Numerous courts in jurisdictions other than New York State have construed language similar to "latest federal census" as set forth in subdivision (b) of section 1262 Tax of the Tax Law to include census data which is preliminary and subject to correction, so long as it is officially promulgated. To this effect are Holcomb v Spikes ( 232 S.W. 891 [Tex]), Herndon v Excise Bd. of Garfield County ( 147 Okla. 126), Ervin v State ( 119 Tex Crim App 204), Ford v Owens ( 160 S.C. 168), Excise Bd., Washita County v Lowden ( 189 Okla. 286) and Cahill v Leopold ( 141 Conn. 1, overruled on other grounds by Butterworth v Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754, affd 378 U.S. 562, affd remanded 378 U.S. 564). In Cahill v Leopold ( supra), the question presented was the meaning of the phrase "completion of a census" as set forth in a State constitutional amendment providing for reapportionment of State legislative districts.
The injunction is said to be immediately necessary because of the provision of Art. III, § 5, of the present Connecticut Constitution, C.G.S.A. — being Amendment XXXI of the earlier Constitution — authorizing the first session of the General Assembly after the decennial federal census to redistrict the Senate and providing that if it does not act no redistricting shall be until the first session after the next census. In Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 103 A.2d 818, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors established that the stated limitation is mandatory, so that if the first legislature in session after the census results are available does not act, no action is then possible for ten years and until the results of the next census are available. This is the provision heavily relied on by the plaintiff as showing the need of action before the 1961 Assembly is succeeded by the next biennial session, which was elected in November 1962 and which will convene on January 9, 1963. In deciding the application we must proceed according to familiar principles of equity with respect to temporary injunctions designed essentially to preserve the status quo until adjudication can be had upon the merits.
Compare Noecker v. Woods, 259 Pa. 160, 164, 165 ("The words, '. . . at the next succeeding session . . . and not oftener . . .' indicate a clear intention . . . that . . . acts are to be passed at definitely designated sessions . . ."). In Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 3-4 (note), 24, in the course of holding that only the specified session has the power ("after which said districts shall not be altered . . . except at a session . . . next after the completion of a census . . .") the court distinguished the many authorities to the contrary saying: "Our amendment is unique in two respects: first, it contains no language of command . . . but is, on the other hand, expressed in language of absolute prohibition; and secondly, the inclusion of the words 'if found necessary' emphasizes the absence of a duty." "The aim of all interpretation is to give effect to the dominating idea of the instrument.
As counsel for one of the defendant counties properly observes, such preliminary statistics have been adjudged adequate for the purpose of meeting the provision for apportionment "as nearly as may be" according to the number of inhabitants of each county. Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 103 A.2d 818 ( Sup. Ct. Err. 1954). It may be noted that our Constitution requires reapportionment after the "following census shall have been taken."
This Court, in Valenti v. Dempsey, 211 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D.Conn. 1962), held that "* * * under Baker v. Carr [ 369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663] * * * [plaintiff] is pressing a federal constitutional right; and if he is correct in his federal constitutional claim, the state constitutional limitation need not be construed as a bar, for no state limitation on legislative action can prevent relief which the Federal Constitution, as construed by the Supreme Court, requires." Accordingly, we rejected the claim that the Connecticut Senate could be redistricted only by the legislature next after the federal decennial census as provided in Article Third, Section 5, of the Connecticut Constitution, and we reaffirmed that holding in Butterworth v. Dempsey, supra at 760 n. 10: "We hold that the decision of the Supreme Court of Errors in Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 103 A.2d 818 (1954), cannot bar or delay prompt redistricting of the Senate to comply with federal constitutional requirements." And of course it is elemental that if we have the power to enjoin an election to the General Assembly pursuant to an unconstitutional plan of districting and apportionment, we certainly have the power to approve a special election pursuant to a constitutional redistricting and reapportionment and to allow such election at the earliest practicable date without delay because of state constitutional or statutory limitations.
This court has recognized that there are circumstances under which "[a] practical construction placed upon a constitutional provision immediately after its adoption and consistently and repeatedly followed ... for over a century thereafter is most persuasive." Snyder v. Newtown, 147 Conn. 374, 386, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299, 81 S.Ct. 692, 5 L.Ed. 2d 688 (1961) ; Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 14, 103 A.2d 818 (1954) (same); see also Board of Water Commissioners v. Curtis, 87 Conn. 506, 510–11, 89 A. 189 (1913) ("[I]f there was a practical construction of the provision given by the General Assemblies of the years immediately following 1818, in the forms which their legislation assumed, such contemporaneous construction would also furnish substantial aid to interpretation. This would be peculiarly so in the present instance, since during those years a considerable number of the members of the constitutional convention were members of the General Assembly, and among them were not a few who have held high place in public position and esteem as lawyers and judges.").
” (Citation omitted.) Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 14, 103 A.2d 818 (1954). As I discussed previously, statutes governing the administration of bail have provided for the setting of a bond to ensure the defendant's appearance since at least 1784.
" (Citation omitted.) Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 14, 103 A.2d 818 (1954). As I discussed previously, statutes governing the administration of bail have provided for the setting of a bond to ensure the defendant's appearance since at least 1784.
As a general matter, "[i]n dealing with constitutional provisions we must assume that infinite care was employed to couch in scrupulously fitting language a proposal aimed at establishing or changing the organic law of the state. Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 19, 103 A.2d 818; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th Ed.) p. 125. Unless there is some clear reason for not doing so, effect must be given to every part of and each word in the constitution.
Fundamental principles of constitutional interpretation require that "[e]ffect must be given to every part of and each word in our constitution . . . ." Cahill v. Leopold, 141 Conn. 1, 21, 103 A.2d 818 (1954); State v. Gethers, 197 Conn. 369, 386, 497 A.2d 408 (1985); Stolberg v. Caldwell, 175 Conn. 586, 597-98, 402 A.2d 763 (1978), appeal dismissed sub nom. Stolberg v. Davidson, 454 U.S. 958, 102 S.Ct. 496, 70 L.Ed.2d 374 (1981).