Opinion
No. 4-563 / 03-1041
Filed January 26, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for WapelloCounty, James Blomgren, Judge.
Greg and Sharon Cain appeal from the denial of their petition for judicial review of an agency ruling concluding the issue, from which they sought review, was not appealable. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Matthew Cunningham of the Walter Law Office, Ottumwa, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary Wickman and Gordon Allen, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee-State.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel, Zimmer, Hecht, JJ., and Nelson, S.J.
Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
Greg and Sharon Cain are the grandparents of Brooke and Jazzmin, the children of their son, Chris. In May of 2000, Brooke and Jazzmin were adjudicated to be children in need of assistance (CINA) due to problems in Chris's home. The Cains subsequently expressed to the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) an interest in adopting the children. In response, DHS completed a background check and filed a permanency plan regarding the children's adoption prospects. On March 6, 2001, the parents of Brooke and Jazzmin had their parental rights terminated. On September 7, 2001, DHS informed the Cains it had placed the children with another couple.
On September 18, 2001, the Cains filed an application to appeal the agency's placement decision. In a "Notice of Prehearing Conference" an administrative law judge (ALJ) specifically certified the issue on appeal as "[w]hether the Department was correct in not placing a child or children with a prospective adoptive family." In a subsequent "Notice of Hearing" DHS identified the issue as being whether "the issue certified by DHS is an appealable issue." The ALJ thereafter determined:
[t]he issue of whether the department was correct in not placing a child or children with a prospective adoptive family is determined to be a non-appealable issue. In addition, the issue of whether the department followed proper procedure in failing to consent to the adoption of the children by the Appellants is determined to be a non-appealable issue.
The Cains filed a petition for judicial review of the administrative ruling. Following a hearing, the district court affirmed the agency decision. The court noted that while the Iowa Administrative Code does allow for appeals if prospective adoptive families are denied approval of their home study, no such denial was given the Cains in this case. The district court held that the agency correctly concluded the action of not placing a child with a specific prospective adoptive family is a non-appealable issue. The Cains appeal from the judicial review ruling.
DHS has now filed a "Motion to Dismiss for Mootness," which our supreme court has ordered us to consider with the appeal. In the motion, DHS notes that Brooke and Jazzmin's parents have had their parental rights terminated and that the children, as of October 11, 2002, have been adopted by another family. Accordingly, DHS asserts that because Brooke and Jazzmin "have been legally adopted by another family there is no relief this court can grant that would have any effect on the issue of either preadoptive placement or consent to adoption."
We thus proceed to address the mootness question. An appeal "is moot if it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because [the contested issue] has become academic or nonexistent." In re D.C.V., 569 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 1997) (quoting In re Meek, 236 N.W.2d 284, 288 (Iowa 1975)). "The test is whether the court's opinion would be of force or effect in the underlying controversy." Id.; see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 572 N.W.2d 537, 540 (Iowa 1997). As a general rule, we will dismiss an appeal "when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon the existing controversy." Christensen v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Roth v. Reagen, 422 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa 1988)).
We conclude this appeal has been rendered moot by virtue of the children's adoption. As DHS argues on appeal, there is no relief the court could order that would have any effect on the issue of the preadoptive placement of these children, or DHS's lack of consent to an adoption of them by Greg and Sharon Cain. Because there has been an adoption, preadoptive placement and DHS's failure to consent to the children's adoption by the Cains are no longer issues.
There is an exception to this general rule of mootness, however, "where matters of public importance are presented and the problem is likely to recur." Iowa Freedom of Info. Council v. Wifvat, 328 N.W.2d 920, 922 (Iowa 1983). Under these circumstances, our court has discretion to hear the appeal. See Christensen, 578 N.W.2d at 679. An important factor to consider is "whether the challenged action `is such that often the matter will be moot before it can reach an appellate court.'" Id. (quoting Danner v. Hass, 257 Iowa 654, 660, 134 N.W.2d 534, 539 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Needles v. Kelley, 261 Iowa 815, 822, 156 N.W.2d 276, 280 (1968)).
We decline to reach the merits of this case under the public importance exception to the general rule of mootness. This situation is not likely to recur. Subsequent to the rulings in this case, DHS adopted a new rule. The agency rule first provides that "[a]ny person or group of persons may file an appeal with the department concerning any issue . . . [and that] [t]he department shall determine whether a hearing shall be granted." Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-7.5. However, the rule further provides that a hearing shall not be granted on such appeal when "[c]hildren have not been placed with or have been removed from a preadoptive family." Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-7.5(2)(a)(5). Thus, the issue presented on appeal by the Cains subsequently has been addressed by this new rule.
