Opinion
CASE NO. 02-CV-73050-DT
June 3, 2003
OPINION
Plaintiff filed this action on August 5, 2002, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe. Presently before the Court are two reports and recommendations (RRs) issued by Magistrate Judge Pepe on March 31, 2003. In one RR, Magistrate Judge Pepe recommends that Plaintiffs notice of voluntary dismissal filed on November 15, 2002, be denied as moot. Neither party has objected to this RR; therefore, the Court shall adopt this RR. In the other RR, Magistrate Judge Pepe recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust be granted. Plaintiff and Defendants have each filed an objection to this RR. For the reasons set forth below, the objections to the RR recommending this Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss shall be overruled and the Court shall grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
On April 3, 2003, this RR was modified to add certain language, but the modification did not change the conclusions reached in the RR.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The parts of the RR to which Plaintiff objects will be reviewed by the Court de novo. Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp.2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001). However, the Court "is not required to articulate all of the reasons it rejects a party's objections." Id. (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff and Defendants have filed objections to the RR recommending the Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The objections are discussed separately below.
Plaintiffs Objection:
In the RR, Magistrate Judge Pepe recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims against Defendants. Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Pepe's conclusion regarding Plaintiff's exhaustion of his "cold cell" claim. Plaintiff states in his objection that "Plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies insofar as the Defendants putting [Plaintiff] in a cold cell and leaving [him] there without moving [him] til [sic] the condition was fixed." (Pl.'s Obj.). In the RR, Magistrate Judge Pepe concluded that Plaintiff had not exhaust this claim, even though Plaintiff had mentioned Defendant Cady in his Step I grievance, because Plaintiff had added additional claims in his Step II and Step III filings that were not addressed in his Step I filing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims regarding the "cold cell," but for reasons that differ from the RR.
Since the passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), the Sixth Circuit has held that "the exhaustion requirement is . . . a necessary prerequisite to filing prisoner claims in federal court, and the district court no longer has the discretion to `waive' exhaustion as it did before passage of the 1996 Act." Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999). "The plain language of the [PLRA] . . . makes exhaustion a precondition to filing an action in federal court under the statute." Wolff v. Moore, 199 F.3d 324, 327 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998)).
In interpreting the Michigan Department of Corrections' grievance procedure, the Sixth Circuit has concluded that these policies require:
that a prisoner seeking to administratively exhaust a claim against a prison official describe the alleged mistreatment or misconduct at Step I of the grievance process. By negative implication, we understand these policies to preclude administrative exhaustion of a claim against a prison official if the first allegation of mistreatment or misconduct on the part of that official is made at Step II or Step III of the grievance process. . . . We do not, however, understand these policies to preclude a prisoner from presenting additional factual detail at Step II or Step III that clarifies an allegation made at Step I as a means of justifying an appeal.Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
In addition to the requirements addressed above regarding the Michigan Department of Corrections' procedures, the court stated that "a prisoner must administratively exhaust his or her claim as to each defendant associated with the claim, . . . and a district court should enforce the exhaustion requirement sua sponte, if not raised by the defendants." Id. at 574-75 (citations omitted). In order to find exhaustion "against a particular defendant, a prisoner must have alleged mistreatment or misconduct on the part of the defendant at Step I of the grievance process. " Id. at 575 (emphasis added). The prisoner need not set forth specific legal theories or facts. Id. The Court can find the allegations are sufficient if "a prisoner's Step I problem statement gave prison officials fair notice of the alleged mistreatment or misconduct that forms the basis of the constitutional or statutory claim made against a defendant in a prisoner's complaint." Id. (citation omitted).
In his objection, Plaintiff contends that Defendants Burt, Yarborough, Cady, and Becker were "acutely aware" of the "cold cell" situation, and that their keeping Plaintiff in the cell constituted deliberate indifference and cruel and unusual punishment. In his Step I grievance on the matter, Plaintiff set forth the following as his "problem statement:"
The cell I am dwelling in is very . . . COLD, because the window directly behind the cell is broken and can not be closed completely, therefore air comes through the vent and it feels as if one is outdoors.
