on the facts and conditions before it at the time its judgment is rendered. New facts or conditions intervening after that time raise new issues, which the former judgment cannot include. Greenberg v. Taylor, 152 Colo. 342, 382 P.2d 191.
Here, the August 10 judgment could not include the additional attorney fees, since the court had not at that time had an opportunity to hear the issue. Furthermore, under the circumstances here, there was no merger of the two parts of the "Judgment." An order of court, whatever it is denominated, that establishes a right to future court hearings is not abrogated by the action of the parties in signing the satisfaction of another, separate money judgment. The character of a judicial instrument is to be determined by its contents and substance, not by its title. Johnson v. Johnson, 132 Colo. 236, 287 P.2d 49.
Because the second part of the August 10 judgment is of an entirely different character than the settled money judgment and was not expressly included in the September 10 satisfaction, it is necessarily excluded from the effect of the satisfaction. Plaintiff is entitled to have a post-judgment hearing as provided in the August 10 order.
Order reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
JUDGE ENOCH and JUDGE PIERCE concur.