Opinion
E074267
01-07-2022
CALIFORNIA ARTICHOKE AND VEGETABLE GROWERS CORPORATION et al., Cross-complainants and Appellants, v. DRAKE LARSON, Individually and as Co-Trustee, etc. et al., Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Thompson Welch Soroko & Gilbert, Darin T. Judd, Eric McFarland and David Truong for Cross-complainants and Appellants. Moskovitz Appellate Team, Myron Moskovitz; Lieberg Oberhansley and Jon H. Lieberg for Cross-defendants and Appellants.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. PSC1701306. Kira L. Klatchko, Judge. Affirmed in part; dismissed in part.
Thompson Welch Soroko & Gilbert, Darin T. Judd, Eric McFarland and David Truong for Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Moskovitz Appellate Team, Myron Moskovitz; Lieberg Oberhansley and Jon H. Lieberg for Cross-defendants and Appellants.
OPINION
MILLER, ACTING P.J.
Cross-complainants and appellants California Artichoke and Vegetable Growers Corporation, which does business as Ocean Mist Farms (Ocean Farm), and Desert Mist Farms, LLC (Desert Mist) sued their adjoining landowners, cross-defendants and appellants Drake Larson (Drake) and Pamela Larson (Pamela) as individuals and as cotrustees of the Larson Family Trust dated October 7, 1992 (the Trust). They sought damages for trespass, which pertained to a fence constructed by Drake and Pamela, as well as declaratory relief concerning the boundary line between the parties' properties.
We use first names for the sake of clarity; no disrespect is intended.
Following summary adjudication of the boundary line dispute, the trial court declared Ocean Farm to be the owner of the disputed property. A jury gave a verdict in favor of Drake, Pamela, and the Trust (collectively, the Larsons) on the issues of trespass and damages. Ocean Farm and Desert Mist (collectively, the Farms) moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The trial court entered a partial judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Ocean Farm's lessee, Desert Mist, on the issue of trespass. The court granted the motion for new trial on the issue of damages, and a bench trial was held on that issue. The trial court awarded Desert Mist $36 in nominal damages. The trial court denied Desert Mist's motion for attorney's fees.
The Farms raise five issues on appeal. First, the Farms contend the damages awarded were for actual damages; they were not nominal damages. Second, the Farms assert the trial court erred by not awarding them the cost of removing the fence. Third, the Farms contend the trial court erred by not awarding them the reasonable rental value for the fenced-off property. Fourth, the Farms assert the trial court erred by excluding evidence of surveyor costs and attorney's fees from the trial on damages (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (a)). Fifth, the Farms contend the trial court erred by denying Desert Mist's motion for attorney's fees (Code Civ. Proc., § 1201.9). We affirm both the judgment and the order denying attorney's fees.
All subsequent statutory references will be to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.
In a cross-appeal, the Larsons contend the trial court erred in its summary adjudication of the boundary line dispute. However, the Larsons assert their cross-appeal need not be addressed in the event the judgment and order denying attorney's fees are affirmed in the Farms' appeal. We dismiss the cross-appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Larsons owned agricultural property in Mecca that adjoined agricultural property owned by Ocean Farm. The Larsons grew grapes on their property. The Larsons' property was to the west of Ocean Farm's property. The Larsons and Ocean Farm had a dispute over the boundary line between their properties. The dispute concerned whether the boundary line fell 46 feet to the east or west, i.e., did the Larsons' property extend another 46 feet toward Ocean Farm's property, or did Ocean Farm's property extend another 46 feet toward the Larsons' property.
In February 2017, the Larsons placed a grape stake fence, with grape wires, on the disputed land. The fence was 1, 300 feet long and ran parallel to the boundary line. According to Ocean Farm, the Larsons' fence was located 25 feet into Ocean Farm's property.
On March 10, 2017, the Larsons filed a complaint against Ocean Farm. In the lawsuit, they sought declaratory relief regarding the boundary line between the properties. On April 26, 2017, Ocean Farm cross-complained against the Larsons. In Ocean Farm's cross-complaint, it too sought declaratory relief regarding the boundary line, but it additionally alleged a trespass cause of action and sought damages and attorney's fees.