Moreover, we concur in DHS's sentiment that "[o]btaining permanent, stable placement for adoptive children is arguably one of the most important goals of the juvenile court system." These children were adopted approximately two years ago. The Cains failed to avail themselves of other methods to challenge DHS's decisions and to seek adoption of the children themselves. For example, the Cains could have appealed the juvenile court ruling which denied them guardianship. In addition, Iowa Code chapter 600.7 (2001) provides a means for individuals to petition for the adoption of children, an alternative the Cains did not avail themselves of. Accordingly, we find this appeal to be inappropriate to invoke the exception to the mootness doctrine.
Having concluded this appeal is moot, we therefore grant the agency's motion to dismiss.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Vogel and Zimmer, JJ., and Nelson, S.J., concurring; Sackett, C.J., specially concurring.
Petitioners sought to adopt their two biological granddaughters born in 1996 and 1998. At the time the children's parent's parental rights had been terminated and the children were living in a foster home. The foster parents were not seeking to adopt the children.
On March 14, 2001 Adoption Connection of Ankeny did a home study and its adoption home study investigator recommended petitioners be approved to adopt of their grandchildren. On September 7, 2001 petitioners received the following letter:
An adoption staffing was recently held to match the family who would best meet the needs of Jazzmin and Brooke. While your family was given careful consideration and many strengths were noted, another family was selected.
We want to thank you for responding and we encourage you to continue your interest in special needs adoption. If you desire your homestudy will continue to be available for consideration for other children.
If you want information about how this decision was made please contact me.
Thank you again for your time and efforts with this matter.
James Veldhuizen Mahaska County Dept. of Human Services Adoption Worker, Social Worker II
The letter apparently followed a staffing with Richard Johnson, Human Services Area Administrator, Ottumwa Cluster; Marjorie Striegel, Service Supervisor, Mahaska County; and Jim Veldhuizen, Social Worker II, Adoptive Worker. Their report indicated:
relatives were considered for placement of the children and were interviewed, however, it was believed that the paternal grandparents could not provide a home for the children that would be able to meet the needs of the children. Staffing members took into consideration the emotional needs of the children. Staffing members believed that the children having contact with biological father and mother would not be in the children's best interest. Biological mother has mental health issues that has caused many disruptions in the children's lives and it is believed that mother would continue disruptions in the children's lives if placed in the grandparent's home. Biological father has had a history of substance abuse that has caused disruptions in the children's lives. Also according to the history, domestic abuse occurred and the biological father was named as being the offender. What role father would play in the children's lives was another concern.
It also provided the foster parents did not want to adopt the children and they need a nurturing home with no interference from their extended family.
On September 21, 2001 petitioners filed an "Application for Appeal" contending they were denied the right to adopt the children. On November 9, 2001, as a part of a notice of a prehearing conference, the administrative law judge formulated the issue as "Whether the Department was correct in not placing a child or children with the prospective adoptive family." The same issue was certified as the hearing issue by the administrative law judge on February 20, 2002. The Department subsequently certified the issues as "Whether the placement is an appealable issue." On May 3, 2002 the administrative law judge filed a decision finding it was not an appealable issue and dismissed the petition. The administrative judge's decision became a final decision on May 31, 2002.
On June 26, 2002 petitioners filed a petition for judicial review which the Department answered. The district court affirmed the May 31 decision. Not until September 24, 2003, after petitioners filed their appellate brief, did the Department move to dismiss for mootness, contending the children had been adopted nearly a year earlier, on October 11, 2001. The petitioners resisted the motion contending they had not been aware of the adoption and the issue of mootness was raised for the first time.
I do concur with the majority that the subsequent adoption of the children has rendered the issue of whether the Department should have recommended that petitioners adopt their biological grandchildren moot. While I have agreed with the majority's decision the matter is moot, I am disturbed that (1) the Department did not challenge the issue as formulated by the administrative judge in the pretrial conference, and (2) did not raise the mootness issue in a timely manner. These things can understandably give the petitioners concern about the fairness of the process. I also have concern that the manner in which the proceeding went forward understandably led the petitioner to believe that they would have a fair hearing on the issue, which unfortunately they never had.
Finding the matter moot the majority has determined there were other methods for petitioners to seek adoption of their biological grandchildren.
While it is conceivable there may have been other methods for the petitioners to seek their goals, more particularly by filing their own petition for adoption, I fail to see this as a reasonable method to resolve the conflicting issues. Understandably, the Department wants these issues quickly resolved and they should be. But where parties approved for adoption seek to adopt their biological grandchildren and the Department approves other adoptive parents, it would appear that decision should be quickly reviewable by the juvenile or district court as are all or nearly all other Department decisions that substantially impact a child's future. However, it appears it will take a statutory change for this to happen.