" That the admission of this testimony was erroneous cannot be seriously doubted. Respondent makes a half-hearted effort to justify it under the rule in Cahill v. Murphy, 94 Cal. 29 [ 28 Am. St. Rep. 88, 30 P. 195], and cases there cited, wherein it was held proper to show of what members the plaintiff's family consisted, "and the damages consequently enhanced by the fact that the members of the plaintiff's family would suffer by reason of the disgrace visited upon [plaintiff] by the slanderous charge." But that rule has never been extended so as to render admissible evidence to prove that members of plaintiff's family actually did suffer in consequence of the publication.
It is well settled that in such cases as this a jury may consider as a basis for its award of actual damages all of such matters as those set out above, including the wide publicity given to the libel, plaintiff's prominence in the community where he lives, his professional standing, his good name and reputation, his injured feelings and his mental sufferings. ( Cahill v. Murphy, 94 Cal. 29, [28 Am. St. Rep. 88, 30 P. 195]; Turner v. Hearst, 115 Cal. 395, [47 P. 129]; Davis v. Hearst, 160 Cal. 143, 185, [ 116 P. 530].) Appellant's motion for a new trial was made on the ground, among others, that the award of actual damages was excessive.
The next contention of the appellants is that the trial court erred in overruling an objection to the following question asked plaintiff while testifying as a witness in support of the averments of his complaint: "Q. What is the age of your children and the sex of each?" A similar inquiry was held proper in the earlier cases of Rhodes v. Naglee, 66 Cal. 677, [6 P. 863], and Dixon v. Allen, 69 Cal. 527, [11 P. 179], while the question in almost its precise form was held to be permissible in the case of Cahill v. Murphy, 94 Cal. 29, [28 Am. St. Rep. 88, 30 P. 195], wherein the court, after citing the foregoing cases, stated that the rule rests upon the principle that as mental suffering entitles a plaintiff to compensation in cases of this character, such suffering may be increased and the damages consequently enhanced by his consciousness of the fact that members of the plaintiff's family would suffer by reason of the disgrace visited upon him by the slanderous charge. It follows that the trial court was not in error in its ruling in the instant case.
She had not testified why she had suffered greatly from the article published by defendant, nor testified that it was intensified because of her family ties, nor on account of her past or present mode of living or occupation. It is true that in Cahill v. Murphy, 94 Cal. 29, [28 Am. St. Rep. 88, 30 P. 195], cited by appellant, it is held that in an action of slander a married woman might testify to the number and respective ages of her children for the purpose of showing increased mental suffering by reason of the fact that the members of her family would suffer on account of the disgrace visited upon her by the slanderous charge, and as bearing on her right to enhanced damages therefor. But, as plaintiff did not testify as to any family ties on direct examination, the case cited furnished no authority for defendant to go into the subject on cross-examination.
The testimony was admissible from this standpoint. 18 Am. Eng. Ency. Law, 1096; Cahill v. Murphy, 94 Cal. 29, 66 Cal. 681, 69 Cal. 527; Klumph v. Dunn, 66 Pa. St., 141. In the case last cited the court said: "The position in life and the family of the plaintiff are always important circumstances as bearing upon the question of damages, and have always been held to be admissible in evidence for that purpose."