In June 2017, Desert Mist was identified as Doe 1 in the Larsons' lawsuit. Desert Mist leased Ocean Farm's property that adjoined the Larsons' property, i.e., the property at issue in this case. Desert Mist grew watermelons on its property. On July 21, 2017, Desert Mist filed a cross-complaint against the Larsons. Desert Mist also sought declaratory relief regarding the boundary line, as well as damages and attorney's fees for trespass.
On August 31, 2017, the Larsons sold their property to Double Eagle Dover Investments, LLC (Double Eagle). Double Eagle agreed with the Farms regarding the location of the boundary line. In September 2017, the Larsons dismissed their complaint without prejudice. Double Eagle removed grape trellises from the disputed property. In October 2017, Desert Mist removed the grape stake fence from the disputed property.
Although Double Eagle agreed with the Farms regarding the location of the boundary line, the Larsons did not agree. In October 2018, Ocean Mist moved for summary adjudication on its cross-complaint, concerning the location of the boundary line. The trial court noted that the Farms' current neighbor, Double Eagle, agreed with the Farms regarding the location of the boundary line. The court explained that the boundary line issue would be moot but for the Farms' trespass causes of action. The court concluded that it had to determine the location of the boundary line prior to Double Eagle's purchase of the land because that finding was integral to whether a trespass occurred-whether the fence was on the Larsons' property or the Farms' property. The trial court found there were no triable issues of fact and concluded Ocean Farm owned the disputed property.
Thereafter, the trial court held an eight-day jury trial on the issues of trespass and damages. Jeffrey Percy was the Vice President of Production for Ocean Farm and the President of Desert Mist. Ocean Farm owns part of Desert Mist. In 2017, Desert Mist paid all the rent it owed to Ocean Farm. Desert Mist did not request a refund or lower rent due to the grape stake fence installed by the Larsons.
Percy testified that the grape stake fence was on Desert Mist's watermelon beds. However, in the area where the fence was located, irrigation had not been installed, plastic sheeting was not in place, seeds had not been planted, plants had not been transplanted, and fertilizer had not been spread. Desert Mist's watermelon planting plan, dated November 30, 2016, reflected that it intended to plant 68.88 acres of watermelons. A document pertaining to Desert Mist's 2017 final planting reflected that it planted 68.80 acres of watermelons. Thus, there was a difference of "eight one- hundredths of an acre" between the planned amount of planting and the actual amount of planting.
Percy did not know how much money was spent removing the grape stake fence because Desert Mist did not "have an accounting line item for taking down a fence." Percy believed it took three management employees, as opposed to day laborers, two and one-half days to remove the fence, which he estimated cost $5,000. Percy could not recall who removed the fence, so he was giving his "best estimate." Percy further estimated that it cost $1,250 to dispose of the fence, which was part of the $5,000, but he did not know where or how the fence was disposed of.
Pamela testified that when installing a grape stake fence, she had employees, who cost approximately $18 per hour, install the stakes. Drake testified that it would take "less than an hour" to remove the grape stake fence.
The jury found in favor of the Larsons. Specifically, the jury found that Drake and Pamela did not intentionally enter or cause another person to enter the Farms' property. The Farms moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial court granted the motion for JNOV as to trespass but denied it as to damages. The trial court entered a partial judgment reflecting the Larsons trespassed on Desert Mist's property, and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages. The parties agreed that the trial on damages would be a bench trial, and that the court could consider the evidence presented during the jury trial as well as evidence presented during a one-day bench trial. During the bench trial, Charles Topalian, a licensed contractor, testified that he saw photographs of the grape stake fence. He estimated that disposing of the fence would cost $1,925 in hauling and dump fees.
