-appealed from so much of the order as denied those branches of their cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence insofar as asserted against Coen (seeCaiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 719, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ). In a decision and order dated July 16, 2014, this Court affirmed the order insofar as appealed from and insofar as cross-appealed from by Coen and Reyes, but reversed the order insofar as cross-appealed from by MJC and granted that branch of MJC's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging common-law negligence insofar as asserted against it (seeid. at 719, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ).
Where a one-family or two-family residence has both commercial and residential uses, whether the exemption applies depends on whether "the site and purpose of the work" relates to the owner's residential use of the property ( Khela v. Neiger , 85 N.Y.2d 333, 337, 624 N.Y.S.2d 566, 648 N.E.2d 1329 ; seeBartoo v. Buell , 87 N.Y.2d 362, 368, 639 N.Y.S.2d 778, 662 N.E.2d 1068 ). Whether the work being performed relates to residential or commercial use "must be based on the owner's intentions at the time of the injury" ( Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc. , 119 A.D.3d 718, 721, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ).Here, the defendant established, prima facie, inter alia, that he and his family intended to reside at the premises after the renovations were completed and, thus, that the exemption applied (seeid.
A contractor may be held liable for such claims if it had control over the work site and actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition. (See Bessa, 148 AD3d at 978; Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 AD3d 718, 720-721 [2d Dept 2014]; White v Village of Port Chester, 92 AD3d 872, 876 [2d Dept 2012].) Defendants, who have not been deposed and have not submitted an affidavit from a party with personal knowledge of the facts, have each failed to establish a prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action.
"'Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty [and absolute liability] upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites'" (Von Hegel v Brixmor Sunshine Sq., LLC, 180 A.D.3d 727, 728, quoting Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 720; see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 369, 374). To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant violated Labor Law § 240(1) and (2) that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 N.Y.3d 280, 289; Mora v 1-10 Bush Term. Owner, L.P., 214 A.D.3d 785, 785).
For example, "[r]enovating a residence for resale or rental plainly qualifies as work being performed for a commercial purpose" (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Applicability of the exemption turns on whether the site and purpose of the work was connected to the owner's residential use of the property" (Marquez v. Mascioscia, 165 A.D.3d 912, 913) and "must be based on the owner's intentions at the time of the injury" (Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 721). Moreover, "[t]he statutory phrase 'direct or control' is construed strictly and refers to situations where the owner supervises the method and manner of the work" (Ortega v Puccia, 57 A.D.3d at 59; see Santibanez v. North Shore Land Alliance, Inc., 197 A.D.3d 1123, 1126). "In order to be entitled to the protection of the homeowner's exemption, [a defendant] must demonstrate (1) that the work was conducted at a dwelling that is a residence for only one or two families, and (2) that the [defendant] did not direct or control the work" (Sanders v. Sanders-Morrow, 177 A.D.3d 920, 921; see Nucci v. County of Suffolk, 204 A.D.3d 817, 819).
"'Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty [and absolute liability] upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites'" (Von Hegel v Brixmor Sunshine Sq., LLC, 180 A.D.3d 727, 728, quoting Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 720). To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action
The exemption "was not intended to insulate from liability owners who use their one- or two-family houses purely for commercial purposes" ( Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 296, 590 N.Y.S.2d 55, 604 N.E.2d 117 ; seeVan Amerogen v. Donnini, 78 N.Y.2d 880, 882, 573 N.Y.S.2d 443, 577 N.E.2d 1035 ). "[R]enovating a residence for resale or rental plainly qualifies as work being performed for a commercial purpose" ( Landon v. Austin, 88 A.D.3d 1127, 1128, 931 N.Y.S.2d 424 ; seeBatzin v. Ferrone, 140 A.D.3d 1102, 1103, 32 N.Y.S.3d 660 ). Where the property serves both residential and commercial purposes, "[a] determination as to whether the exemption applies in a particular case turns on the nature of the site and the purpose of the work being performed, and must be based on the owner's intentions at the time of the injury" ( Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 721, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ; seeBartoo v. Buell, 87 N.Y.2d 362, 368, 639 N.Y.S.2d 778, 662 N.E.2d 1068 ; Batzin v. Ferrone, 140 A.D.3d at 1103, 32 N.Y.S.3d 660 ). Here, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the defendants failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether they were entitled to the homeowner's exemption to Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6), including whether the premises had a commercial purpose and whether the work the decedent performed related to a commercial purpose of the property (seeHannan v. Freeman, 169 A.D.3d 1016, 1017, 93 N.Y.S.3d 396 ; Sanchez v. Palmiero, 118 A.D.3d 860, 862, 988 N.Y.S.2d 249 ).
"Applicability of the exemption turns on whether the site and purpose of the work was connected to the owner's residential use of the property" ( Marquez v. Mascioscia, 165 A.D.3d at 913, 86 N.Y.S.3d 180 ). "Where an owner engages in both commercial and residential uses of the property, a ‘determination as to whether the exemption applies ... must be based on the owner's intentions at the time of the injury’ " ( id., quoting Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 721, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ).
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability on the Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action insofar as asserted against the LLC. Labor Law § 240(1) "imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites" (Caiazzo v Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 720; see Canas v Harbour at Blue Point Home Owners Assn., Inc., 99 A.D.3d 962, 963). To prevail on a cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must show, prima facie, that the defendant violated the statute and that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries (see Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 N.Y.3d 280).
" ‘ Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty [and absolute liability] upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites’ " ( Von Hegel v. Brixmor Sunshine Sq., LLC, 180 A.D.3d 727, 728, 115 N.Y.S.3d 712, quoting Caiazzo v. Mark Joseph Contr., Inc., 119 A.D.3d 718, 720, 990 N.Y.S.2d 529 ). To prevail on a Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the defendant violated Labor Law § 240(1), and (2) that such violation was a proximate cause of his or her injuries (seeBlake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, Inc., 1 N.Y.3d 280, 771 N.Y.S.2d 484, 803 N.E.2d 757 ).