This constitutes Crule [sic] Unusual Punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution Amendment Eight. Also INHUMANE TREATMENT which is prohibited by the Constitution.
I would like to be moved out of the cell until either the window is fixed or put in a different cell where this doesn't occur and I risk being a victim of catching Pneumonia in a dwelling whichi [sic] is supposed to be heated.
(Compl. Ex. 51).
As Magistrate Judge Pepe points out, the only Defendant mentioned in this grievance is Defendant Cady. Under the heading "[w]hat attempt did you make to resolve this issue prior to writing this grievance[,]" Plaintiff wrote "[s]poke with both Counselor and R. UM. Cady." ( Id.). In this Court's opinion, this mention of Defendant Cady is insufficient for this grievance to begin to meet the exhaustion requirements of the PLRA. As stated above, the Sixth Circuit in Burton held that in order to meet the exhaustion requirement, "a prisoner must have alleged mistreatment or misconduct on the part of the defendant at Step 1 of the grievance process. " Burton, 321 F.3d at 575 (emphasis added). The Step I grievance in the case at bar fails to meet this requirement.
The Step I grievance does state Plaintiff's problems associated with the cold cell as a result of the broken window and Plaintiff even goes as far as stating some legal theories for his claim, which he is not required to do at this stage. Plaintiffs grievance fails to meet the exhaustion requirement, however, because he does not allege any misconduct or mistreatment on the part of any of the Defendants in the case at bar. Defendant Cady is mentioned in the grievance as one of the people Plaintiff spoke to regarding his grievance, but Plaintiff makes no allegations of misconduct or mistreatment on the part of Defendant Cady in his Grievance. Therefore, this grievance cannot serve to meet the exhaustion requirement for Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Cady, Burt, Yarborough, and Becker, as Plaintiff contends in his objection to the RR. As such, Plaintiff's objection is overruled, and Magistrate Judge Pepe's conclusion regarding Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his claims shall be adopted by this Court, albeit on slightly different grounds. Defendants' Objection:
Magistrate Judge Pepe concluded that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust any of his "cold cell" claims because the Step I grievance and the Step II grievance dealt only with the window in his cell whereas the Step III appeal complained about windows in different cells. Because the window in Plaintiff's cell was fixed, his complaint in this lawsuit is based on the failure to fix other windows. Magistrate Judge Pepe concluded that because Petitioner did not include this claim in his Step I or Step II filings, he has not properly exhausted his administrative remedies. While the Court believes there is merit to this conclusion by the Magistrate Judge, in this Court's opinion, the more solid basis for concluding that none of Plaintiff's claims were exhausted is the fact that he did not assert any misconduct or mistreatment on the part of any of the Defendants in his Step I grievance.
Because both Magistrate Judge Pepe and this Court have concluded that Plaintiff has not exhausted any of his claims, the Court sees no need to address Defendants' objection to the RR, which relates to the Magistrate Judge's analysis of the "total exhaustion" rule.
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion shall issue forthwith.
JUDGMENT At a session of said Court, held in the U.S. District Courthouse, City of Detroit, County of Wayne, State of Michigan on June 3, 2003
Plaintiff filed this action on August 5, 2002, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe. Presently before the Court are two reports and recommendations (RRs) issued by Magistrate Judge Pepe on March 31, 2003. In one RR, Magistrate Judge Pepe recommends that the remaining Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for failure to exhaust be granted. In the other RR, Magistrate Judge Pepe recommends that Plaintiffs "notice" of dismissal of Defendant Huffman be denied as moot. Plaintiff and Defendants have each filed an objection to the RR recommending this Court grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
On April 8, 2003, this RR was modified to add certain language, but the modification did not change the conclusions reached in the RR.
After careful review of the RRs and the objections thereto, the Court shall adopt both RRs. For the reasons set forth in the RRs issued on March 31, 2003, and the Opinion issued this date,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Plaintiff's "Voluntary Dismissal of Amended Complaint Defendant T. Huffman" is DENIED AS MOOT.