The trial court found the Farms failed to "put forward reliable or credible evidence of any actual damages suffered as a result of the Larsons['] trespass." The trial court said that Topalian "ha[d] no basis for his estimate. He looked at some photos and kind of guessed what the material was." The court said that Topalian "was guessing about a lot of things." Additionally, the trial court stated that "Percy wasn't really sure how many hours were spent; he wasn't really sure who spent the time," and it seemed as though Percy was "making up that [$5,000] number and guessing on that number." The trial court awarded Desert Mist nominal damages of $36 "as a symbolic award to acknowledge that it removed the grape stake fence."
Desert Mist moved for an award of attorney's fees in the amount of $451,830.50. (§ 1021.9.) The trial court denied the motion for multiple reasons. First, the court concluded that an award of nominal damages would not support an award of attorney's fees-actual damages were required. Second, the court found the Farms only pursued the trespass claims as a means of obtaining attorney's fees because the lawsuits were essentially seeking declaratory relief for a boundary line dispute. Third, the court determined that $451,830.50 in fees was "outrageous and not reasonably incurred," given that no actual damages were proven and that the Larsons sold their property prior to trial. Fourth, the trial court concluded that the Farms failed to prove the trespass occurred on "lands under cultivation," which is required for an award of attorney's fees (§ 1021.9).
DISCUSSION
A. NOMINAL DAMAGES
At the outset, we address what appears to be a contradiction in the trial court's $36 nominal damages award. "Nominal damages are properly awarded in two circumstances: (1) Where there is no loss or injury to be compensated but where the law still recognizes a technical invasion of a plaintiff's rights or a breach of a defendant's duty; and (2) although there have been real, actual injury and damages suffered by a plaintiff, the extent of plaintiff's injury and damages cannot be determined from the evidence presented." (Avina v. Spurlock (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 1086, 1088.) "With one exception, . . . an unbroken line of cases holds that nominal damages are limited to an amount of a few cents or a dollar." (Id. at p. 1089.)
By contrast," 'actual damages' are those which compensate someone for the harm from which he or she has been proven to currently suffer or from which the evidence shows he or she is certain to suffer in the future. They are to be distinguished from those which are nominal rather than substantial, exemplary or punitive rather than compensatory, and speculative rather than existing or certain. [Citations.] In short, '" '[a]ctual damages' is a term synonymous with compensatory damages." '" (Saunders v. Taylor (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1544.)
The trial court asserted that it awarded Desert Mist nominal damages of $36 "as a symbolic award to acknowledge that [Desert Mist] removed the grape stake fence." The trial court's assertion indicates that it found Desert Mist suffered actual damage as a result of having to remove the grape stake fence. The $36 award appears to be calculated based upon Drake's testimony that it would take less than one hour to remove the fence, and Pamela's testimony that it would cost $18 per person per hour to install the fence. It could appear that the trial court credited the Larsons' evidence and calculated $18 per hour for two people to remove the fence within one hour's time i.e., $18 multiplied by two. Therefore, the $36 award appears to be based on actual damages. Moreover, the $36 award is greater than the typical $1 award given as nominal damages, which further indicates that the $36 award was for actual damages incurred in having to remove the grape stake fence.
However, on two separate occasions, the trial court wrote that the $36 award was symbolic and meant to be nominal damages, which indicates that the trial court did not credit any of the evidence of damages. If the trial court concluded there were no actual damages, one would expect the court to have awarded $1 in order to clarify that all of the evidence-including the Larsons' $18 per hour evidence-lacked credibility.
The Farms contend that Desert Mist's damages were not nominal because the trial court calculated damages based upon the Larsons' evidence of the cost to remove the grape stake fence, and because $36 "is not legally 'nominal.'" The Farms fail to explain how we reconcile those two points with the trial court's repeated declarations that the award was symbolic and nominal. Ideally, the Farms would have moved the trial court to clarify the judgment. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 152, 160-161 [discussing an appeal from the denial of a motion to clarify].) No such motion was made.
Nevertheless, the trial court did clarify its intention when ruling on the motion for attorney's fees. In denying that motion, the trial court wrote, "[Desert Mist] mischaracterizes the verdict in its favor by stating that [t]he court determined that Desert Mist . . . incurred damages of $36.00 for the Larsons['] trespass. [¶] In fact the Court specifically found that [Desert Mist] did not prove any actual damages as a result of the Larsons['] trespass and in rendering a verdict after trial found as stated in both the minutes and in the ultimate judgment that neither plaintiff has put forward reliable or credible evidence of any actual damages suffered as a result of the Larsons['] trespass." The trial court then repeated that it awarded "$36 to Desert Mist . . . as a symbolic award to acknowledge that it removed the grape stake fence placed on property that the Court ultimately concluded the Larsons did not own."
That Desert Mist was actually damaged by having to incur the expense of removing the Larsons' fence is undisputed. (Saunders v. Taylor, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 1543 [" 'actual damages' are those which compensate someone for the harm from which he or she has been proven to currently suffer"].) Therefore, we infer that the trial court found Desert Mist suffered actual damage because it had to remove the fence, but that Desert Mist failed to prove the amount of damages that it suffered. Due to Desert Mist failing to prove the amount of damages, the trial court awarded nominal damages of $36. (Avina v. Spurlock, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at p. 1088 [nominal damages can be awarded when there has been actual damages but the amount of damages "cannot be determined from the evidence presented"].)
B. REMOVAL OF THE FENCE
The Farms assert the trial court erred by not awarding them the reasonable cost of removing the fence.
" 'In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment . . . . [¶] Thus, where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding." [Citation.]' [Citation.] The appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the judgment. [Citation.]' "All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent." '" (Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.)
Percy testified that he did not know who removed the fence, how long it took to remove the fence, where the fence was disposed of, or how the fence was disposed of. In Percy's deposition, he asserted it took two workers two days to remove the fence. At trial, Percy asserted it took three workers two and one-half days to remove the fence. Percy's testimony was essentially that the fence was removed and it cost money to do that removal, but he had little information as to how much was actually spent on the removal and disposal of the fence.
Further, Percy's belief that it took days to remove the fence was contradicted by Drake's testimony that it would take "less than an hour" to remove the fence. In sum, the evidence provided by the Farms was contradicted and was not of such weight and character that the court had to find it sufficient. Therefore, the trial court could reasonably find that the Farms failed to prove the actual or reasonable cost of removing and disposing of the fence.
The Farms contend they presented Percy's estimates of the costs related to the fence as well as expert testimony estimating the cost of disposing of the fence, while the Larsons presented hypotheticals about what removal of the fence could cost, so the Farms should have prevailed given that their evidence was stronger. The trial court was free to reject the Farms' evidence given that Percy provided an estimate with strikingly little concrete information to support the estimate, i.e., where the fence was disposed of and how long it took to remove the fence.
The Farms also contend the trial court erred by not awarding them the reasonable cost of removing the fence because the Larsons did not contest the fact that the Farms removed the fence. While the Larsons conceded that they left the fence on the Farms' property after selling to Double Eagle, the Larsons did not concede that $5,000 was either a reasonable amount for removal of the fence or the actual amount paid for removal of the fence.
C. RENTAL VALUE
The Farms contend the trial court erred by not awarding them the reasonable rental value of the disputed property because the parties stipulated to a lost rental value of $235.40. The "stipulation" cited by the Farms is actually the Larsons' attorney's closing argument to the jury. Argument by counsel is not a stipulation to an evidentiary fact, unless it is in the form of a stipulation. (Haynes v. Hunt (1962) 208 Cal.App.2d 331, 335; People v. Kiney (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 807, 815.) The Farms fail to explain in what way the Larsons' attorney's argument was in the form of a stipulation. (Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 655, 685 ["An appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error through reasoned argument"].)
In our review of the argument, we do not see a stipulation. The Larsons' attorney did the math for the jury related to the lost rental value claim: per Desert Mist's lease an acre of land was $525 per year; the fenced-off portion of the disputed property was 0.75 acre, which would be $391.32 per year; the trespass was 220 days, which would reduce the rental value to $235.40. The Larsons' attorney did not concede that $235.40 was owed; he simply did the math for what the rental value would be in the event the jury decided to award such damages. The lack of a concession can be found at the end of his closing argument when he said, "[I]f you even find liability and find damages." Besides, the trial court granted a new trial on damages, so argument to the jury is irrelevant.
Next, the Farms contend that the undisputed evidence supported a damage award for the reasonable rental value of the fenced-off property. In support of this argument, the Farms cite Civil Code section 3334. The relevant portions of the statute are as follows: "The detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property . . . is deemed to include the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful occupation." (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (a).) "[T]he value of the use of the property shall be the greater of the reasonable rental value of that property or the benefits obtained by the person wrongfully occupying the property." (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (b)(1).)
We presume the Farms' citation to Civil Code section 3334 is meant to assert that the measure of damages set forth in Civil Code section 3334 is mandatory, such that the trial court had to employ the rental value measure of damages. However, the Farms provide no legal analysis explaining why the statutory measure of damages is mandatory. Such a legal argument is needed for two reasons. First, the statute does not use "may" or "shall" before the word "deemed," e.g. "the detriment shall be deemed to include" or "the detriment may be deemed to include." Thus, it is unclear, without a reasoned legal argument, whether using Civil Code section 3334 to measure damages is mandatory or discretionary.
The second reason is that case law indicates the use of Civil Code section 3334 to measure damages is discretionary. In Cassinos v. Union Oil Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1784-1785, the appellate court wrote, "Civil Code section 3334 states, in pertinent part, that '[t]he detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property . . . is deemed to include the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful occupation.'" Accordingly, one measure of damage for trespass is the reasonable rental value of the property during the wrongful occupation. [Citations.] [¶] There are many ways, however, to determine the proper measure of damages for wrongful occupation of property, and courts are very flexible in choosing a measure of recovery which is most appropriate to the particular facts of the case. [Citation.] 'There is no fixed rule with respect to the measure of damages for the wrongful injury or destruction of property. Each case must be determined on its particular facts.' [Citation.]' ". . . [W]hatever rule is best suited to determine the amount of the loss in the particular case should be adopted."' "
In the instant case, the trial court wrote, "The Court finds that [the Farms did not] put forward reliable or credible evidence of any actual damages suffered as a result of the Larsons['] trespass." We gather from the foregoing that the trial court measured damages by actual damages suffered by the Farms. To the extent the Farms are asserting the trial court was required to measure damages by the rental value of the fenced-off property, rather than by actual damages, the Farms would have to provide a legal analysis as to why that measure of damages is required. The Farms have failed to provide such a legal argument. Therefore, even if the Farms are correct that there is uncontradicted evidence concerning the rental value of the fenced-off property, we cannot conclude the trial court erred because we have not been presented with a legal argument reflecting that an award of the rental value is mandatory. (See Bullock v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 685 ["An appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error through reasoned argument"].)
D. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The trial court provided a written explanation of its ruling on the summary adjudication of the boundary line dispute. The court wrote, "In support of its motion, [Ocean Farm] argues that the boundary line set in a 1950 survey by the Bureau of Reclamation is correct and that it the line [sic] was confirmed by subsequent surveys. [Ocean Farm] relies upon past surveys and the expert declaration of Steven J. Van a licensed California Professional Land Surveyor." The court found "Van's testimony is sufficient to meet [Ocean Farm's] burden to establish a prima facie case that it held title to the disputed area as of 1998, when it purchased its property based upon the location of [the] boundary line as established in the 1950 survey."
Prior to the jury trial on trespass and damages, the Larsons moved in limine to exclude evidence of the cost of a surveyor hired by Ocean Farm to survey the boundary line. The Larsons contended, "In their amended responses, both [Ocean Farm] and [Desert Mist] allege 'damages' of $46,512 in survey costs with Olson Engineering. . . . Ben Olson of Olson Engineering was originally designated as one of [the Farms'] retained experts but was subsequently removed. A surveyor from Olson Engineering remains [the Farms'] designated expert. [citation.] [¶] No experts have been authorized by order of the court." The Larsons asserted that expenses related to experts are costs, not damages. Additionally, the Larsons moved in limine to exclude evidence of the Farms' attorney's fees because attorney's fees are not damages.
In the Farms' opposition to the motions in limine, they relied upon Civil Code section 3334, which provides, "The detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property . . . is deemed to include the value of the use of the property for the time of that wrongful occupation, not exceeding five years next preceding the commencement of the action or proceeding to enforce the right to damages, the reasonable cost of repair or restoration of the property to its original condition, and the costs, if any, of recovering the possession." (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (a), italics added.)
The Farms asserted that surveyor expenses and attorney's fees constituted costs of recovering possession under Civil Code section 3334, subdivision (a). The Farms contended that they needed "licensed surveyor Ben Olson of Olson-Engineering to assist in recovering possession of the disputed portion of land." The Farms explained, "In order to recover possession of the property, [Ocean Farm] necessarily incurred costs relating to surveying as that was the only method to determine the location of the boundary line." Additionally, the Farms had "to incur attorney fees . . . to recover possession of its fenced-off property as well."
On May 2, 2019, the trial court granted the motions to exclude evidence of attorney's fees and surveyor expenses. The May 2, 2019, minute order reflects a court reporter was present for the hearing; however, the record does not include a reporter's transcript from that day, so we do not know if the trial court stated reasons for its ruling.
2. ANALYSIS
The Farms contend the trial court erred by excluding, from the trials on damages, the Farms' evidence pertaining to attorney's fees and surveyor expenses because those are costs of recovering possession under Civil Code section 3334. The Larsons assert the Farms forfeited this issue because the Farms "fail[ed] to cite any part of the record that includes such a ruling." We located the ruling in the register of actions. Therefore, we will address the issue.
As discussed ante, the Farms have failed to provide a reasoned analysis as to why the measure of damages set forth in Civil Code section 3334 is mandatory. Therefore, we could conclude the trial court did not err in excluding the evidence of attorney's fees and surveyor costs because it exercised its discretion to not follow Civil Code section 3334's measure of damages that includes costs. Nevertheless, we will proceed with our analysis of the issue.
We begin with the ruling excluding evidence of attorney's fees. We apply the de novo standard of review when interpreting statutory language. (Goodman v. Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.) "Statutory attorney fee awards must be specifically authorized by a statute." (That v. Alders Maintenance Assn. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1428-1429, fn. omitted.) Civil Code section 3334, subdivision (a), permits damages to include "the costs, if any, of recovering the possession." It does not specifically permit damages to include attorney's fees. For example, the statutory language does not read, "the costs and attorney's fees, if any, of recovering possession." Therefore, attorney's fees are not part of the costs of recovering possession.
We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review when determining whether the trial court erred by excluding evidence. (Employers Reinsurance Co. v. Superior Court (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 906, 919.) Because Civil Code section 3334 does not include attorney's fees as damages, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of attorney's fees from the trial on damages.
Next, we address the ruling excluding evidence of surveyor expenses. On appeal, the Farms assert that, in general, surveyor expenses are admissible as the costs of recovering possession, and therefore, the trial court erred. The Farms fail to explain how, specifically in this case, the evidence of money spent on Olson Engineering was admissible. There are two reasons that an argument, by the Farms, specific to the Olson Engineering evidence is necessary.
The first reason is that Double Eagle did not dispute the boundary line and the fence was removed approximately one year before Ocean Farm moved for summary adjudication of the boundary line dispute. Therefore, the Farms had possession of the disputed property prior to the boundary line issue being adjudicated. Because the Farms had possession of the disputed property prior to the case being adjudicated, the Farms need to explain in what respect Olson Engineering assisted in recovering possession.
The second reason that an argument specific to the Olson Engineering evidence is needed is that, when the trial court summarily adjudicated the boundary line dispute, it relied upon a declaration by Van, who was a licensed surveyor, and who was hired by Ocean Farm. For the jury trial on damages and trespass, the parties stipulated that the fence was on property that the trial court determined was owned by Ocean Farm. Because it appears that Van was the critical surveyor for determining the boundary line dispute, it is unclear in what respect expenses related to Olson Engineering's services constitute costs of recovering possession.
In sum, if we were to assume that the Farms are correct that, in general, surveyor costs are admissible as costs of recovering possession (Civ. Code, § 3334, subd. (a)), we could not reverse because the Farms have failed to argue why, in this case, evidence of costs pertaining to Olson Engineering was erroneously excluded. Due to the Farms' failure to provide an argument specifically addressing the admissibility of the Olson Engineering cost evidence, we need not address their abstract assertion concerning the meaning of Civil Code section 3334, subdivision (a). (See Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. Of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541 [courts should not "declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it' "]; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 475 [a court cannot reverse unless it is demonstrated that a different result would have been probable absent the error].)
E. ATTORNEY'S FEES
The Farms contend the trial court erred by denying Desert Mist's motion for attorney's fees (§ 1021.9). Section 1021.9 provides, "In any action to recover damages to personal or real property resulting from trespassing on lands either under cultivation or intended or used for the raising of livestock, the prevailing plaintiff shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to other costs, and in addition to any liability for damages imposed by law." (§ 1021.9.)
The trial court gave four reasons for denying the motion for attorney's fees. One of the reasons given by the court was that the Farms "only pursued trespass claims as a way to recover attorney[']s fees incurred to litigate the boundary dispute . . . . In other words the trespass claims here were only brought as a way to recover attorney[']s fees that would not otherwise be recoverable in a quiet title action to settle a boundary [line]. Such bootstrapping is not contemplated by Section 1021.9 and in fact would be contrary to its intent."
We infer from the trial court's explanation it concluded that Desert Mist's lawsuit was not an action to recover damages to real property caused by trespass because, at its heart, Desert Mist's lawsuit was for declaratory relief of a boundary line dispute, and the trespass claim was merely a means to obtain attorney's fees, not damages. Thus, because the case was not an "action to recover damages to . . . real property resulting from trespassing" (§ 1021.9), it did not qualify for an award of attorney's fees under section 1021.9. The Farms ignore this basis for the trial court's ruling in their appellate briefs. Instead, the Farms focus on other reasons given by the trial court for denying the motion, e.g, that the trial court incorrectly denied the motion due to a lack of actual damages.
When a trial court gives multiple reasons for its ruling, an appellate court cannot reverse unless the appellant demonstrates error as to each reason given for the ruling. (People v. JTH Tax, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1237.) The Farms have failed to argue that the trial court erred by concluding that Desert Mist's lawsuit, at its core, was not a lawsuit for trespass damages. The Farms' failure to address that aspect of the trial court's reasoning is a forfeiture of any appellate claim regarding that reasoning. (Ibid.) Consequently, even if the trial court erred in one of the other reasons it gave for denying the motion, we would not be able to reverse because the Farms forfeited the issue as to whether the motion was properly denied due to the trial court's alternate reason of Desert Mist's lawsuit not being an action for trespass damages (§ 1021.9). Accordingly, we need not, and do not, address whether the trial court erred in denying the motion on the basis that actual damages were not proven. (People v. JTH Tax, Inc., at p. 1237 ["When a trial court states multiple grounds for its ruling and appellant addresses only some of them, we need not address appellant's arguments"].)
F. CROSS-APPEAL
In the Larsons' cross-appeal, they raise two contentions. However, the Larsons assert that neither contention needs to be addressed if the Larsons prevail on the Farms' appeal. We will be affirming the judgment and the postjudgment order denying the motion for attorney's fees. Therefore, we will dismiss the Larsons' cross-appeal.
DISPOSITION
Both the judgment and the postjudgment order denying the motion for attorney's fees are affirmed. On the Farms' appeal and the Larsons' cross-appeal, the Larsons are awarded their appellate costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (a)(2).) The cross-appeal is dismissed.
We concur: FIELDS, J., MENETREZ J.